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Abstract 
The thesis considers an understudied form of third party peacemaking, namely peacemaking 
interventions with kin-state involvement. The main research question this thesis seeks to analyse 
is how local actors, their kin-states and third party peacemakers interact within the context of a 
peacemaking intervention for power-sharing in deeply divided societies. The literature on third 
party peacemaking largely neglects the role of kin-states in peacemaking, while in the literature on 
power-sharing the role of external actors, including kin-states, remains understudied. This thesis 
aims to address these gaps by investigating the recent peacemaking interventions for power-
sharing with kin-state involvement in Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The findings of the case 
studies are combined and assessed through the use of a five-level analytical framework, which 
includes the local actors level; the local actors-third party peacemaker level; the local actors-kin-
state(s) level; the third party peacemaker-kin-state(s) level; and the kin-states level. The analysis 
identifies a number of conditions pertinent to each of these levels which affect peacemaking 
interventions for power-sharing in deeply divided societies with kin-state involvement. There are 
two main original contributions of this thesis to the above mentioned literatures. First, it proposes 
a typology of kin-state involvement in peacemaking, which categorises kin-state involvement into 
four roles: promoter; quasi-mediator; power-broker; and enforcer. Second, through the use of 
game theoretical analysis, more specifically a nested games approach, it illustrates how the 
interaction between local actors, their kin-states and third party peacemakers can be modelled in 
the context of a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing. The empirical and theoretical 
conclusions of this study indicate that kin-state involvement in third peacemaking interventions is 
more complex and fluid than widely assumed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
On 16 August 2012, Kamil Hür, a 77 year old Turkish Cypriot pensioner, appeared to be the only 
Cypriot to mark the 52nd anniversary of Cyprus’s independence, by hanging the flags of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth in front of his 
house in the northern part of Cyprus’s divided capital, Nicosia.1 One of the reasons why Hür, who 
has been doing so for the last eight years, was alone marking the anniversary was that the island’s 
last power-sharing government, in the early 1960s, moved the official celebrations to 1 October, 
citing the sweltering heat of August. The other reasons, though, were all related to the island’s 
deeply divided society and politics. Anniversaries of the independence, whether in August or 
October, have always been low-key events on the island, whereas the Greek and Turkish 
independence days are more vigorously marked. Besides, the Turkish Cypriot northern part of the 
island, where Hür lives, has been a self-declared republic since 1983; and surprisingly, Turkish 
Cypriot police this year did not bother to confiscate Hür’s Republic of Cyprus flag. 
Politics of a deeply divided society is almost nowhere as bizarrely complicated as it has 
been in Cyprus. But the island is not in a league of its own, countries or territories with deeply 
divided societies can be found in most parts of the world. A list of countries or territories with 
deep social divisions would definitely include Afghanistan, Belgium, Bosnia, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, 
Kashmir, Kosovo, Lebanon, Macedonia, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka. Since 
all societies are divided in their own ways, it should be emphasised that these are “deeply” divided 
societies which are suffering from long running and intense social or ethnic divisions. The common 
characteristics of deeply divided societies have long been debated among scholars, and although it 
lies beyond the remit of this thesis, it is essential to posit and discuss some basic definitions of the 
term here. According to Nordlinger (1972, 9), a deeply divided society can be defined as follows: 
In short, a conflict is intense (or a society is deeply divided) when a large number of 
conflict group members attach overwhelming importance to the issues at stake, or 
manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions towards the opposing segment, 
or both.  
                                                          
1
 “Lone Turkish Cypriot marks Cyprus’ Independence”, Cyprus Mail, 18 August 2012, http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/breakaway-state/lone-turkish-cypriot-marks-cyprus-independence/20120818 (accessed 9/9/12). 
 
16 
 
Nordlinger (1972) also identifies violence and repression as possible consequences of the 
state of affairs in deeply divided societies.  His definition, though, remains somewhat incomplete 
as it does not specify what mainly differentiates deeply divided societies from others. Neither 
holding strongly antagonistic beliefs about some other segments of society nor the ensuing 
violence are necessarily inexistent in most societies. And many polities have managed to remain 
stable and relatively peaceful in spite of deep social divisions stemming from their history or 
socioeconomic structure, e.g. the United States. Guelke (2012, 32) points out that this is primarily 
because decision-making framework and its outcomes are widely accepted and respected in stable 
polities, whereas in deeply divided societies there is “… a lack of consensus on the framework for 
the making of decisions and a contested political process in which the legitimacy of outcomes is 
commonly challenged by political representatives of one of the segments.” 
However, not all deeply divided societies are unstable or violent, some have successfully 
established political systems based on power-sharing among opposing segments of the society. 
Power-sharing essentially entails management of the conflict through an elite led inter-segmental 
grand coalition government, in which all the segments are represented. Thus, the conflict could be 
managed and its negative consequences largely avoided. The power-sharing governments in some 
cases such as in the Netherlands and Austria proved so successful in ameliorating social divisions 
that they were no longer needed. The main obstacle preventing stability and peace in deeply 
divided societies is a societal security dilemma, which arises when one ethnic or religious 
community faces a distrustful other and one’s action to increase its own security is likely to be 
perceived by the other as a threat to its very existence (Sambanis 2000). In order to alleviate and 
manage this dilemma, negotiated peace settlements usually envisage political systems based on 
power-sharing between rival ethnic groups. Since the end of the Cold War negotiated settlements 
have become more common as a way of ending civil wars. Some suggest this phenomenon can be 
attributed to the fact that great powers now have fewer incentives to make sure that their side 
wins the conflict and therefore negotiated peace settlements are now more attractive to the 
warring groups (Licklider 1995; Hartzell 1999). According to Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), 
forty-one civil wars between 1945 and 1998 were concluded through negotiated settlements. 
They also claim that four conditions are proven to be crucial for a durable peace settlement: 
democracy as previous regime; a low intensity civil war which lasted for extended period of time; 
inclusion of provisions for the territorial autonomy of threatened groups; and security assurances 
to the warring parties by third parties. It has been also argued that proportional representation 
and communal autonomy, either as a combination or separately, increases the probability of 
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sustainable peace (Lijphart 1991; Binningsbo 2005). Moreover, third party peacemaking 
interventions in deeply divided societies are often predicated on the assumption that a power-
sharing regime should be established.  Peacemaking interventions in deeply divided societies are, 
therefore, often directed towards bringing about power-sharing settlements.2 Although this aspect 
of the intervention usually remains implicit, those interventions are essentially peacemaking 
interventions for power-sharing. 
Research Question 
In some cases of peacemaking interventions for power-sharing not only international actors but 
also kin-state(s) to one or more of the local groups to the conflict have been also directly or 
indirectly involved. A kin-state can be defined as a certain state whose dominant ethnic group has 
identified itself with a co-ethnic population beyond its borders. The role of kin-states and their 
dealings with their kin communities has only recently become a matter of international interest. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on kin-states is limited and kin-states’ involvement 
in peacemaking has been often ignored. Most studies on kin-state involvement in deeply divided 
societies look at kin-state-kin community interaction in terms of its effect on citizenship law or 
foreign policy of kin-state. Studies on the nature of kin-state-kin-community relationships and 
their dynamics are very few. Caspersen (2008) points out that the degree and form of kin-state 
involvement would vary between cases as well as over time, and that a unity of kin-state and local 
leadership should not be assumed. But there is no suggestion in her work on how this interaction 
could be theoretically modelled or whether there is any specific form of kin-state involvement in 
terms of peacemaking. In other words, kin-states’ role in peacemaking, whether negative or 
positive, remains understudied. 
Addressing this gap in the peacemaking literature constitutes a major interest of this 
thesis. The main research question which this thesis seeks to analyse is how local actors, their kin-
states and third party peacemakers interact within the context of a peacemaking intervention for 
power-sharing. This interactive process is not necessarily direct or explicit as it could be indirect 
and implicit through a number of means which could affect all actors’ positions and courses of 
action. The empirical and analytical findings gathered through the case studies of Cyprus, Bosnia 
and Northern Ireland regarding this interaction (or rather the multiplicity of interactions) will be 
                                                          
2
 For example, the UN’s six-person “Standby Team of Mediation” currently includes, in addition to one 
constitutions expert, a dedicated power-sharing expert. Source: United Nations (2012), “Department of 
Political Affairs: Standby Team of Mediation Experts”, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/standby_team (accessed 9/9/12). 
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combined and used towards building a theoretical framework for analysis of international 
peacemaking with kin-state involvement for power-sharing. Secondarily, this thesis engages in a 
comparative analysis of different approaches to power-sharing and their applications in deeply 
divided societies. The institutions and systems of power-sharing envisaged in the peace 
settlements for the three deeply divided societies will be examined, especially with respect to the 
roles envisaged for international actors and kin-states. 
The use of kinship as a concept in the thesis is limited to the international level as the 
focus is on interactions between state actors and communities who share kinship bonds across the 
borders. However, it should be noted that there is a broad literature on kinship which exists in 
other disciplines, primarily in anthropology and sociology, which looks at kinship at the level of 
relationships within and across families and kindred. As such micro level analysis is not undertaken 
for the purposes this research, the anthropological and sociological debates on kinship will not be 
covered. 
Case Selection and Methodology 
The empirical analysis in this thesis is based on the case studies of Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern 
Ireland. As mentioned earlier, a modest number of deeply divided societies could be identified. 
However, as this thesis investigates peacemaking interventions for power-sharing in deeply 
divided societies, particularly those with kin-states, the number of cases is not many. A crucial 
aspect of cross-case analysis is looking at relatively similar cases, at least in some ways, so that 
they could be comparable. Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland meet this requirement. They are 
all small or medium sized European countries or territories, albeit with different histories and 
regional contexts. The three have been recipients of international peacemaking interventions 
almost within the same decade, lasting from the early 1990s to the early 2004. There are also kin-
states with strong ties and involvement in the politics of these societies. Amongst the tree, two are 
qualified successes in terms of peacemaking and one is a failure. The 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement was the culmination of the negotiations (1991-1995) between the Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats and Serbs. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was the result of the negotiations (1996-1998) 
between the nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland, while the UN led 
negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities in Cyprus (1999-2004) 
ended in failure. Cyprus and Northern Ireland both also have a history of failed experiments with 
power-sharing. In short, the three cases are almost perfect candidates for a comparative analysis. 
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Comparative case study analysis is inherently problematic where the sample is limited to 
one or several case studies. The inferential reasoning from a sample, regarding the wider 
population of empirical cases, is a crucial premise of case study research. And success of such 
reasoning, by definition, depends on representativeness of the sample. The case selection 
methodology used in this thesis is “typical case approach” which, according to Gerring (2007, 91), 
seeks to “provide insight into a broader phenomenon” by studying one or more cases that are 
typical (i.e. representative) examples of some cross-case relationship. It is worth underscoring that 
representativeness cannot be fully achieved in any case study, but the “typicality” of the cases 
selected is required to be high relative to other cases (Ibid, 96). The three cases selected for 
analysis are similar in many ways and they represent a population of cases, which would, for 
instance, include India’s involvement in Sri Lanka as well as Russia’s engagement in Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and Armenia’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh. There are also dissimilarities between and 
across the selected cases and the population of cases, such as the complicated nature of Britain’s 
status in Northern Ireland in terms of kinship and sovereignty, which will be discussed in the 
Northern Ireland case study. Overall, however, the three selected cases are well-suited for theory 
building since the three also offer a good variety of observations for within-case analysis, both in 
terms of historical cases and multiplicity of actors involved. Case studies mostly focus on within-
case analysis, and a cross-case component is less common. The analysis in this thesis has both of 
these components: all the three cases are individually discussed and there is also a cross-case 
analysis combining the case study findings.  
Case study research is regarded as one of the most conducive methods to elucidate 
inferences about causal mechanisms –or pathways- in explaining political phenomena. Causal 
mechanisms are underlined as central to the idea of causality; and in any coherent account of 
causality, the relationship between cause and effect, particularly how the effects are exerted, 
needs to be specified (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 85). But what are causal mechanisms 
exactly? There are at least four distinct definitions of the causal mechanisms held by scholars: i) 
mechanisms as a cause of an outcome, ii) mechanisms as an intervening process, event, or 
variable, iii) mechanisms as an underspecified causal process, iv) mechanism as an unobserved  
entity that generates outcome (Mahoney 2003). The second definition seems the most apt for use 
in this study; and more precisely the one suggested by Bennett and George (1997, 1): “the 
processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal 
effects.” This understanding of causal mechanisms will provide analytical basis for exploration of 
the relationship between the nature of the settlement sought (i.e. power-sharing) and a 
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multiplicity of roles which can be assumed by third parties in their peacemaking interventions. 
Moreover, a specific method for cross-case comparison is also employed. That is the method of 
structured, focused comparison: 
The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. 
The method is “structured" in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide 
and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of 
the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused" in that it deals only with 
certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus 
apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases (George 
and Bennett 2004, 67). 
At the end of Chapter 3, this method will inform the development of a framework for 
analysis of international-kin-state intervention for power-sharing, which case study discussions will 
be built on. This framework will be created by formulating a series of questions on the basis of the 
discussion in Chapter 2 and 3. Another method used in this thesis is game theoretical analysis. The 
use of game theoretical analysis in the second half of Chapter 7 is for generating broadly 
applicable models. The conclusions drawn from the earlier discussions are translated into model 
games to demonstrate how kin-state involvement could be analysed in the context of 
international peacemaking interventions for power-sharing. The game theoretical analysis is thus 
complementary in the overall methodology of the thesis. 
The empirical research in this thesis draws on newspaper reports, memoirs of those 
involved, UN documents and reports, as well as many primary documents from the peacemaking 
processes studied. The wealth and availability of such sources have made this study possible 
without need to conduct interviews or any other fieldwork. Another reason for not conducting 
interviews was the sheer difficulty of doing this across the three cases with many actors involved 
in the peacemaking interventions either totally inaccessible (due to death) or not available for 
many other reasons. There is also a very extensive, both primary and scholarly, published 
literature on the conflicts in Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland, which suggests that fieldwork is 
not necessary, particularly as the primary aim of this project is conceptual: the identification of 
kin-states as mediating actors and some demarcation of their role in deeply divided societies. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that fieldwork would uncover many new facts of significance with respect 
to these cases. Furthermore, elite interviews, in particular, are prone to certain weaknesses such 
as defensiveness and hindsight on part of the interviewees – something which is especially true 
with regard to political controversy. A rigorous approach with data collection and analysis, 
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however, has been taken to compensate for the lack of fieldwork. The newspaper reports, which 
were gathered through the Lexis Nexis UK database and other means, have been crosschecked 
with the memoirs and the official documents and vice versa. The vast scholarly literatures on the 
conflicts in Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland have been extensively used. The many excellent 
histories and monographs of the conflicts were particularly helpful. 
At this stage, I also need to comment on my identity and its relationship to this research. I 
am a Turkish Cypriot who has been born and raised in Cyprus. The conflict in Cyprus is part of my 
history and present and therefore I am aware of the fact that I might have many preconceptions, 
and possibly a bias, which could undermine my analysis. As researchers, I believe we all have 
preconceptions or other similar issues, and what is rather dangerous is we often think we do not 
have any. For that reason, I sought to repeatedly question my assumptions on the conflict and 
took utmost interest in producing a balanced analysis. It was also a deliberate choice on my part to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the UN peacemaking process in Cyprus along with the two 
similar interventions in Bosnia and Northern Ireland, so that I can look at Cyprus through a 
common analytical framework rather than a specifically tailored one. 
The Argument and Structure of the Thesis 
By studying the peacemaking interventions for power-sharing with kin-state involvement in 
Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland, this thesis aims to reach empirical and theoretical findings, 
which it will draw on to conceptualise how local actors, their kin-states and third party 
peacemakers interact in the context of a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing. The core 
argument of this thesis is that kin-states could play significant roles in peacemaking interventions. 
As kin-states are often direct or indirect parties to the conflicts involving their kin, it is 
questionable whether kin-states’ role in peacemaking processes can be considered as mediation. 
The conceptual discussion on kin-state involvement in peacemaking in Chapter 3 will point out 
that mediation is done at many levels and in various forms and kin-states could act as quasi-
mediators. The fact that their role is not perceived impartial is likely to bring them certain 
advantages in their interactions with some local actors. However, the role of kin-states is also 
context-dependent and dynamic. An important determinant of the form of a kin-state’s 
involvement in peacemaking is its wider international interests, including its relationships with 
other kin-state(s) and third party peacemakers, and therefore where third party peacemakers and 
kin-states are cooperating, a power-sharing settlement in the deeply divided society would 
become more likely. This thesis offers a number of theoretical conclusions and engages in theory 
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building on those matters. Most notably, it proposes a typology which categorises kin-state 
involvement in peacemaking into four roles: promoter; quasi-mediator; power-broker; and 
enforcer. Such conceptualisation of kin-state involvement in peacemaking is an original 
contribution to the literature, which further research and theoretical development investigating 
this understudied form of peacemaking could be built on. 
This Introduction is followed by Chapter 2, which looks at power-sharing in deeply divided 
societies. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to review the literature on power-sharing theory in 
order to identify what roles, if any, are envisaged for external actors, including kin-states, in the 
making and functioning of power-sharing regimes. The chapter initially discusses Lijphartian 
consociationalism, the original and most prevalent model of power-sharing. Its analysis points out 
that that there is no role for external actors provided in the Lijphartian consociationalism. The 
same is true for the subsequent refinements to consociational theory. There is no mention of the 
role of external actors in the favourable conditions suggested by Lijphart either. The latter half of 
Chapter 2 posits the main alternative approaches to power-sharing and provides a comparative 
overview of the power-sharing approaches. The chapter concludes that the role of third party 
actors, particularly kin-states, is understudied. 
Chapter 3 investigates the broadly defined literature on international intervention. First, it 
reviews the literature on third party peacemaking in terms of core issues and concepts in 
mediation. It suggests that power-mediation is likely to be more conducive to peacemaking for 
power-sharing and collective mediation is often incoherent and ineffective. The existing literature 
on kin-states is then analysed, and quasi-mediation is identified as a possible role for kin-states in 
peacemaking. Subsequently, the wider context of international intervention in the post-Cold War 
era and the shift of focus from peacekeeping and peacemaking to peacebuilding and statebuilding 
are discussed. The liberal peace paradigm, which conceptually underpins the post-Cold War era 
interventionism, and its critiques are also overviewed. This is followed with a discussion on a post-
liberal peace and whether kin-states could play a role in hybridisation of liberal peace blueprints. 
Chapter 3 concludes with formulation of a framework for analysis, which is going to be used for 
structuring the case study analyses. 
Chapter 4 looks at the 1999-2004 UN peacemaking intervention for power-sharing in 
Cyprus. It initially discusses the history and the main dimensions of the conflict. Then, the 
dynamics behind the emergence of the Annan Plan, the UN blueprint for a Cyprus settlement, is 
investigated. This is followed with an analysis of the role of Turkey, as a kin-state, in regenerating 
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the process in 2002. Subsequently, the finalisation of the Annan Plan, its contents, and its rejection 
in the referenda are studied. As for kin-state involvement, the chapter argues that Turkey as a kin-
state first engaged in quasi-mediation and then sought to assume a more coercive role vis-à-vis 
the Turkish Cypriots within the context of peacemaking process in Cyprus. However, the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships were often not genuinely interested in a settlement and 
the UN mediation ultimately ended in failure. The chapter demonstrates that a power-sharing 
settlement cannot be achieved solely through the efforts of a third party peacemaker and 
consistent and considerable kin-state involvement is also necessary. Chapter 5 is on the 
international peacemaking interventions in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 war. The chapter first 
focuses on the collective mediation processes, which all failed in bringing about a settlement. The 
latter half of the chapter looks at the American mediation in the conflict, as well as the Dayton 
Peace Agreement and its implementation. It specifically points out how the kin-state leaderships 
played enforcement roles with regard to their kin groups in their implicit alliance with the US 
mediation team to bring about a power-sharing settlement. The findings of Chapter 5 also indicate 
that kin-states’ policies towards their kin groups could be substantially manipulated by the third 
peacemakers through the use of international policy and sanctions, and that collective mediation 
is less effective than power mediation led by a state actor. Chapter 6 analyses the Anglo-Irish 
peacemaking process in the Northern Ireland conflict. The chapter begins with an overview of the 
conflict and subsequently discusses the British-Irish intergovernmental cooperation towards a 
settlement over the years, the 1996-1998 all-party negotiations, the Good Friday Agreement and 
its implementation. The chapter’s findings show that the two governments were the actual 
mediators in the conflict, and the role of the official mediators was secondary in the process 
leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The findings thus highlight that kin-states led 
quasi-mediation can be very effective. 
Chapter 7 combines and analyses the findings of the case studies through a five-level 
framework, which incorporates all the interactions between local actors, kin-states and third party 
peacemakers. The framework includes all the levels of interactions in a peacemaking intervention 
for power-sharing with kin-state involvement: the local actors level; the local actors-third party 
peacemaker level; the local actors-kin-state(s) level; the third party peacemaker-kin-state(s) level; 
and the kin-states level. This framework is broadly applicable to analysis of similar peacemaking 
interventions for power-sharing. The chapter provides a number of theoretical conclusions 
pertinent to each of the five levels. It also suggests a typology of kin-states’ involvement in 
peacemaking, which conceptualises kin-states’ involvement into four roles: promoter; quasi-
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mediator; power-broker; and enforcer. The chapter finally uses game theoretical analysis, 
specifically a nested games approach, and illustrates how kin-state involvement in peacemaking 
for power-sharing could be modelled. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Power-sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: 
Consociationalism and its Alternatives 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As noted in the Introduction, power-sharing is often regarded as an ideal political settlement for 
deeply divided societies. However, there is no one formulation or conceptualisation of power-
sharing; instead there are a number of power-sharing models suggested. Amongst competing 
models of power-sharing, consociationalism has long been the dominant paradigm for political 
settlements in deeply divided societies. This chapter points out that the power-sharing literature 
has long focused on a few questions, such as what form of power-sharing is more conducive to 
stability and under which conditions certain forms of power-sharing could be introduced. As this 
literature often assumes that negotiation and functioning of power-sharing would be an 
endogenous process, the involvement of certain external actors like kin-states in these processes 
is largely ignored. The main reason for this omission seems to stem from the fact that power-
sharing has been first conceptualised within the context of a small number of European 
consociational democracies. Those Western European societies, as will be discussed below, have 
been often more stable and relatively less divided than deeply divided societies in general. 
Moreover, since the end of the Second World War, the emergence of the European Union and a 
peaceable system for the resolution of disputes in Western Europe have seemingly reduced the 
politicisation of these conflicts and concealed the role played by kin-states or external actors. This, 
however, is not the case in much of the world. 
The chapter ultimately seeks to identify what is specifically ignored in the power-sharing 
literature with respect to third party and kin-state involvement. Such gaps identified in power-
sharing theory in this chapter will be further discussed in Chapter 3, and eventually addressed in 
Chapter 7 on the basis of the empirical findings from the case studies. In terms of its structure, the 
chapter first looks at the original formulation of consociationalism, which is also the first 
theoretical conceptualisation of power-sharing. This is followed with an analysis of favourable 
conditions for consociationalism. Consociationalism’s fundamental critiques and their alternatives 
to consociationalism are also assessed. The latter part of the chapter offers a comparative analysis 
of consociationalism with respect to its three alternatives– centripetalism (integrative), complex 
power-sharing and power dividing approaches. 
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2.2. Lijphartian Consociationalism 
The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart’s 1969 article, “Consociational Democracy”, is widely 
regarded as the first theoretical formulation of power-sharing. However, Lijphart (2008, 3) points 
out that he first outlined the concept in his monograph on the politics of the Netherlands, and 
then in his study on typologies of democratic systems, in which he used the term “consociational”, 
which he borrowed from Apter’s (1961) study of Uganda.3 Lijphart (1969; 1977; 1985; 2008) also 
acknowledges that the term itself can be traced back to the writings of Johannes Althusius in the 
17th century, used in its Latin form “consociatio”,4 and that the general concept was first 
introduced by Lewis (1965) in his study of Western African politics, Politics in West Africa. Gerhard 
Lehmbruch’s (1967) study on “Proportional Democracy” has been also identified as another earlier 
and theoretically similar work to Lijphart’s 1969 article (Lijphart 1969; Andeweg 2000). 
Notwithstanding the fact that there are similar studies that preceded him, Lijphart is often seen as 
the pioneer and foremost theoretician of consociationalism. And this is mainly because his studies 
have long advocated a certain form of power-sharing, which I call Lijphartian consociationalism, 
and generated a fierce debate among power-sharing theorists. 
The main claim of Lijphartian consociationalism is that there is a distinct kind of 
democracy that is both socially fragmented and stable. That is “consociational democracy”, 
through which the elites of rival communities in a socially fragmented society engage in 
cooperative behaviour, instead of sustaining the competition which would lead to political 
instability (Lijphart 1969). Thus the country, Lijphart argues, achieves a high degree of political 
stability on contrary to the expectations based on its social heterogeneity. Lijphart (1969) suggests 
that the grand coalition cabinet is the most common, if not the only possible, political solution for 
a fragmented society, and that the basic component of consociational democracy is not any 
particular institutional arrangement but the deliberate and joint effort by the elites to stabilise the 
system (Lijphart 1969, 213). But in his subsequent and comprehensive study on the subject, 
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Lijphart (1977) claims that there are 
four main institutional characteristics of consociational democracies: the grand coalition principle; 
mutual veto rights for the segments; the proportionality principle in public employment and 
resource allocation; and the segmental autonomy principle. The empirical analysis underpinning 
Lijphart’s (1977) formulation is mostly drawn from the historical experiences of Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. Although all these countries were historically divided 
                                                          
3
 The studies Lijphart refers to are, respectively, Lijphart (1968a) and Lijphart (1968b). 
4
 “Consociatio” means associating or association in Latin. 
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societies, their politics, for the most part, have not been as fractious as those of deeply divided 
societies; for instance, none of them has been through any militarised civil conflict in their recent 
history. In other words, it could be said that Lijphart’s analysis focuses on the experiences of 
divided societies rather than deeply divided ones. 
2.3. The Institutions of Consociationalism 
This section provides an overview of the four main institutions of consociationalism as originally 
envisaged by Lijphart (1977), which will be followed with a discussion of some refinements to the 
original consociationalism suggested both by Lijphart and some other scholars. As most deeply 
divided societies tend to adopt power-sharing frameworks predicated on the one suggested by 
Lijphart, a discussion of these institutions is essential for underpinning the discussion in this 
chapter and the subsequent chapters. 
2.3.1. Grand Coalition 
According to Lijphart (1977, 25-31), grand coalition is the primary characteristic of consociational 
power-sharing and can be defined as a coalition that incorporates leaders of all significant 
segments in a plural society.5 Its complete opposite is known as the British model,6 where there is 
usually a bare majority government and a large opposition. The British system is based on the 
assumption that there are some voters that are likely to swing between parties from one election 
to another so other party or parties can come to power. But in plural societies political parties are 
mostly divided along the ethnic lines, and therefore minorities are very unlikely to become 
majorities to have governments and oppositions alternate. The most problematic aspect of the 
British model for plural societies is that it entails that decisions are to be made by a bare majority. 
And since most issues would be very divisive in plural societies, making decisions under majority 
rule is very likely to destabilise the whole political system (Lijphart 1977, 25-31).  
The institutional arrangements for translating the grand coalition principle into practice 
vary from one consociational democracy to another. In the case of Switzerland, the Federal 
Council, the seven member executive body of the country, is by tradition composed of the 
representatives of the main political parties, and also there should be an equal representation of 
the different regions and the languages. Meanwhile, in Belgium and the Netherlands the grand 
cabinet principle is not used for the executive body, although most of the Dutch and Belgian 
                                                          
5
 When Lijphart (1977, 3-4) speaks of plural society, he refers to the definition of Eckstein (1966, 34): “a 
society that is divided by segmental cleavages, which are politically salient and can be of religious, 
ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature.” This is quite similar to the definitions of a 
deeply divided society which I discussed in the Introduction. 
6
 Although Lijphart prefers to call it “the British model”, it is more widely known as the Westminster model. 
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cabinets are coalitions which are larger than required minimal size. In these two countries, 
however, decision-making powers on some significant issues are delegated to grand coalitions in 
other organs which are permanent or ad hoc grand councils; those are formally advisory bodies, 
but in practice they play a decisive role. For example, the Dutch Social and Economic Council, 
which is in effect an economic parliament, is one of the most prominent examples of such councils 
(Lijphart 1977, 31-33). In short, in parliamentary consociational power-sharing systems grand 
coalitions are not necessarily coalition cabinets. But could the grand coalition principle be 
incorporated into the presidential system? As the presidential system is based on the dominance 
of a single leader in the executive arm of the government, ways in which the segments of a deeply 
divided society are to be represented might seem limited. Lijphart (1977, 158-161) points out 
there are examples like the 1960-63 Cypriot power-sharing system, which required that the 
President and the Vice-President, who both had veto powers, to be separately elected by the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. 
 
2.3.2. Mutual Veto  
Lijphart (1977, 36-38) argues that participation in a grand coalition offers an important means to 
minority segments to participate in decision-making but, in practice, only a minority veto can 
provide the minority segment or segments a complete guarantee. If decisions in a grand coalition 
are to be made under majority rule, minority’s influence is very much likely to remain limited. 
Therefore, in consociational power-sharing regimes a minority veto, either written in the 
constitution or informally agreed, is seen as an essential supplement to the grand coalition 
principle in order to protect minority’s interests. However, the minority veto could also lead to a 
tyranny of minority. Lijphart (1977, 37) claims there are three reason why this will not necessarily 
be the case. First, the veto is a mutual one that all segment possess thus it can be used by other 
segments too. Second, the existence of veto as a potential weapon gives its holder a feeling of 
security which in return makes its actual use improbable. Third, each segment would understand 
that an unrestrained use of veto is likely to bring about a deadlock thus the segments are likely to 
counteract against this possibility by being more conciliatory to each other. It is very unlikely that 
those assumptions would be shared by every social segment in a consociational system. This is the 
most significant weakness of Lijphartian consociationalism: there is no mechanism envisaged to 
prevent individual segments from blocking the whole system. 
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2.3.3. Proportionality 
The proportionality principle, like the mutual veto, is a complementary instrument to achieve full 
participation of all segments in the government. It applies to civil service appointment and 
financial resource allocation; therefore it is quite instrumental in solving the major problem of any 
political system, which is how the “spoils” of government to be shared among the social segments. 
Moreover, the proportionality principle simplifies how the segments will be represented in a grand 
coalition by stipulating that they should be represented proportionally. It also entails a 
proportional electoral system, which will translate each party’s voting strength into parliamentary 
seats as faithfully as possible (Ibid, 38-39). 
The proportional representation of segments in parliament, and in the other decision 
making bodies, however, does not solve the question of how issues that are dichotomous by 
nature can be tackled. Lijphart (1977, 39-40) suggest that there are two possible solutions: 
logrolling is one of the ways to resolve this dilemma, and the other solution is delegating it to the 
top leaders of the segments. Delegation of decision to the top leaders inevitably leads to the 
concentration of power into the hands of a few. The positive aspect of the top level decision 
making is that small group can be more intimate and secretive and therefore more likely to reach a 
deal. There are also two kinds of distorted applications of the proportionality rule. These are 
deliberate overrepresentation of small segments, and parity of representation. When a plural 
society is divided into two segments of unequal size, parity becomes an almost inescapable option 
to have a meaningful power-sharing (Ibid, 41). 
 
2.3.4. Segmental Autonomy and Federalism 
Lijphart (1977, 41) defines segmental autonomy as the rule of minority over itself in the area of 
minority’s exclusive concern. Its premise rests on the grand coalition principle: the grand coalition 
principle suggests that decisions that are concerning all segments should be made collectively; 
therefore it is a logical corollary that decisions solely concerning each social segment should be 
individually made by segments. Lijphart (1977, 42) also sees federalism as a special form of 
segmental autonomy and claims that:  
As a theory, federalism has a few significant parallels with consociational theory: not only 
the granting of autonomy to constituent parts of the state, which is its most important 
feature, but also the overrepresentation of the smaller subdivisions in the federal 
“chamber”. Federal theory can therefore be regarded as a limited and special type of 
consociational theory. 
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Thus, federalism offers an efficient and practical way of implementing segmental 
autonomy, particularly where each segment is territorially concentrated in a plural society. But 
there is an important aspect of segmental autonomy, either through federalism or not, which is 
not taken into account by Lijphart: how to determine what issues are specifically concerns for 
social segments. In federal polities this issue often remains contentious for the reason that it is 
almost impossible to envisage and apportion all jurisdictions among local and federal 
governments; and even if such jurisdictions were agreed in advance, it would inevitably run into 
problems in practice. An arbitration mechanism is therefore needed, and this role is often 
assumed by federal or national constitutional courts, which plays a much more significant role 
than their counterparts in non-consociational systems. However, Lijphart does not seem to 
recognise this feature of consociational democracies and makes no reference to such bodies. A 
possible explanation is that he sees grand coalition as the mechanism through which most 
jurisdictional disagreements would be settled, but although that may appear plausible for 
Lijphart’s plural societies, it seems unlikely in the context of deeply divided societies. 
 
2.4. Refining Consociationalism 
Some subsequent refinements to consociational theory have been proposed both by Lijphart and 
other scholars. Lijphart (2008, 4), while explaining why he chose to republish his article on Indian 
consociationalism in Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and 
Practice, which is a collection of his studies, sums up his current perspective on the four main 
characteristics as follows: 
Compared with my writings of the late 1960s, I made five significant improvements. One 
was to define consociational democracy in terms of four basic characteristics – grand 
coalition, cultural autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto – listed in the first 
paragraph of the India article and discussed at length later on. Only the first of these was 
extensively discussed in my 1969 article. Second, I now usually make a distinction between 
primary and secondary characteristics: grand coalition and autonomy are the most crucial, 
whereas the other two occupy somewhat lower position of importance. Third, I now 
always emphasize the fact that all four consociational features can assume quite different 
forms but, at the same time, that these different forms do not work equally well and are 
not equally to be recommended to multi-ethnic and multi ethnic societies that are trying 
to establish consociational institutions. 
  
 This statement shows that Lijphart has somewhat loosened his original theoretical 
framework. A comparison of some of his earlier studies to more recent ones also confirms this. For 
instance, Lijphart (1996, 261-262) argues that there is an informal veto in the Indian system and 
tries to substantiate his claim by citing a case where minority veto allegedly occurred. Accordingly, 
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in India the Muslim minority succeeded in vetoing a decision of the Supreme Court, concerning the 
community’s personal law, by persuading the government to pass another law repealing the 
court’s judgement. Whereas in his guidelines for consociationalism in South Africa, Lijphart (1985, 
81) notes that there should be a minority veto available to even relatively small groups, which 
provides an absolute veto on the most fundamental issues, such as cultural autonomy, in addition 
to a suspensive one non-fundamental questions. 
Refinements to consociationalism, however, are not only suggested by Lijphart himself. 
McGarry and O’Leary (2006a) have proposed a typology of consociations in terms of the support 
they have across segments. 
In fact, we may usefully distinguish ‘unanimous consociations’ (grand coalitions), 
‘concurrent coalitions’ (in which executive has a majority support in each significant 
segment), and ‘weak consociations’ (where the executive may have only a plurality level of 
support among one or more segments). By contrast, consociations become undemocratic 
when elites govern with merely factional or less levels of support within and across their 
communities. Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2001 operated intermittently as a 
concurrent consociation, and sometimes looked like a weak consociation – because of a 
lack of majority support among unionists, though it had plurality support for much of the 
time (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a, 62-63). 
 
  McGarry and O’Leary’s theoretical contribution, or conceptual refinement as they call it, is 
empirically based on the Northern Ireland case. If one is to agree that none of Lijphart’s original 
cases (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland) have ever been deeply divided like 
Northern Ireland, the suggested typology of consociations becomes an even more valuable 
contribution to consociational theory with respect to deeply divided societies. In short, a grand 
coalition that incorporates all political parties may not be feasible in deeply divided societies, but 
there are other lesser forms of grand coalition that could be employed instead.  However, each of 
these attempts to revise Lijphart’s original work – both his own revisions and those of others – 
continues to assume that the divided society is contained within the borders of the state.  What 
none of these conceptual refinements consider is the involvement of kin-states and other third 
party actors in deeply divided societies. 
 
2.5. The Favourable Conditions Debate: Ripe for Consociational 
Democracy? 
Both the explanatory and predictive power of consociational theory can be improved by 
identifying the conditions – both internal and external – that are favourable to building 
consociational regimes. Lijphart (1968) posits a few favourable conditions for consociational 
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democracy, but Lijphart (1977, 53-103) provides an extensive discussion on favourable conditions. 
However, his conditions are, once again, those internal to the state in question thus limiting the 
explanatory power of his analysis in cases where the conflict is internationalised and kin-states 
play a role. Lijphart’s conditions are briefly introduced below to provide a basis for further 
discussion and criticism. 
 
2.5.1. The Balance of Power 
A multiple balance of power is a favourable condition for consociational democracy, because in a 
case of dual balance of power the leaders of rival segments may seek to win a majority and 
dominate over the minority. The notion of balance of power, according to Lijphart (1977, 55-56), 
consists of two elements: a balance or approximate equilibrium among the segments; and the 
existence of at least three segments. Moreover, Lijphart (1977, 56) contends that, as cooperation 
and negotiations among segments would become more difficult, the presence of a relatively few 
number of segments, such as three or four, constitutes a more favourable condition than the case 
of a large number of segments. 
 
2.5.2. Multiparty Systems 
A multiparty system is also identified as a favourable condition for consociational democracy. 
Lijphart claims that in plural societies with free elections segmental political parties can act as 
representatives of their segments. Likewise, segmental political parties work as a method of 
selecting segmental leaders for participation in grand coalition. Amongst multiparty systems, a 
moderate multiparty system is regarded as the most favourable. Lijphart does not propose an 
optimum number of political parties to differentiate a moderate multiparty system from an 
extreme multiparty system, and instead discusses Sartori’s criterion. According to Lijphart (1977, 
61-65), earlier Sartori defines moderate party systems as one in which relevant parties are not 
more than four but later Sartori defines the moderate system as one with three, four, or at most 
five relevant parties.7 
 
2.5.3. Small Country Size 
All European consociational democracies are small countries in terms of their population. Lijphart 
(1977) argues that the explanation for this empirical observation lies with both direct and indirect 
                                                          
7
 A party is considered relevant either when it has a coalition or blackmailing potential (Lijphart 1977, 62). 
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effects of small size: smallness directly enhances the spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation 
among the segmental elites, and indirectly it entails better chances for consociational democracy 
since smaller countries have lesser burdens of decision-making and thus are easier to govern by 
virtue of their size. There is also an external direct effect of smallness: small countries are more 
likely to feel threatened by external factors and thus vulnerability and insecurity may lead to a 
stronger internal solidarity. For instance, consociationalism in both Austria and the Netherlands 
came into being under international emergency situations, respectively under the Allied 
occupation in the immediate aftermath of the World War II and during the World War I. However, 
there is a qualification to this external threat argument: Lijphart (1977, 67) concurs with 
Lehmbruch (1975) that when the internal divisions between the segments correspond with 
international lines of conflict, the international threat factor could work against consociationalism. 
 
2.5.4. Crosscutting Cleavages 
The ways in which various cleavages cut across each other is crucially important for the chances of 
consociational democracy for two reasons. First, crosscutting cleavages can alter the balance of 
power among the segments by affecting the numbers and the relative sizes of the segments. 
Second, crosscutting can have important consequences for the intensity of feelings produced by 
the cleavages; crosscutting entails cross-pressures that lead to moderate behaviour. The extent to 
which various cleavages cut across the socioeconomic cleavage is particularly important since if 
two cleavages tend to coincide, rather than cross cut, one of the groups is very likely to feel 
resentment over its inferior economic status (Lijphart 1977, 75). The intensities of crosscutting 
cleavages are also important, and the crosscutting of cleavages of equal intensity could lead to the 
formation of too many groups which see each other antagonistic terms and are unlikely to 
cooperate (Lijphart, 1977, 81). 
 
2.5.5. Overarching Loyalties 
 Divisive effect of the cleavages can be mitigated by overarching loyalties. The interaction of 
cleavages and overarching loyalties can produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular 
segments. For instance, the class cleavage has not fragmented the Catholic and Calvinist segments 
in the Netherlands, and this has been explained by religious bonds. More importantly, a much 
bigger role is played by overarching loyalties if they provide cohesion for the entire society. 
Nationalism is potentially one of such cohesive forces; but Lijphart (1977, 82) notes that it can also 
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be an additional cleavage when it invokes allegiance to a nation that is not concurrent with the 
state. 
 
2.5.6. Representative Party Systems 
This favourable condition relates to the relationship between party system cleavages to the other 
main cleavages. Lijphart’s (1977, 84-85) analysis points out that the party system cleavages tend to 
coincide with religious cleavages, to coincide partly and crosscut partly with the class cleavage, 
and to crosscut almost perfectly with the linguistic cleavage. However, in Belgium the linguistic 
cleavage is not translated into party cleavages, which, according to Lijphart (1977, 86), leads to 
ineffective organization of linguistic demands and makes the issue more difficult to tackle. 
 
2.5.7. Segmental Isolation and Federalism 
Segmental isolation provides the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and thus limiting potential 
antagonisms between the segments. The segmental isolation argument is at odds with the widely 
held opinion that mutual contacts between different people and groups can lead to mutual 
understanding. Lijphart (1977, 88) claims that mutual contacts can lead to mutual understanding 
in relatively homogenized societies, but are likely to lead strain and hostility in plural societies. 
Territorial federalism, where different segments live under different political units, is one form of 
segmental autonomy. Federalism appears as an important factor in explaining stability of 
Switzerland, which consists of mostly homogenous cantons, and Belgium has evolved towards 
becoming a territorial federation. 
 
2.5.8. Traditions of Elite Accommodation 
The prior existence of a tradition of elite accommodation is a favourable condition for 
consociational democracy. Lijphart (1977) agrees with Daalder’s (1971) call for emphasizing the 
importance of the tradition of elite accommodation, especially in Switzerland the Netherlands. 
However, Lijphart (1977, 99-103) claims that in the four European cases studied the 
accommodationist tradition argument can not entirely replace his self-negating prophecy 
argument, which suggests that elites choose to cooperate because they see the potential harms of 
not doing so. In short, accommodationist tradition and the occurrence of self-negating prophecy 
are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
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2.5.9. Recent Formulation 
As noted above, Lijphart (2008) emphasises that his article on Indian consociationalism is his latest 
and finest statement on consociational theory. In that article, Lijphart (1996, 262-263) lists nine 
factors that may favour or hinder consociationalism. According to that latest formulation, the 
most serious obstacle to power-sharing in divided societies is the presence of a solid majority that 
prefers majority rule to consociationalism. The second most important factor is the absence or 
presence of large socio-economic differences among the groups of a divided society and the third 
factor is the number of groups: if there are too many groups, the negotiations among them will be 
extremely difficult. The fourth factor is the roughly equal size of groups which means there is a 
balance of power between them. The fifth factor suggests that relatively small population leads 
less-complex decision-making and thus better chances for consociationalism. The sixth factor 
claims that external dangers promote internal unity, and the seventh stipulates that overarching 
loyalties, such as nationalism, reduces the strength of particularistic loyalties. The eight regards 
federalism useful in promoting group autonomy, if groups are geographically concentrated. 
Finally, the ninth posits that traditions of compromise and accommodation foster 
consociationalism. 
2.5.10. Is the Presence of Favourable Conditions Necessary for Consociationalism? 
The debate over favourable conditions for consociational democracy is one of the most contested 
parts of consociational theory, and both status of the favourable conditions within the theory and 
the favourable conditions have long been debated.8 The suggestion of different sets of favourable 
conditions by Lijphart over the years have been critiqued by many who argued that those 
conditions are inductively formulated on an ad hoc basis, which limits their theoretical value and 
wider applicability.9 
An early critic of the favourable conditions, Pappalardo (1981) argues that only two 
conditions appear favourable after a rigorous analysis; those two enduringly favourable conditions 
are inter-subcultural stability and elite predominance over their segment. On the other hand, 
Bogaards (1998, 488) claims that Lijphart’s strong belief in the possibility of elite led consociational 
engineering relegates favourable factors to a rather ambivalent position within the theory: 
Lijphart’s view on the status of the favourable factors can be traced to the voluntarist 
approach toward elite behaviour in consociational theory. Lijphart reasons that politicians, 
if they so desire, can change the course of a country in a self-negating prediction. Hence 
                                                          
8
 Bogaards (1998, 478) compiles the different lists of favourable conditions suggested by Lijphart up to 1985 
in a table. An updated version of that table, with the addition of Lijphart’s 1996 list, can be found in 
Appendix A. 
9
 See, among others, Andeweg (2000); Steiner (1981); Bogaards (1998); and Pappalardo (1981). 
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Lijphart’s (1977:223-228) plea for consociational engineering. This voluntarism reduces 
the predictive value of the favourable factors to a minimum since in the end it is about the 
will of the elites. In this elite centred approach, the favourable factors are conditional 
variables on elite decisions, not on consociational democracy itself. The term conditions is 
in this context less appropriate, since it can be read as the incorrect ‘requirements’ and as 
the correct and neutral ‘factors’. Lijphart uses the terms ‘factors’ and conditions 
interchangeably, but distinguished them explicitly from ‘preconditions’ and 
‘requirements’. 
 
Andeweg (2000) also critiques Lijphart’s favourable conditions along the same lines and 
suggests that the correlation between “supposedly” favourable conditions and consociationalism 
needs to be tested further by employing a larger sample of both cases of success and failure. 
Andeweg’s call for further research on favourable conditions will be taken up in this thesis by 
examining the conditions in cases studied to identify which favourable conditions, if any, were 
present. As pointed out by Bogaards above, Lijphart views favourable conditions not as 
preconditions, therefore he does not suggest they are necessary for consociationalism. 
Identification and confirmation of the favourable conditions for consociationalism remains an 
important task for power-sharing theorists. This task becomes an even more important one in the 
context of deeply divided societies, because there are often third party actors involved and their 
intervention could benefit from knowing the favourable conditions. Indeed, a core objective of 
third party intervention is to identify positive and negative conditions for resolution of the conflict.  
However, the absence of conditions related to the relationships between kin-states, other third 
parties and local actors suggest that the list of favourable conditions is, at best, incomplete. 
Further analysis on the favourable conditions, drawing on my case study findings, will be offered in 
Chapter 7. 
2.6. Fundamental Critiques and their Alternatives 
There have been many critiques of consociationalism, which can be broadly divided into two 
categories. The first category can be called fundamental critiques as they question the empirical 
and theoretical underpinnings of consociational theory, and often propose some theoretical 
solutions which fundamentally differ from power-sharing. The second category can be named 
alternative models of power-sharing; such critiques of consociationalism are directed at the 
theory’s wider applicability and durability, and some other forms of power-sharing are suggested 
instead. The fundamental critiques will be discussed below, and the alternative approaches will be 
reviewed in the next section. 
Early critiques of consociationalism focused on the original four European consociational 
cases and claimed that the political systems of those countries were not as consociational as it was 
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widely accepted. Barry (1975a), for example, examines the Swiss case, using the empirical analysis 
provided in Jürg Steiner’s (1981) book Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict 
Resolution in Switzerland, and argues that Steiner’s empirical evidence, in fact, indicates that 
Switzerland is not a consociational democracy. 
 
In short, then, we may say: (i) if we give full weight to the potentialities of the referendum 
and the popular initiative, it is highly doubtful whether the decision-making system in 
Switzerland can be said to be preponderantly one of ‘amicable agreement’ or ‘elite 
accommodation’; and (2) there is no evidence that there is a low level of consensus 
between members of the subsequent groups, so even if we allowed that the system were 
one of ‘amicable agreement’ this would not be necessary to explain the low level of 
intersubcultural hostility. These two points show clearly that Swiss politics do not fit the 
model of ‘consociational democracy’ (Barry, 1975a, 488). 
 
In the case of Austria (1945-1962), Barry does not challenge that there was 
consociationalism. According to Barry (1975a, 498-499), the absence of a consociational grand 
coalition would not have made a difference because the country’s post-war elites were already 
restrained due to low level of hostility amongst the different segments of the public. Barry thus 
reverses Lijphart’s claim that consociationalism is an elite-led process for conflict management by 
pointing out that the public was a restraining influence Austria. In other words, Barry sees 
consociationalism in Austria as an unnecessary political invention, as opposed to Lijphart’s view 
that consociationalism was essential in managing the conflict in Austrian society. 
Moreover, Barry (1975a, 502-503) suggests that divisions based on ethnic identity are 
more likely to be resistant to consociational management. His claims is mainly based on his 
assumption that ethnic groups are less amenable to elite initiatives, and that disputes stemming 
from religious or class divisions relates to the question of how the country should be run but 
ethnic divisions mostly derives from the question of whether the country should exist at all. 
Barry’s critique is not limited with two cases of consociationalism and the distinction that should 
be made between ethnic, and religious or class based conflicts. Barry (1975b) questions the wider 
applicability of consociationalism and argues against the imposition of consociationalism through 
constitutional design, for instance, in Canada or Northern Ireland. 
 
It is one thing for the leaders of a number of parties to decide that stability requires them 
to join in an ‘oversized’ government. It is another thing altogether if the constitution 
requires them to join in an ‘oversized’ government or have no government at all. The 
second is a recipe for instability because it means that any group of people (whether 
represented in parliament or not) who want to bring down the regime know that all they 
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have to do to achieve their end is to make an ‘oversized’ government unworkable (Barry, 
1975b, 409-410). 
 
In sum, Barry (1975a; 1975b) argues that in the cases of Austria and Switzerland there is 
no unambiguous empirical support for consociationalism, the applicability of the theory is only 
limited to religious or class based conflicts and its constitutional imposition would not bring 
stability. The last two claims, particularly, need scrutiny because persistent conflicts, especially in 
deeply divided societies, are often ethnic and some form of power-sharing is usually regarded as 
the best political solution to them.  
If power-sharing, consociational or not, is not applicable to ethnic conflicts, how could 
such conflicts be resolved or managed then? Lustick (1979) argues that consociationalism is not 
the only theoretical explanation to stability in deeply divided societies and that it is one of the two 
theoretical approaches. The other approach is what Lustick calls control. Lustick (1979, 330) 
defines control as a model where the stability in a vertically segmented society is achieved through 
manipulation of subordinated segment(s) by a superordinate segment.10 Moreover, Lustick (1979, 
336) claims that consociationalism may lead to chaos, thus stability through control should be 
preferred in deeply divided societies: 
 
Much of the energy invested in consociational approaches is drawn from a normative 
concern for the amelioration of the consequences of communally based conflicts. But it is 
perfectly reasonable to presume that, in some deeply divided societies, the effective 
subordination of a segment or segments by a superordinate segment may be preferable to 
the chaos and disorder that might accompany the failure of consociationalism. 
 
But this claim has been totally falsified by the developments in the decades following the 
publication of his article. In some of his major examples, such as the Apartheid in South Africa, the 
Arabs in Israel/Palestine, and the Kurds in Iraq, the regimes of control have either totally collapsed 
or become very unstable. Consequently, his suggestion to develop control as an alternative 
approach bringing stability to deeply divided societies seems no longer empirically valid. 
Applicability of control is also limited with cases where there are strong state institutions to build 
and sustain it, as Byman (2002, 46) has put it:  
 
Control policies are often difficult to implement. For control to succeed, the state must be 
stronger than the groups it seeks to dominate. Geography, leadership, demographics, 
social organisation, and other factors all the shape the implementation of control. Thus 
policies that would strengthen groups at a local level (such as consociational democracy) 
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 For a much more recent discussion on control policies for divided societies, see Byman (2002, 44-80). 
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are often incompatible with control. Successful control requires excellent intelligence. It is 
not enough to repress, governments must repress well. 
 
Along with its empirical weaknesses and limited applicability, control is also shaky in moral 
terms as it advocates dominance of one group another one. Control as an alternative approach to 
consociationalism (or other forms of power-sharing, discussed in the next section) is problematic 
at many levels and so is no credible option for deeply divided societies. Co-option and 
manipulation of ethnic identities have also been pointed out as possible means for conflict 
management. However, both suffer from problems similar to control: their applicability is very 
contextual. Co-option essentially means offering wealth, status or power to communal elites to 
get their support, however, its impact is often limited because it does not solve the underlying 
problems, such as security or hegemony, and also there are likely to be elites who are not co-
opted (Byman 2002, 95-99). Manipulation of ethnic identities, on the other hand, has even more 
serious disadvantages: few groups would be willing accept it, as it often involves assimilation; and 
so it requires the heavy hand of the state, which often further deepens security concerns of ethnic 
groups (Ibid, 123-124). 
Another fundamental alternative to power-sharing is partition. Should states which have 
persistent ethnic conflicts be preserved, or should they be partitioned into more homogenous 
ethnic states? There are many powerful arguments for and against partition.11 The main 
disadvantages of partition are that it does not necessarily lead to elimination of the conflict (as an 
intra-state conflict can turn into an inter-state one), and that successor states are usually not 
ethnically homogenous (hence the possibility of further partition). Moreover, its main advantage, 
stability brought by separation, can be largely achieved by other means as well, such as federalism 
and autonomy. Therefore, consociationalism coupled with federalism offers a better alternative 
than partition. Consociationalism with federalism is superior to partition because it does not 
require any of the initial costs of executing partition, such as population exchange or ethnic 
cleansing. 
The methodology of consociational theory’s development has also been critiqued. Lustick 
(1997) argues that the success of consociationalism as a research programme cannot be explained 
by the theory’s explanatory power or its heuristic value. However, the success of consociational 
research programme can be explained by the late Lakatosian proposition that research 
programmes can succeed by relying on the political and rhetorical abilities of their leading 
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 See, among others, Kaufmann (1996; 1998), Sambanis (2000), Byman (2002, 154-176) and O’Leary (2006). 
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practitioners as well as the relations between those practitioners and political interests outside 
the scientific arena.  
Ignoring the principle of parsimony, he [Lijphart] protects his research program via ad hoc 
and inconsistent amendments to what had been it’s “hard core”, basing himself on 
appeals to the authority of scholars who reviewed his work positively, to the sheer 
number of consociationalist studies of various countries, and to the attention accorded 
the theory by South African politicians and constitutional designers (Lustick 1997, 112). 
 
Lustick (1997) also claims that Lijphart’s core concepts are unsatisfactorily defined, his 
favourable conditions are untestable, and his theoretical model seems to change abruptly to fit in 
more cases. The inclusion of India into the consociational countries list, despite the fact that this 
country featured a majoritarian political system, is analysed by Lustick (1997, 113-117) as a major 
case of the late Lakatosian consociational theory development. Lustick is right to point out that 
Lijphart has occasionally reformulated some of the core concepts of consociational theory. 
However, Lustick’s demand for parsimony may be misplaced as many deeply divided societies are 
open to many more conditions and factors than are included within Lijphart’s conception, 
including kin-states as external parties to the conflict. If consociational theory is to be improved, 
some reformulations are inevitable, and those reformulations should be judged on the basis of 
their empirical and theoretical validity. As noted earlier, the case of India as a consociational 
democracy appears rather weak, but this hardly tarnishes consociationalism’s standing as a well-
suited theoretical model for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. 
2.7. Alternative Models of Power-sharing12:  Centripetalism, Complex 
Power-Sharing, and Power Dividing 
While the fundamental critiques question consociationalim’s theoretical intactness and empirical 
basis, some other scholars have suggested replacement of consociationalism with new models of 
power-sharing. Among those alternative approaches, centripetalism, which is also known as 
integrative13 power-sharing, is the most prominent one. The other two alternative models are 
complex power-sharing and power-dividing. 
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 Lijphart (2008, 6) notes that he uses the terms of power-sharing and consociationalism interchangeably; 
and that, for the sake of clarity, he tends to employ power-sharing when he addresses policy makers rather 
than academics. 
13
 Sisk (1996, 34-45) introduces the classification of main approaches to power-sharing into two categories 
as consociational and integrative. He uses the term “consociational” in reference to Lijphart’s formulation, 
and employs the term “integrative” while referring to Horowitz’s suggestions. However, both Horowitz and 
Reilly, two chief proponents of the latter approach, call it centripetalism in their works. 
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2.7.1. Centripetalism 
Horowitz (1985; 1993; 2002; 2008) has long argued that some of Lijphart’s consociational 
institutional prescriptions are more likely to deepen divisions in divided societies rather than 
ameliorating. Regarding the grand coalition, for instance, Horowitz (2008) claims that grand 
coalitions are unlikely because the very act of forming a multi-ethnic coalition brings about 
flanking (intra-ethnic competition), if that does not already exist. 
 
[T]he willingness of leaders to form interethnic coalitions can produce a negative reaction 
among members of their own groups, which in turn can lead to the formation of new 
ethnically exclusive parties on the flank. If so, what begins as a grand coalition may end as 
a coalition of the middle, opposed by extremists on the flanks who are able to thwart 
interethnic compromise by making inroads into the support of those who joins such 
coalitions. In short, the grand coalition may not be durable (Horowitz 2008, 1220). 
  
Instead of forming such unstable inter-ethnic coalitions, Horowitz (1985; 1993; 2008) 
suggests that political actors should be provided with incentives to cooperate during elections and 
there should be some form of territorial divisions of power –i.e. federalism. Horowitz’s alternative 
model is built on two main premises. The first one is that political engineering in divided societies 
should seek to support moderates against extremists by engineering political institutions with 
incentives for moderation; hence there should be no grand coalition in which participation is 
based on ethnic quotas. And the second premise posits that most important of those institutions 
to be engineered is electoral systems; Horowitz particularly makes a case for the alternative vote, 
which is a preference based voting system, that would encourage the exchange of preferences 
between different ethnic parties to achieve moderation.14 However, Horowitz, like Lijphart, 
acknowledges the depth of cleavages in divided societies and aims to manage the conflict rather 
than trying to eliminate it. In other words, Horowitz’s centripetalism diverges from the 
consociational approach not in the way it regards divided societies but about the most feasible set 
of institutions that should be adopted in order to manage the conflict. Horowitz (2008, 1219) 
compares the two as follows: 
Neither the consociational nor the centripetal approach has abolition of ethnic conflict as 
its agenda. Both accept the existence of ethnic cleavages and attempt to manage their 
effects – in one case, by guaranteed representation and outcomes and in the other, by 
various regimes of incentives to moderation, cooperation or fragmentation. The 
consociational approach has a well-specified menu of institutions, whereas the centripetal 
approach is at home with a variety of governmental institutions, presidential or 
parliamentary, provided that appropriate institutions are built in. So far as parties and 
                                                          
14
 For specific recommendations on electoral engineering for divided societies, from the centripetalist 
perspective, see Reilly (2001). 
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elections go, consociationalists aspire to a post electoral compromise – hence the grand 
coalition – whereas centripetalists aspire to a pre-electoral compromise- hence various 
incentives to induce parties to pool votes and form coalitions across group lines. According 
to the latter, pre-election compromise is superior, because it requires that parties make 
commitments to moderate their ethnic claims in order to secure alliances and electoral 
support across group lines, whereas compulsory post-election coalitions require no such 
commitments. 
         
The centripetalist approach also sees federalism as a conflict management mechanism 
differently. Horowitz (2008, 1218) claims that in ethnically homogenous units of a federation there 
is an opportunity for sub-ethnic competition to emerge and thus possibly mitigating the effect of 
interethnic competition at the central level; and in heterogeneous units of federation federalism 
can cultivate interethnic cooperation among local politicians before they move to compete at the 
central level. On the other hand, Lijphart has promoted federalism as an institutional instrument 
that is conducive to further group autonomy in homogenous federal units. These two perspectives 
on federalism are clearly distinct from each other with respect to the question of what role federal 
units should play in a power-sharing regime. According to Horowitz, federalism should create sub-
ethnic competition in homogeneous units, or interethnic cooperation in heterogeneous units, 
while Lijphart recommends homogenous federal units in which an ethnic group can further its 
autonomy. The latter view is evident in terms of how federalism will bring about the desired 
result. But the same cannot be said about Horowitz’s argument since it is not clear whether 
federalism will always produce either sub-ethnic competition or interethnic cooperation. Sub-
ethnic competition cannot be achievable where there is a broad consensus among the members of 
a given ethnic group; and when it is achieved, this will not be necessarily beneficial towards 
interethnic cooperation. 
By comparing the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, Sisk (1996, 116-117) 
concludes that the choice between consociational and integrative (centripetal) power-sharing 
depends on the structure and dynamics of a given conflict: consociational power-sharing practices 
provide the parties to a conflict with a greater sense of security but at the same time it may 
contain the seeds of future conflict, and, on the other hand, integrative (centripetal) power-
sharing is possible when there is a greater degree of trust among the parties, which is often non-
existent. Likewise, I would argue that the two should not always be seen alternatives to each 
other: if we accept that the integrative approach (centripetalism) requires a relatively high level of 
trust among the conflicting parties to be adopted, then it cannot be suggested as an alternative 
when such level of trust between the parties simply does not exist. For example, in the Northern 
Ireland conflict where the nature and extent of divisions run deep and broad, McGarry and 
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O’Leary (2006b) argue that integrationist approach (centripetalism) is definitely more unrealistic 
than consociationalism. McGarry and O’Leary (2006b) points out that in Northern Ireland the 
Agreement (the 1998 Good Friday Agreement) was made possible by the inclusion of radical 
parties associated with paramilitary organisations in negotiations, namely Sinn Féin, the Ulster 
Democratic Party and Progressive Unionist Party, and it was completely unthinkable to expect the 
leaders of those parties to agree on an AV electoral system that would minimize their electoral 
strength. McGarry and O’Leary (2006b, 270) thus arrives at the conclusion that: “Horowitz’s 
integrationist prescriptions are perhaps most pertinent at the formation of competitive party 
system, but thereafter are inapplicable.” Their conclusion seems similar to Lijphart’s (2002, 48-49) 
argument that when there is one or a few relatively small minorities facing a majority or relatively 
large groups, the minorities will not be willing to accept a system that does not let them to be 
represented by their own leaders but by moderate members of the majority. In sum, once there is 
an ethnically defined party system in place, there will be very few leaders, especially from smaller 
parties, with the incentives to implement Horowitz’s preferred set of institutions without 
considerable coercion and persuasion by external actors including, potentially, kin-states. 
2.7.2. Complex Power-sharing 
It has been suggested that consociationalism and centripetalism are not sufficient to explain the 
current developments in the actual practice of power-sharing. According to the participants of the 
Cambridge Carnegie Project on Resolving Self-Determination Disputes Using Complex Power-
Sharing15, the recent power-sharing models adopted for management of various conflicts have 
shown that power-sharing literature has focused on the same old debate between the 
consociational and integrative (centripetal) approaches for too long. In practice, they argue, many 
power-sharing systems no longer depend on the distinct theoretical models offered by those 
approaches. As such, recent developments point towards a complex model that includes elements 
of both consociational and centripetal models. Moreover, the complex power-sharing models have 
international involvement in design and implementation, and a concern for broader issues 
including military-civilian relations, economic management, human and minority rights is evident. 
The complex power-sharing arrangements also widen the realm of power-sharing by including all 
local agents in the conflict in addition to the elites. This mostly achieved through regional 
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 “Cambridge Carnegie Project on Resolving Self-Determination Disputes Using Complex Power-Sharing”, 
http://www.polis.cam.ac.uk/research/cps/about.html (accessed 1/8/12). Also, see Weller and Wolff (eds. 
2005), Wolff (2007; 2008; 2009), and Weller and Metzger (eds. 2008). 
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autonomy arrangements that may or may not be adopted as a part of central level power-
sharing.16 
One of the participants of the complex power-sharing project, Wolff (2005) argues against 
the rigid divisions between the integrative (centripetal) and consociational power-sharing.  After 
discussing the merits of both consociational and integrative (centripetal) electoral institutions, 
namely the closed list PR and preferential voting systems, he posits that the application of a 
preferential and proportional voting system, such STV (Single Transferable Vote), can be combined 
with a set of rigid consociational political institutions to achieve both inclusion and moderation, 
which are respectively the goals of consociational and centripetal power-sharing approaches.  
For consociational institutions to function and perform well, a (widely representative and 
therefore necessarily broadly inclusive) grand coalition is required. STV in this context can 
contribute to achieving both of these aims: its proportional character ensures an inclusive 
composition of the assembly elected, while its preferential character is at the same time 
likely to favour the election of moderate politicians and the formation of pre-election 
coalitions (Wolff 2005, 63). 
 
Wolff (2005) thus claims that hybrid systems combining elements of both consociational 
and centripetal power-sharing may be best equipped for sustainable democratic power-sharing. 
But he also notes that he has some reservations due to the shaky empirical basis for such a mix 
approach (Wolff 2005, 72). It is obvious that most complex power-sharing arrangements are 
relatively new and therefore the level of success is still hard to assess. However, the number of 
cases that fall into the complex power-sharing category confirms that there is a trend towards 
complex power-sharing. 
The trend towards complex power-sharing, to some extent, can be attributed to the 
inherent weaknesses of constitution making processes. Horowitz (2008) argues that there are 
many obstacles to the adoption of a coherent set of political institution to mitigate conflict and 
many of those obstacles stem from processes of constitution making. Some of those major 
obstacles are: the asymmetric preferences that are possessed by the parties at the table, the fact 
that third parties do not seek optimal institutions but any deal that can garner minimal support of 
the conflicting parties, and the historical bias towards some designs (Horowitz 2008, 1226-1230). 
One might add that the presence of kin-states as actors in deeply divided societies, as will be 
shown in Chapter 7, complicates matter further as they are said to represent one particular party 
whilst bring their own interests and objectives to the table which may relate to broader foreign 
policy goals such as their own place in the region and relations with great powers. Moreover, 
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Horowitz (2008, 1230) notes that: “Many constitutions in severely divided societies are not the 
product of single minded attention to the goal of reducing conflict. Many, in fact, do not contain 
any of the institutions recommended by either of the contending consociational or centripetal 
schools of thought”. Whether Horowitz sees those neither consociational nor centripetal 
institutions as complex power-sharing is not clear in the article, but it is obvious that he does not 
think that they are coherent and likely to succeed. 
2.7.3. Power Dividing 
Power dividing, also known as the multiple majorities approach, is the most recently proposed 
alternative approach to power-sharing (Roeder 2005; 2012). It substantially differs from other 
approaches to power-sharing as it does not suggest a specific form of power-sharing government 
and there is no emphasis on institutions. Instead, Roeder (2012) recommends that the most 
decisive issues should be removed from the jurisdiction of the government and entrusted to 
decision-making processes involving individual citizens and civil society. The theoretical basis for 
such approach is predicated on the liberal and the pluralist philosophies. Roeder (2012, 69-70) 
notes that power dividing constitutions are in place in Switzerland and the ten West Coast and 
Rocky Mountain states (except Utah) of the United States, where there are multiple levels of 
governance, which privileges no one configuration of interest. For example, in the state of 
California, Roeder (2012, 70) argues that: 
The cross-cutting jurisdictions and diversity of representation formulae have produced 
multiple majorities, not the domination of policy by one majority: Majorities in one organ, 
such as Christian fundamentalists who control a school district, find it difficult to sweep 
into power across all organs. The dispersion of power and multiplication of  cross-cutting 
lines of division throughout the state have meant that most citizens are parts of a majority 
in some organs and that no one divide, such as race, urban versus rural, or north versus 
south has come to dominate political conflict. 
Although there are some very appealing aspects of power dividing, such as its potential for 
meeting various demands of different segments of the society, its applicability appears very 
limited. Its major cases (the US states and Switzerland) are products of long processes of gradual 
institutional development which sought to address limited demands of specific constituencies. For 
that reason, its adoption in deeply divided societies that have experienced deep and long running 
divisions seems rather unlikely. Roeder (2012, 71) acknowledges this difficulty but postulates that 
the likelihood of introducing power dividing would increase under three circumstances. First, it 
would be more likely to emerge or easily imposed on in societies where no single divide has yet 
dominated the conflict. Second, it could emerge in the case of negotiations participated many and 
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diverse interests. Third, it can rather easily be imposed on societies when occupying powers hold 
sway over the design of political institutions.  
Along with its very limited applicability, another major disadvantage of power dividing is 
that policy may become incoherent as policies adopted by different policy-making organs is not 
consistent with each other’s policies. This incoherence in policy-making is likely to increase the 
public expenditure and hence the tax burden on citizens but could be managed if more 
coordination among various policy making organs are maintained (Ibid, 72). Such coordination, 
however, may lead to the formation of a majority which is dominant across all policy areas and 
thus eliminating the main advantage of power dividing vis-à-vis other models of power-sharing. 
Nevertheless, the main allure of power dividing is that it grants similar rights to all sorts of 
minorities, whereas power-sharing often privileges ethnic or religious groups who are involved in a 
salient conflict (Ibid, 80). Overall, the theoretical case for power dividing is strong and convincing, 
though it remains the most unlikely of the all four power-sharing models which could be 
introduced as a political settlement for deeply divided societies. This is particularly the case where 
there are a few groups with strong identities, who would not settle for anything less than some 
form of group level participation at the government. 
2.8. Conclusion  
Consociationalism has attracted plenty of criticism over the years. Some of its critics have claimed 
that the reformulations of consociationalism offered by Lijphart are in fact proving their case that 
the theory is inconsistent and lacks empirical basis. Since consociational theory was formulated 
and reformulated inductively, through the use of case studies, the varying interpretations of the 
cases have also been noted by the critics. However, even if some of the cases were not as 
consociational as they were portrayed by Lijphart, consociational democracy as a theoretical 
model would still remain relevant for deeply divided societies, for whom majoritarian democracy 
cannot be an appropriate remedy. 
The debate between Lijphartian consociationalism and its centripetalist alternative has 
been long running, and the relative merits of their institutional prescriptions are still a matter of 
debate in the literature. But my overview of the literature has indicated that centripetalism is not 
an alternative to consociationalism in the context of deeply divided societies, mainly because 
minority groups in such societies would not prefer to be represented by moderate representatives 
of the majority instead of their own leaders. And power dividing seems to be the most unlikely of 
the four to be adopted by deeply divided societies. Therefore, either the consociational or the 
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complex power-sharing approach is very likely to serve as the basis for political settlements for 
deeply divided societies. The four models’ main characteristics, basic institutions, advantages and 
disadvantages are summed up in Table 1 below. 
There is currently a trend towards adoption of complex power-sharing institutions,17 
which incorporate both consociational and centripetal elements at the same time. Whether the 
contradictory elements of such mix designs can sustain peace and democratic stability in the 
longer term remains unknown. As will be shown in the following chapters, however, third party 
actors’ involvement is often necessary to establish and sustain power-sharing regimes in deeply 
divided societies. Traditional consociational theory’s neglect of the role of external actors in the 
making of consociational settlements is noted by McGarry and O’Leary (2006a, 48) as follows: 
Conventional consociational theory is overly ‘endogenous’ or ‘internalist’; it has tended to 
treat states and regions as if they are sealed entities, relatively immune from exogenous 
forces. This has produced two related problems. First, there has been a tendency to 
downplay the importance of outside factors both when explaining how consociational 
settlements emerge, and when seeking to engineer their creation. 
 
This observation has been taken into account by the complex power-sharing project, 
which has underscored international involvement as one the peculiarities of the complex power-
sharing arrangements. But their analyses of that involvement in the making of power-sharing 
settlements have been limited. In Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in 
Theory and Practice,18 the large edited volume combining the findings of the project, there is only 
one chapter on international involvement, which describes specific roles assumed by third parties 
in eight cases of self-determination conflicts, including Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The author of 
the chapter, Ulrich Schneckener (2008, 467-499), identifies a number of roles which can be 
assumed by third parties, such as mediation, monitoring, coercive diplomacy and arbitration. 
However, Schneckener’s analysis does not study any particular peacemaking intervention for 
power-sharing in-depth; neither does it take into account involvement of kin-state actors in the 
making of some power-sharing settlements. In other words, the role of third party actors, 
particularly kin-states, remains understudied. The literature on third party intervention, or 
international intervention, as well as the kin-state literature will be surveyed in the next chapter in 
order to explore potential roles for third party actors and kin-states in peacemaking interventions 
for power-sharing. 
                                                          
17
 This trend is evidenced by the fact that there are many cases of complex power-sharing regimes recently 
adopted, geographically ranging from Philippines to the Balkans and Caucasus (Weller and Metzger eds. 
2008, 59-383). 
18
 Weller and Metzger (eds. 2008). 
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Consociationalism 
  
Centripetalism 
(Integrative) 
Complex Power-
sharing  
Power Dividing 
Main 
Characteristics 
Elites cooperate for 
managing the conflict. 
Groups are autonomous and 
have guaranteed 
representation. 
Elites cooperate 
for forming broadly 
inclusive 
governments. But 
there is no 
guaranteed 
representation for 
groups.  
Combined use of 
both consociational 
and centripetal 
power-sharing 
elements. Most 
examples of complex 
power-sharing are 
cases of autonomy or 
power-sharing 
arrangements at local 
level. 
There are various 
levels of 
governance, 
providing widest 
possible autonomy 
to individuals, 
groups and civil 
society. 
Basic 
Institutions  
Parliamentary systems with 
grand coalitions 
incorporating all groups; 
mutual veto powers; 
segmental autonomy; 
proportionality in 
employment and 
representation.  
Devolution of 
power through 
federalism; 
preference based 
voting systems; 
incentives for 
inter-ethnic 
cooperation; 
supermajority 
requirement for 
presidential 
elections. 
Local level power-
sharing not 
necessarily coupled 
with central level 
power-sharing. A 
combination of 
consociational and 
centripetal 
institutions.  
International 
involvement in design 
and implementation 
of power-sharing. 
 No specific 
institutions. The 
rules for 
representation and 
decision-making 
vary according to 
issue at stake, 
preventing the 
formation of 
permanent 
majorities. 
Advantages Provides stability as inter-
ethnic electoral competition 
is minimised. Particularly, 
alleviates minorities’ fears of 
domination by larger 
group/s. 
Incentivises inter-
ethnic 
cooperation, in 
addition to 
providing some 
guarantees to 
minorities. 
Balances the 
minorities’ fear of 
domination, through 
local autonomy and 
complicated decision-
making, with some 
incentives for inter-
ethnic cooperation. 
The multiplicity of 
decision-making 
mechanisms and 
bodies offers 
individuals, groups 
and civil society 
wider 
participation, and 
preclude 
dominance of one 
group over others. 
Disadvantages Elites are not motivated to 
defuse the conflict. Elite 
dominance over their 
segments is required. No 
incentives for moderation. 
Unlikely to be 
accepted in 
countries where 
there is minimal 
inter-group trust. It 
presumes a 
significant role for 
non-ethnic and 
rather inclusive 
political parties. 
Its cases are local 
level power-sharing 
arrangements. Its mix 
of consociational and 
centripetal elements 
is empirically shaky. 
The most difficult 
of all approaches 
to implement, 
particularly after 
civil wars. Its 
multiplicity of 
decision-making 
may lead to 
incoherent 
policies. 
Table 1 - Comparison of Power-sharing Models 
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CHAPTER 3 
International Intervention, the Liberal Peace and Power-
sharing: What Role for Kin-states? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical literature on international intervention, which 
will serve as a conceptual basis for discussion in the subsequent chapters. Also, it seeks to explore 
what roles third parties, especially kin-states, are likely to assume in the making of power-sharing 
settlements for deeply divided societies. The chapter initially surveys some of the recent literature 
on third party peacemaking theory, and then reviews the existing literature on kin-state 
involvement in intrastate conflicts. This is followed by a brief review of the post-Cold War era 
conceptual developments with regard to wider process of international intervention. Particularly, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding as new and more intrusive forms of intervention are analysed. 
The liberal peace framework, which conceptually underpins the post-Cold War era 
interventionism, as well as its major critiques are also briefly discussed. Finally, the first and 
second chapters’ assessments are formulated into an analytical framework for use in the case 
study chapters. 
Some terminological clarifications should be made at this point. Although I use the terms 
“third party intervention” and “international intervention” interchangeably, and international 
interventions are by definition third party interventions, third party interventions in civil conflicts 
are not necessarily international in their nature - e.g. the British intervention in the Northern 
Ireland conflict. I also use the terms peacemaking and mediation interchangeably, and this is a 
rather common practice in the literature. However, a fine distinction between the two concepts 
can be made, as I will point out below. 
3.2. Third Party Peacemaking: Core Concepts and Issues 
Peacemaking and mediation are often used synonymously by many, as scholars of the subject 
often tend to use the latter, while the practitioners, especially at the UN, seem to prefer using the 
former. There are a myriad of definitions of mediation in the literature because of disagreements 
regarding the scope and role of the third party. According to Zartman and Touval (1996, 446), 
mediation can be described as “a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find 
a solution which they cannot find by themselves." To Moore, it is “the intervention into a dispute 
or negotiation by a third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist disputing 
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parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute” 
(Moore 1986, 14; as cited by Bercovitch 2002, 6). Although most scholars seem to have simply 
defined mediation as a third party intervention in a conflict between two or more disputants in 
order to help them reach a settlement, it is also suggested that being a third party mediator 
requires having some other qualities, such as neutrality and status. Spencer and Yang (1993, 1495; 
as cited by Bercovitch 2002, 7) define mediation as “the assistance of a third party not involved in 
the dispute, who may be of a unique status that gives him or her certain authority with disputants; 
or perhaps an outsider who may be regarded by them as suitably neutral go-between”. But 
Bercovitch (2002, 7) argues that mediation can take various forms depending on the mediator’s 
goal and context of the conflict and therefore mediation should be seen as “… a complex, changing 
and dynamic interaction between mediators, who have some resources and an interest in the 
conflict or its outcome, and parties in conflict or their representatives.” Wall and Dunne (2012, 
219), however, in their article surveying the recent scholarship on mediation, claim that the 
definition of mediation seems to have remained essentially the same despite various attempts at 
fine-tuning, shortening or lengthening over the years, and mediation is simply “assistance to two 
or more interacting parties by a third party who – at that time- has no power to prescribe 
agreements or outcome”.  
Meanwhile, the UN’s conceptualisation of peacemaking appears to have a wider remit 
than mediation as defined in the scholarly literature. 
UN peacemaking brings hostile parties to agreement through diplomatic means. The 
Security Council, in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, may 
recommend ways to avoid conflict or restore or secure peace — through negotiation, for 
example, or recourse to the International Court of Justice. 
The Secretary-General plays an important role in peacemaking. The Secretary-General 
may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that appears to threaten 
international peace and security, use good offices to carry out mediation or exercise quiet 
diplomacy behind the scenes — either personally or through special envoys. The 
Secretary-General also undertakes preventive diplomacy aimed at resolving disputes 
before they escalate (United Nations 2009).19 
The UN Security Council in its peacemaking capacity thus may recommend the parties to 
seek recourse at the International Court of Justice, but the UN Charter stipulates that in making 
such recommendations the Security Council should also “take into consideration that legal 
disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in 
                                                          
19
 United Nations (2009), “The UN in Brief: What the UN does for Peace”, 
http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/peacemaking.shtml (accessed 1/8/12). 
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accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”20 In other words, UN peacemaking 
does not necessarily have an arbitration component, unless that is sought by the parties, and the 
terms mediation and peacemaking can be interchangeably used to refer to third party 
interventions which seek to help the conflicting parties towards a negotiated settlement. 
There is a wide range of theoretical and empirical questions raised in the mediation 
literature. However, most pertinent of those questions to this study are: Who mediates? What 
tasks and roles do mediators undertake? What tactics and strategies are employed by mediators? 
Is neutrality an asset? Are states and international organisations equally capable as mediators? Is 
there a “ripe” moment for the mediator’s entry into a conflict? How do the nature of the conflict 
and the parties’ views of the mediation affect the mediation process and its outcome? What 
constitutes success in mediation? The discussion below seeks to explore answers to these 
questions, particularly in reference to mediation in deeply divided societies for power-sharing 
settlements. 
3.2.1. Who mediates? 
The identity and capabilities of a mediator are likely to have an influence over the mediation 
process and its result. Bercovitch (2002) argues that most mediators fall into one of the three 
following categories: individuals; states; and institutions and organisations. However, although 
most mediators are unilateral actors, there is also a “collective” form of mediation which can 
include a group of states, individuals, and/or organisations acting together as a collective 
mediation body, such as the Contact Group in Bosnia or the UN Security Council in some cases 
(See Leigh-Phippard 1998; Touval 1995). In fact, bulk of international mediation is done by states 
or international organisations, and amongst international organisations the United Nations is the 
most prominent actor (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 146-148). The UN Secretary-General 
(UNSG), on behalf of the organisation and its membership, often through his Special Envoys or 
Representatives, assumes mediation roles in both intra and inter-state conflicts. The UNSG’s main 
asset in mediation is the unique position held by the UNSG in the world’s diplomatic network, as 
the world body’s chief public servant, as well as the office’s high moral standing, as Skjelsbæk 
(1991, 104) noted: 
The ability of the Secretary-General to reward or punish for the purposes of exerting 
influence is limited in indeed. The physical resources at his disposal are very small and 
arguably of less importance than the moral and political status of his office. His authority 
                                                          
20
 United Nations (1945), “The Charter of the United Nations”, Chapter 6 Article 36(3), 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml (accessed 1/8/12). 
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rests to a considerable extent on the ideals of the Charter and the fact that these ideals 
are formally accepted by all members of the world’s most universal intergovernmental 
organisation whose servant and spokesman he is. 
However, Touval (1994, 45) argues that UN cannot effectively mediate because its 
inherent characteristics, as an intergovernmental organisation, make it incapable in provision of 
some basic functions required in effective mediation of complex international disputes: 
As currently constituted, the United Nations has great difficulty performing many basic 
functions required of an effective mediator. It does not serve well as an authoritative 
channel of communication. It has little real political leverage. Its promises and threats lack 
credibility. And it is incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible, and dynamic negotiations 
guided by an effective strategy.  
Touval (1994, 45) claims that no “upgrading, expansion, or revamping of UN powers” can 
rectify these weakness, since they stem from the organisation’s intergovernmental nature, and he 
suggests devising a mechanism through which UN can encourage and sponsor states to undertake 
mediation unilaterally. Touval (1995) also discusses the UN Security Council’s mediation of 
international conflicts and posits that the council’s cumbersome and uncertain decision-making 
processes as well as its lack of resources are hindering it from fulfilling mediation functions. But 
Fretter (2002) points out that although individual state actors have more resources and leverages 
at their hand, states are usually concerned with managing conflicts that will affect them to some 
degree because there is less pressure on states to pursue “altruistic” objectives. The UN, however, 
often becomes a mediator by default as a result of states’ unwillingness to get engaged in 
particular conflicts. Fretter (2002, 102) notes that the UN as a mediator mostly relies on moral 
persuasion and the reinforcement of international norms to reason with the disputants and has 
relatively weak leverage over parties. Thus, international organisations (most notably the UN) are 
usually mandated to get involved in conflicts but they seem to lack some of the most crucial 
resources and capabilities due to political and operational limitations generated by their 
intergovernmental nature. 
3.2.2. Styles in Mediation 
The critiques of UN mediation introduced above are based on the assumption that manipulation 
of the negotiation context through the use of leverage or coercion is required on the part of the 
mediator. That is power mediation, which is also known as manipulative or directive mediation, 
and it is one of the three main styles in mediation identified by scholars along with facilitation and 
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formulation (Touval and Zartman 1985; Beardsley et al. 2006).21 The concept of “mediation style” 
can be broadly defined as: “the overarching goals and definitions of the [mediation] role, 
sometimes implicit, that shape how mediators behave and what they consider the legitimate goals 
of intervention” (Kressel 2007, 251). Facilitative mediation style essentially entails that the 
mediator establishes communications between the disputants; arranges interactions between 
them; and also seeks to identify and clarify the issues at stake. And the formulative mediator, by 
means of substantive suggestions and proposals, strives to devise a solution that is acceptable to 
the disputants.22 Fisher (2001, 11) defines facilitation and formulation based mediation as “pure 
mediation” in which “the third party works to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive 
issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control information, and the suggestion 
of alternatives.” Finally, power mediation encompasses pure mediation but also includes the use 
of leverage or coercion by the mediator, which can be in the form of promised rewards or 
threatened punishments (i.e. carrots-and-sticks); also power mediation may go beyond the 
agreement where the third party mediator takes part in implementation and enforcement of the 
agreement (Ibid, 11; Beardsley et al. 2006, 64-65). Although power-mediation is usually more 
effective, there is also a significant downside. As Carnevale (2002, 34) has put it:  
There is evidence that direct, forceful mediator intervention is effective when the conflict 
between the disputants is so intense that they are unable to engage in joint problem 
solving. … However, power in mediation can corrupt: the powerful mediator may be 
tempted to dictate terms of agreement, terms that are not acceptable to the parties. 
Nevertheless, manipulation of the negotiation context and the use of some coercive 
techniques seem to have become essential in successful mediation of some conflicts, particularly 
where facilitation and formulation efforts of the mediator have proven insufficient in improving 
the interparty relationships towards a settlement. As I argued in Chapter 1, deeply divided 
societies are trapped in a vicious cycle of mutual distrust, which necessitates power-sharing 
political institutions, and third party intervention can play a significant role in breaking that cycle. 
Therefore, it is likely that such conflicts may require power mediation. However, there is also the 
discrepancy in international mediation market: not many state actors are likely take up power 
mediation unless their or their allies’ interests are at considerable risk. This point will be 
                                                          
21
 These three are the main styles in international conflict mediation; in the wider field of mediation there 
are more styles employed, such as the strategic style which is used in divorce mediation (See Kressel 2007). 
22
 For an extensive list of mediation techniques, see Wall (1981, 171-177), and for most common tactics and 
strategies in mediation, see Wall and Lynn (1993, 166); Beardsley et al. (2006, 66). And for the most recent 
categorisation of mediation strategies (i.e. group of techniques) based on a survey of the scholarship in the 
last decade, see Wall and Dunne (2012, 227). 
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investigated in the case studies to see whether power mediation is, as expected, only pursued 
when other forms of mediation are exhausted and where a state with an interest in the settlement 
has become involved. 
3.2.3. Is “impartiality” an asset in mediation? 
Impartiality of the mediator is also part of the debate on mediation styles. By definition, power 
mediation requires the use of leverage or coercion and thus implicates that the mediator is not 
likely to be impartial. Smith (1994) notes that the necessity of impartiality is in fact a non-debate 
as both sides seem to have valid arguments depending on how mediation is defined. Smith (1994, 
448) also underscores that both forms of mediation (power and pure mediation) can be effective 
under certain circumstances and both should be retained for that reason, and therefore it would 
be unfair to compare them on the grounds of impartiality. It is also suggested that biased 
mediators are more likely to be perceived credible by the parties (Kydd 2003). Farvetto (2009) 
argues that impartiality can be effective in mediation especially when a highly biased power 
intervenes in an international conflict: this is likely to lead to a peaceful settlement because the 
disputants will be certain that the third party will enforce an agreement by all means, including the 
use of military force. Neither is the widely assumed UN’s impartiality an empirical fact: Benson and 
Satana’s (2009, 152) analysis of UN Security Council resolutions, for example, finds that there is a 
lack of neutrality at least 43% of the time for all types of potential action. In sum, impartiality is 
not necessarily an asset for a mediator. 
3.2.4. Implications of the nature of the dispute and the parties views of mediation 
Implications of both the nature of the dispute and the parties’ views and intentions regarding the 
mediation process have also been investigated by scholars. Bercovitch and Langley’s (1993) claim 
that intensely hostile conflicts, which they measure by looking at the number of issues at stake 
and high fatalities, are not particularly amenable to mediation. Bercovitch and Gartner’s (2009) 
statistical analysis, however, concludes that directive (i.e. coercive) strategies are particularly 
effective in high intensity conflicts. It has been also pointed out that the disputants’ views of the 
mediation and what brings the parties to the negotiation table are crucial factors in shaping the 
negotiation process and its outcome. Richmond (1998) looks at the mediation process from inside, 
at the level of the disputants’ views of the mediation, and argues that in some cases, such as in 
Cyprus, the parties might have “devious” objectives regarding the mediation. That is, when the 
mediator has been regarded by the disputants as a party to be bargained with in order to progress 
their respective unilateral objectives. The existence of devious objectives implicates that the party 
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or parties are not genuinely interested in seeking a negotiated settlement but would rather prefer 
to continue the conflict through mediation process. Similarly, Ghosn (2010, 1065), claims that the 
factors that bring the parties to the table may not necessarily lead to agreement as the parties, 
especially in high intensity conflicts, tend “to forgo the long-term benefits of negotiated 
agreements to take advantage of the short-term benefits, which of course include an interlude 
from the fighting.” The conflicts in deeply divided societies are obviously high intensity conflicts, 
some like Cyprus may not be necessarily high in terms of casualties (the most widely used 
indicator of conflict intensity), but still some other indicators are there: for example, the 
complexity of the conflict as measured by the number of issues at stake or the minimal intergroup 
cooperation, which can be best evidenced by the domination of political spectrum by ethnic 
political parties. The arguments on mediation in relation to the intensity of conflict and the 
disputants’ views and objectives regarding the process indicate that mediation in high intensity 
conflicts, such as the cases in deeply divided societies, needs to be tailored to meet the particular 
challenges of the conflict, and the tailoring should envisage strategies for tackling the party or 
parties’ unwillingness to genuinely engage in mediation process. 
3.2.5. Mutually Hurting Stalemate and Ripeness in Mediation 
Another core issue in the mediation literature is that of the timing of mediation, which is usually 
centred on the concepts of Mutually Hurting Stalemate and “ripe moments” (Zartman 1985; 
2001). According to Zartman (2001), the concept of a ripe moment is dependent upon the parties’ 
perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). The MHS describes the situation when the 
parties realise that they are not able to achieve a unilateral victory and they are stuck in a 
stalemate which is painful for both sides, though not necessarily at the same degree for each. As 
they perceive the MHS, the parties become more inclined towards seeking an alternative course of 
action, rather than escalating or continuing the conflict, and in the absence of the possibility of 
unilateral victory that is a search for negotiated settlement. Thus ripeness is said to have occurred 
when both sides perceive the existence of the MHS and also regard the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement as a “way out”. Ripeness, however, does not guarantee any particular outcome: 
Ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient, for the initiation of negotiations. 
It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be seized, either directly by the parties 
or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator (Zartman 2001, 9). 
Lederach (2003), on the other hand, points out that ripeness is rather like a rear-view 
mirror from practitioner’s point of view, and argues that ripeness may be most useful in 
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retrospect. Otherwise, Lederach (2003, 32) claims, MHS’s predictive capacity is very limited 
particularly because of the nonlinear and ephemeral nature of some conflicts: 
In protracted conflict temporal conditions are ephemeral and non-linear, requiring 
paradoxical intentionality: a set of meditative attitudes that keep your feet on the ground 
(a realist view of the situation) and your head in the clouds (a hope-driven idealist view of 
the possible). Therefore, rather than orienting my action around predictive ripeness, I find 
the opposite increasingly true in my work. I am carefully cautious when all appears ripe for 
settlement and inoculating naive when all appears hopelessly lost in the grip of calamity. 
Although it appears MHS and ripeness, as predictive tools for mediators’ entry into the 
conflict, may not be as useful as they are being promoted by Zartman, nevertheless, they may 
have some value in indicating when the conflict is going through a delicate stage where 
intervention could be more fruitful. But, as noted by Lederach, this does not necessarily implicate 
that ripeness will last or be seized upon by the parties. In terms of successfully mediating in deeply 
divided societies, ripeness and the MHS as concepts suggest that the parties should perceive that 
the conflict as it stands is unsustainable so that a move towards power-sharing could become an 
alternative. The mediator can help parties to realise the situation as such by persuasion or where 
possible even through “coercion”. Coercion here is not necessarily about making a party or both 
parties to do something which they would not otherwise do; instead it can also be regarded as 
enabling the parties to make the necessary concessions under the cover of being “coerced” by the 
third party as this could serve the party elites as a defence against their intraparty critics. In other 
words, the parties’ leaderships might be willing to compromise privately, as they perceive the 
direness of the status quo, but they may not be able to act unless there is a pressure on them 
which would help them legitimise their compromises internally. And in that respect ripeness can 
be a useful concept for the mediator in identification of the right moments for exerting such 
pressure on the parties. Furthermore, ripeness should also be explored with respect to the 
mediator’s readiness and involvement, whether there are “ripe” moments, on the part of the 
mediator, to be fully engaged in in the mediation process. 
3.2.6. Defining Success in Mediation 
The definition of success in mediation is rather elusive and analysts studying particular mediation 
processes often seek to define their own criteria to assess mediation outcomes. Although a 
negotiated settlement is often the crude measurement used to assess success in mediation, some 
scholars note that there are also lesser forms of success which fall short of a settlement, such as a 
ceasefire, a partial settlement or initiation of some dialogue between the parties (Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille, 1991, 9). Kriesberg (1991, 19) points out that assessing whether a mediation 
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has been successful is difficult because evidence required is often very obscure, while failure is 
always relative as it depends on what the original goal sought was. There is also the problem of 
whose goal would be taken as a reference point; the mediator and the disputants individual 
objectives would not necessarily be the same. Moreover, the goals of the disputants are not 
always clear and could be changing over the course of the mediation (Kleiboer 1996, 362). 
However, these problems do not seem to be applicable in negotiation processes explicitly aimed 
at bringing about a specific form of settlement, such as power-sharing. In that case the mediation 
success can simply be defined as a negotiated settlement on power-sharing. This measurement of 
success is particularly well-established in the studies on Bosnia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, 
almost all of the studies on these societies focus on negotiated settlement in order to assess the 
mediator’s role in the negotiations. In other words, a negotiated settlement on power-sharing is 
widely accepted as the normative outcome which the mediation process will be judged against. 
This does not, however, mean that the mediator’s role should be considered as the main 
determinant and anything other than a power-sharing settlement should always be regarded as a 
total failure. Instead, it can be posited that mediator’s particular role towards bringing about the 
settlement or its efforts in that direction can be assessed. This role may not be the crucial one but 
that does not entail that the mediator’s role, and particularly whether it has been effective in a 
given context, cannot be analysed. Therefore, success of mediation processes which will be 
studied in the following chapters will be assessed on the basis of their contribution towards a 
negotiated power-sharing settlement. 
3.3. Peacemaking in Deeply Divided Societies: What is lacking in the 
mediation literature? 
The mediation literature seems to have often focused on issues around the effectiveness of 
certain mediators and mediation styles in general. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions which 
could be inferred from the third party mediation literature with regard to peacemaking 
interventions in deeply divided societies. Regarding the identity of the mediator, it can be claimed 
that the United Nations is not likely to be an effective mediator in negotiations for power-sharing 
in deeply divided societies. In terms of the style of mediation, as noted above, power mediation 
seems to be more effective given the context; and impartiality is not necessarily an asset for the 
mediator, thus it can be argued that biased mediators are likely to be more effective in mediation 
of power-sharing settlements. As for the nature of the conflict and the disputants’ objectives in 
mediation, conflicts in deeply divided societies are intensely hostile, and as such will be less 
amenable to mediation. And where this is coupled with the fact that one or both of the parties are 
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regarding the mediation process as a means to continue the conflict, effectiveness of mediation 
may ultimately depend on the use of some form of coercion on the part of the mediator. The 
concepts of the MHS and the “ripe moments” could be useful in identifying when the mediator’s 
intervention would be more effective, but there is also a need to extend these concepts to analyse 
the ripeness of the mediator itself.  Finally, success in mediation of power-sharing in deeply 
divided societies should be assessed on the basis of the progress towards a power-sharing 
settlement. 
However, there are some major deficiencies in the mediation literature. According to Wall 
and Dunne (2012), there are a number of issues not considered at all or understudied in the recent 
mediation literature, and among those two of them are essentially about mediation effectiveness: 
a lack of reports on the conditions under which mediation would be most effective; and the non-
use of the methodology of comparison or control groups for determining the effectiveness of 
specific techniques. 
Now it is time to move forward with structured research programs in which researchers 
investigate actual mediations, utilizing comparison groups. The comparison group might 
be a control in which no mediation is utilized or the comparison group could be one in 
which a different style of mediation is utilised (Wall and Dunne 2012, 239). 
The effectiveness of strategies or styles which have been used by different mediators 
across the conflicts or by the same mediator even in the same conflict over the years will be one of 
the themes which is going to be investigated in the case study chapters. But it is not only different 
styles of mediation utilised which needs to be further researched, there is also a significant 
omission in the mediation literature: kin-states’ role in third party peacemaking processes. 
3.4. The Role of Kin-states in Peacemaking: Quasi-mediation? 
In this section, the existing literature on kin-state involvement in ethnic conflicts will be discussed 
and a new conceptualisation of kin-state involvement within the context of peacemaking will be 
suggested. Broadly speaking, a kin-state is a certain state whose dominant ethnic group has 
identified itself with a co-ethnic population beyond its borders; in some cases the ‘kinship’ linkage 
may be based on non-ethnic identity such as a political or religious identity. The kin-state and its 
dealings with its kin communities became a subject of international interest in relation to 
democratisation processes in the Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. According to 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (more commonly known as the Venice 
Commission), which is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, “the phenomenon of the 
concern of certain States for their kin-minorities” only became an issue of interest for the 
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international community as a result of the discussions which ensued the Hungarian parliament’s 
adoption of the Act of Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries, in June 2001, and the 
commission was set up to deal with this gap.23  
Whereas, in the scholarly literature, kin-states’ involvement in ethnic conflicts has been 
discussed since the mid-1990s and some theoretical perspectives on this involvement have also 
been proposed. Brubaker (1996) suggests a triadic model in reference to the post-Cold War 
Eastern Europe which argues that there is a triadic structure of relational fields constituted by a 
nationalising state (host state), a national minority population and a national homeland (kin-state). 
Brubaker (1996, 59) also emphasises that kin-states claim the right, even obligation, to protect the 
interests of their kin and hence play a significant role in the rise of extreme nationalism and ethnic 
conflict. There have been some studies on kin-states involvement in other geographical contexts 
as well. Ganguly (1998) studies some kin-state interventions in secessionist conflicts in South Asia 
by drawing on Modelski’s (1961) theoretical model.24 Ganguly argues that there are four different 
ways through which kin-states may respond to secessionist conflicts involving their kin. These are 
diffusion and encouragement (which is essentially about the kin-state allying itself with the kin 
group); isolation and suppression (which in effect means allying with the government of the host 
state); reconciliation (i.e. becoming a third party mediator between the kin group and their host 
state); and diffusion or isolation through inaction or non-intervention, if the host state is powerful 
inaction would be regarded as isolation by the kin group, but if the kin group is stronger inaction 
would be interpreted as support to them by the host state (Ganguly 1998, 13-33). Ganguly’s 
analysis underlines that non-intervention on part of the kin-state is often the most unlikely policy. 
Byrne (2000; 2006) uses the term “external ethnoguarantors” to describe the kin-states in the 
Northern Ireland and the Cyprus conflicts.25 However, Byrne’s analysis is built on a comparative 
overview of the external ethnoguarantors and primary mediators’ roles in Cyprus and Northern 
Ireland, and as such does not study the roles played by the ethnoguarantors as part of any 
particular mediation or peace process. Meanwhile, Wolff (2002, 33-36) develops an analytical 
framework which takes into account the complex relationship between host-state, kin-state, 
actors in the disputed territory and the international context in explaining the transnational 
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dynamics of ethnic conflict settlements in Alsace, the Saarland, South Tyrol, Northern Ireland, 
Andorra and the New Hebrides. According to Wolff (2002, 220), at the level of the kin-state 
balancing of the interests of the external minority (the kin community) and of the host-state is a 
key determinant of the possibility to settle the conflict. However, Wolff’s analysis focuses on the 
course of main developments in these conflicts and does not explore the kin-state involvement in 
any particular peacemaking process. For instance, Wolff (2002, 179-182) does not explore the kin-
state dynamics in the Northern Irish all-party negotiations, which culminated in the Good Friday 
Agreement, but only briefly outlines some major developments from the 1995 Framework 
Documents to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. More recently, there has been a growing 
interest in politics of the relationships between kin-states and their co-ethnics, mostly in relation 
to citizenship laws and development of foreign policy of kin-states.26 Caspersen (2007; 2008) 
analyses the nature of relationships between the kin-state leaderships and the kin community 
leaderships in the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia and Nagorno Karabakh. Caspersen’s analysis looks at 
the Serb-Bosnian, the Serb-Croatian Serb and the Armenian-Nagorno-Karabakhi relationships in 
terms of their power dynamics, but does not assess the roles played by the kin-states in regard to 
third-party peacemaking processes. Caspersen’s (2008, 370) conclusion is also limited, she simply 
suggests that “ the degree and the form of kin-state influence are likely to vary both between 
cases and, over time, within cases, and complete unity of kin-state and local leaders should not, in 
any case, be assumed.” 
The literature reviewed suggests that kin-states’ role in ethnic conflicts have not been fully 
explored, and particularly kin states’ role within third party peacemaking processes remains 
underexplored. Analysing kin-states’ involvement in the context of mediation is essential in order 
to assess whether this involvement is consistent or inconsistent with third party mediator’s and 
local parties’ goals. This involvement needs to be analysed in terms of kin-states’ influence on the 
context and process of mediation, specifically kin states’ roles and interactions with mediators and 
disputants within the context of peacemaking. A set of questions can be raised in order to guide 
the case study analyses with respect to kin-state involvement in the context of peacemaking 
interventions for power-sharing. What roles do kin states assume in peacemaking for power-
sharing? Do they act as mediators? What specific roles do they assume if they act as mediators? 
Do they assume tasks similar to a third-party mediator, such as facilitation of communication 
between the disputants, formulation of proposals, or act as power-brokers in the conflict? Many 
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would argue that kin-states are directly or indirectly parties to the conflicts and therefore cannot 
be considered as mediators. Moreover, it is often assumed that kin-states are likely to act as 
counterforces in a mediation process and provide the parties with resources to sustain the 
conflict. These arguments can be challenged by pointing out that there is a wider range 
peacemaking roles than often assumed. Kriesberg (1991) notes that there is a multiplicity of actors 
providing a variety of mediation services which are not only different persons and groups that are 
officially designated as mediators but also representatives of one side in the dispute who function 
as intermediaries between the government they represent and the other side. According to 
Kriesberg (1991, 23) the latter group can be conceptualised as quasi-mediators, and this category 
includes: 
[f]actions or even parties within the governing coalitions ruling one of the adversaries. 
They also include persons who are not officials but who have close ties with officials and 
act as agents for them, conducting unofficial inquiries or testing responses to possible 
official proposals. For some mediating services, quasi-mediators may be non-official 
groups without close ties to any government officials. 
Thus, it can be argued that some kin-states may also be acting as quasi-mediators. In that 
case mediation can no longer be conceptualised as a triadic relationship between the disputants 
and the third party. Likewise, the triadic structure suggested by Brubaker in explaining the kin-
state and kin community nexus would also become insufficient and require addition of the third 
party mediators into the structure. There would also be certain implications for a basic model of 
mediation. As proposed by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, 10-11), in a basic contingency 
model of mediation, it is assumed that there are two sets of variables in a given mediation: the 
context and process variables. The context variables are the nature of the parties, the nature of 
the dispute and the nature of the mediator, while the process variables are the mediator’s 
strategies. According to this contingency model, the interaction of these two sets of variables 
determines the outcome of the mediation. But in cases of mediations where kin-states are 
involved as quasi-mediators, or possibly in other forms as well, the contingency model would also 
need to account for kin-states as another variable. On the basis of findings from the case studies, I 
will reassess and expand on these theoretical suggestions in Chapter 7. 
3.5. International Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: From 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
The questions and propositions raised above cannot be addressed without situating peacemaking 
within the wider process of international intervention and conflict resolution. International 
peacemaking efforts are usually accompanied by peacekeeping missions in the field, and in the 
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post-Cold War era these interventions have been usually followed or supplemented with 
peacebuilding, and less frequently by statebuilding interventions. The combination of 
peacemaking and peacekeeping, however, may come with complications of its own, as 
peacekeeping can become either a political asset or a liability for the third party peacemakers. As 
will be discussed in the case study chapters, the UN’s involvements in Bosnia and Cyprus are prime 
examples of such entanglements. Although peacebuilding is widely conceptualised as a post-
conflict intervention, it can be practiced along peacemaking (as it has been in Cyprus), and it is 
often a continuation of a peacemaking intervention, which is the case in Bosnia. Given all these 
interlinkages, an overview of the conceptual developments in the broader framework of 
international intervention is necessary for underpinning the discussion in the following chapters. 
Peacebuilding and statebuilding have emerged as dominant discourses and practices of 
international intervention and have increasingly supplemented peacemaking and peacekeeping in 
the post-Cold War era. Although a distinct line has never been drawn between the first and the 
second generations of peacekeeping by the United Nations itself, the increasing number of 
deployments of the UN peacekeepers in civil war countries, mostly even before hostilities ended, 
in the early 1990s, is regarded as the beginning of the second generation of UN peacekeeping.27 
The first generation of United Nations peacekeeping, which was during the period of the Cold War, 
essentially entailed interposing peacekeepers between the conflicting parties and hoping for a 
resolution that would come through negotiations between the conflicting parties. It was based on 
three core principles: impartiality (of the UN involvement), consent (of the conflicting parties) and 
minimum use of force (by the UN peacekeepers). Most first generation missions were deployed in 
interstate conflicts but there were exceptions like Cyprus and Lebanon (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
and Miall 2005, 134-135). Bertram (1995) has identified four main substantial differences of the 
second generation from the first generation peacekeeping: (i) they mostly dealt with domestic 
conflicts, (ii) the government of host country was one of the parties to the conflict, (iii) the aim of 
the missions was either development or implementation of a political transition that comes after 
or during an end to military conflict, and (iv) the reform or establishment of basic state institutions 
constituted a central objective of the missions. Although there was a decline after the mid-1990s 
in the number of missions and troops deployed, which marked the end of high point of the second 
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generation operations, these four characteristics were largely present in most of the peace 
operations throughout the 1990s.  
The changes in peacekeeping were essentially due to a conceptual shift in how the 
international community, and particularly the UN, sought to get involved deeper into conflict 
resolution. In addition to UN’s traditional modes of intervention, which were preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in 1992, 
suggested “post-conflict peace-building” as a new component of UN peace operations. According 
to the Secretary-General, peacebuilding would seek to “… identify and support structures which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.28 Although this 
has become the most widely used and cited definition of peacebuilding, some weaknesses and 
limitations of the UN’s definition have also been pointed out.  Lederach (1997, 20), for instance, 
has provided his own much broader and comprehensive definition that emphasises the continuity 
of the peacebuilding process before and after any formal peace process: 
Peacebuilding is a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the 
full array of processes and approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards 
more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities 
that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not 
merely as a stage in time or condition. It is a dynamic social construct.  
There has been also advocacy for democratisation as a means of peacebuilding. The 
Secretary-General Ghali noted this as follows: 
The entire range of United Nations assistance, from support for a culture of democracy to 
assistance in institution-building for democratization, may well be understood as a key 
component of peace-building.29 
   Kofi A. Annan (2002), the immediate successor of Boutros-Ghali, also posited that 
democratisation should be the focus of international intervention, and underlined the essential 
need for dealing with issues relating the control of state and its power in civil conflicts.  
For international peace to grow, democracy must be restored where it has been broken 
down, or cultivated where it has yet to take root. These activities have much to do with 
the domestic affairs of states, and especially with the resolution or prevention of internal 
conflict … At the centre of virtually every civil war is the issue of the state and its power – 
                                                          
28
 UN Security Council (1992a), “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping - Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992”, paragraph no. 21, http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=A_47_277.pdf 
(accessed 28/8/2012). 
29
 Ibid, paragraph no. 46. 
64 
 
who controls it, and how it is used. No armed conflict can be resolved without responding 
to those questions (Annan 2002, 137-8). 
Peacebuilding through democratisation has thus become a major aspect of the 
international intervention framework.30 In the early 1990s, there was also a widespread optimism 
about results of UN peace operations and the international community was willing to initiate such 
missions.31 The optimism, however, would disintegrate because of a set of tragic failures. The 
unexpected and humiliating losses suffered by the US troops who were acting under UN 
authorisation in Mogadishu in 1993, the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, and the Srebrenica Massacre 
in Bosnia in 1995, as well as mixed results of the other missions initiated in the same period, led 
the international community to recognise certain weaknesses of UN operations, as the basic 
principles which they are built on such as impartiality and consent of all the parties to the 
mandate became questionable. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 15-18), what 
subsequently emerged was the third generation, which would seek peace enforcement,  with its 
defining characteristic being the lack of consent from one or more of the parties to the mandate of 
UN operation. The third generation operations would include an even broader array of tasks which 
would vary from the enforcement of ceasefires to the reconstruction of failed states. Moreover, 
the third generation operations were increasingly undertaken by regional security organisations 
and outside UN aegis, e.g. NATO (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005, 155-158). In the so-
called Brahimi Report of the ad hoc UN panel on peace operations convened by the Secretary-
General Annan, it was underscored that UN peacekeeping forces should be provided with 
capabilities and logistical support matching the requirements of their mandates, which would 
enable them to take sides where necessary. The report also advocated “a doctrinal shift in the use 
of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace 
operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions (my emphasis) 
and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments”.32 This particular 
recommendation on institution building, in fact, summed up a new and highly intrusive mode of 
international intervention, which would soon become known as statebuilding. 
The statebuilding recommendation was underlined with the attacks of 9/11; the attacks 
were widely interpreted as a testimony to the fact that failed states, whether due to civil conflict 
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or not, were now the main threat to international security. The repercussions of failed states were 
thought to be generating insecurity both at domestic and international levels; the transnational 
effects of the domestic conflicts such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organised violence were 
specifically pointed out.33 It was also argued that strengthening of state institutions should take 
precedence over democratisation in international peacebuilding missions (Paris 2004; 2006).34 
Statebuilding has thus become increasingly considered as the core task of international 
intervention. A prominent former UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi (2007, 5) underscores this 
conceptual shift succinctly: 
The concept of statebuilding is becoming more and more accepted within the 
international community and is actually far more apt as a description of exactly what it is 
that we should be trying to do in postconflict countries – building effective systems and 
institutions of government.  
In summary, international intervention has evolved from a limited model of peacemaking 
and peacekeeping, which was prevalent during the Cold War, towards an essentially intrusive 
peacebuilding and statebuilding framework. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 63-68) suggest that to 
what extent such peace operations are a domestic or international endeavour is determined by 
the capabilities and willingness of the international community and the domestic capabilities of 
the post-conflict society at the time of intervention, thus where there are very limited capabilities 
of the host-society, the international community is to have the opportunity to maximise its 
influence. This explanatory model seems to explain why international intervention has even taken 
the form of transitional administration by United Nations in some places, such as in East Timor and 
Kosovo.35 However, the intrusive nature of international intervention in the post-Cold War era has 
also been often critiqued, and it is pointed out that it is conceptually underpinned by a certain 
understanding of peace - i.e. the liberal peace. 
3.6. The Liberal Peace and Its Critiques 
Causal association of liberalism with peace can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s (1795) essay, 
Perpetual Peace, in which Kant argued that republics (which are liberal democracies in today’s 
sense) would be more peaceful in their dealings with each other. In the late 20th century, Kant’s 
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proposition became widely known as the democratic peace theory which holds that democracies 
rarely go to war with each other, and this is mostly attributed to success of liberal democratic 
institutions and norms that enable them to resolve their conflicts peacefully.36 A domestic version 
of the Democratic Peace theory is also suggested, and argues that democratic states are expected 
to be more peaceful domestically as well (Rummel 1995; Hegre et al. 2001). Essentially, both 
versions of the liberal peace paradigm is based on liberal theory which argues that mankind is 
mostly non-violent, rational, and cooperative and the relations among states are therefore 
generally cooperative and peaceful. Thus it is widely assumed that promotion of liberal democracy 
would lead peace between and within states, but it is often left obscure what exactly those liberal 
democratic norms and institutions are. Some have suggested that liberal states are distinguishable 
by a set of common characteristics that is shared by most of them, as Doyle (1986, 1156) has put 
it:  
There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call  liberal (emphasis in 
the original) resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognisable by 
certain characteristics – for example, individual freedom, political participation, private 
property, and equality of opportunity – that most liberal states share, although none has 
perfected (my emphasis) them all. 
As such, Doyle seems to emphasise the liberal aspect of liberal democracy, rather than 
simply equating it to representative government. Likewise, Danilovic and Clare (2003) argue that 
when Kant’s essays considered collectively, instead of solely focusing on Perpetual Peace, it can be 
posited that constitutional liberalism lies at the heart of Kant’s claim.37 In the context of 
international intervention, however, the liberal peace is simply used to refer to “the dominant 
form of internationally supported peacemaking and peacebuilding that is promoted by leading 
states, leading international organisations and international financial institutions” (Mac Ginty 
2010, 393). Politically, the liberal peace aims to construct a polity which follows Western liberal 
constitutional models. Paris (2002, 642-650) identifies some mechanisms of transmission which 
are employed by international actors to promote the liberal peace: the international community’s 
role in the making of the peace settlement and thus its influence over the content; provision of 
expert opinion to parties in the implementation phase; imposition of conditionalities that require 
certain political and economic reform in order to get economic aid; and the performance of some 
government functions even including some core functions such as defence, finance and judiciary. 
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A specific free market economic model has also been promoted as part of the liberal peace, and 
according Pugh (2005, 24), this entails: 
[t]ransformation through macro-economic stability, reduction of the role of the state, the 
squeezing of collective and public space, a quest for private affluence, and a reliance on 
privatisation and on exports and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth. 
The liberal peace is not merely about distinct political and economic frameworks, it is also 
a discursive milieu which exhibits a distinct set of assumptions (Richmond 2005; Heathershaw 
2008). Richmond (2005, 206) posits that the liberal peace is “a discourse, framework and 
structure, with a specific ontology and methodology”, which is underpinned by the dominant 
Western peacebuilding consensus. He identifies four major conceptual graduations within the 
liberal peace framework: the hyper conservative, the conservative, the orthodox, and the 
emancipatory peace; and notes that international interventions are often initiated on the 
conservative model (which is a top-down, state-led and hegemonic peace) with the aspiration of 
moving towards the orthodox, a still state-led, but relatively balanced and multilateral peace 
(Richmond 2005, 214-222). Richmond (2005, 227) points out that liberal peace interventions 
focuses on “the creation of the hard shell of the state”, instead of building a functional society and 
sustainable economy, and the overall result is a “virtual” peace which appears to the those outside 
something like the orthodox peace, while the local experience is rather like the conservative 
peace. 
The liberal peace has been subject of a wide range of critiques and some of these critiques 
have been very fundamental. It has been argued that liberal peace interventions are 
counterproductive and therefore should not be undertaken at all (See Herbst 2003; Weinstein 
2005), and that these interventions are very intrusive in affairs of host societies and as such can be 
framed as a new form of Western imperialism. One of the leading proponents of the imperialist 
critique, Chandler (2006) claims that statebuilding, particularly, is an imperial exercise of power by 
the West, and since the West denies taking responsibility for its deeds, this form of imperialism 
has become even more detrimental than once traditional imperialism was. Chandler (2006, 5) also 
regards most engagements of non-Western states with international institutions as statebuilding 
on the grounds that the essence of these engagements “includes forms of conditionality which 
relate to the internal governance mechanisms of non-Western states”. Paris (2002), in his early 
work, similarly claims that liberal peacebuilding could be regarded as a new form of “mission 
civilisatrice” which seeks to transform domestic political frameworks of its host societies. Both 
scholars thus focus on the imperial nature of relationship between third party interveners and 
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host society, but there remains one very crucial difference between the two: the former is critical 
of this essentially imperial relationship, while the latter appears to have become more 
comfortable with it (Paris 2004; 2010). 
Liberal peace interventions are also critiqued for constituting a new form of hegemonic 
control over host-societies, Duffield (2001, 34) has argued that: 
The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is 
different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct 
control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of 
authority. … Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked 
relation of governance. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation 
of economic, political and social processes. 
 Although the maintenance of Western hegemony and imposition of particular forms of 
governance through liberal peace interventions may appear in the interests of Western 
interveners, this perspective, however, becomes questionable if one is to note the costliness and 
rather limited influence of most international interventions on the host societies. As Newman 
(2009, 45) has argued, although it is useful to focus on how peace operations are shaped by 
broader forces and processes of international politics, also “it is highly questionable whether 
peacebuilding has such a momentous impact on these societies, for good or ill”. Moreover, as 
most liberal peace interventions take place in some of the world’s poorest nations where there are 
very limited economic opportunities, it seems rather implausible to assume that there are 
substantial economic gains for the intervening nations as it once used to be with traditional 
imperialism. Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that the relationship between the liberal 
peacebuilders and the host society is one of equals. As it will be pointed out in the case studies, 
there is a hegemonic aspect to liberal peace interventions. 
The economic dimension of the liberal peace paradigm is premised upon free market 
institutions. The free market institutions evolved in the West over the centuries and the 
externalities of the free market economics, such as unemployment and other social grievances, 
have been largely accommodated, whereas the adoption of free market economic institutions 
without sufficient remedies for the market externalities in post-conflict contexts have caused 
instability and suffering in host societies (Pugh 2005; 2010). Jabri (2010) specifically relates this 
situation to the nature of global economic system arguing that the liberal peace project is in fact 
not a project of peace, but one that seeks conformity to liberal international political economy by 
shaping societies to make them self-governing entities within distinct liberal lines. Likewise, 
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Newman (2009, 49) posits that Neoliberal Hegemonic approach to peacebuilding (as opposed to 
the Wilsonian one) is part of the machinery that props up a dysfunctional international system and 
manages the conflict produced by globalization, structural adjustment and social inequality. There 
is almost no doubt that market economics do not work towards management or resolution of 
conflicts, and can become one of the leading catalysts for recurrence of the conflict. Thus, the 
neoliberal culture of peacebuilding, which focuses on political reform and marketisation, should 
be replaced with one which also prioritises the everyday needs of locals, such as social justice, 
growth and economic stability (Richmond 2008, 295-300). 
Many have pointed out that international involvement in post-conflict societies have 
created a long term dependency that neither peace nor democracy can be sustained in the 
absence of internationals (Bastian and Luckham 2003; Burnell 2006; Zaum 2007) In democracies 
sovereignty is meant to belong to the people, so as such any international involvement violates 
this principle and lacks legitimacy which is essential for sustainable democratic development.38 So 
the international community denies the self-governance to the host nations by establishing 
international administrations that seek to strengthen the institutions of state, and by doing so 
international involvement inescapably breaches the sovereignty of the host nation. Zaum (2007, 
27) has called this the sovereignty paradox: “… international administrations compromise a 
fundamental aspect of a political community’s sovereignty by violating its right to self-governance, 
but do so with the aim of making it sovereign with regard to the relations between state and 
society”. Imposition of the liberal peace through undemocratic means brings about a dilemma 
between maintenance of peace in the short term and emergence of a home-grown self-
sustainable democracy in the long term. This dilemma lies in the fact that that democracy 
necessitates some form of peace and stability to develop and in post-conflict settings maintenance 
of peace is often through use of force by internationals, which in turn limits the political space 
available for nurturing domestically legitimate political institutions that are essential for long term 
democratic stability (Fortna 2008). This is particularly evident in cases like Bosnia where 
international involvement has repeatedly resorted to limit the political rights of some extremist 
political groups in order to maintain a modicum of peace. 
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 As Burnell (2006, 16) have noted: “In democracies the people are supposed to be sovereign. And a 
common notion is that democratization must come from within, not gifted from without. Possibly a truism it 
is also a practical observation, for unlike a truce, which can be imposed, democracy must be owned by the 
people. The involvement in political process is essential. Only then can the political arrangements secure a 
lasting legitimacy.” 
 
70 
 
Lack of legitimacy is also a problematic aspect of the liberal peace, as a peace process 
which is externally driven may not be seen as legitimate by the local public. It is also worth 
remembering that statebuilding, particularly, is a reconfiguration of the relationship between the 
state and the society, which cannot avoid the issues relating to the legitimacy of state (Menocal 
2010). The lack of local ownership is hugely problematic for the emergence of sustainable political 
institutions in many ways. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) point out that an informal contract between 
international actors and locals is mostly inevitable since both parties have fewer resources than 
necessary to reach their objectives unilaterally and therefore are likely choose to strike a bargain 
that will benefit them mutually. Thus, in the worst case scenario, a weak statehood can be 
strengthened by striking an informal bargain to create the appearance of change (since both 
parties benefit from such appearance) even though the existing state-society relations are largely 
left intact.  
3.7. Towards a Post-Liberal Peace:  Hybridity and Kin-states 
As there are many problems inherent in liberal peace interventions, particularly its dismal record 
of meeting everyday needs of its “subjects”, Richmond (2009) argues that the liberal peace should 
be replaced with a post-liberal approach which emphases the local needs and participation. 
According to Richmond (2009), a post-liberal peace needs to be built on the basis of a social 
contract between society and polity, and supported with a peacebuilding contract between 
international and local actors reflecting the social contract within the polity.39 The insufficiencies 
and internal inconsistencies of liberal peace are also noted to have led to hybridisation of the 
liberal peace frameworks. In various cases interactions between international and local actors 
have culminated in emergence of hybrid forms of peace (See Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and 
Mitchell eds. 2012). In other words, a post-liberal peace is constantly being sought in many post-
conflict situations as the liberal peace blueprints promoted by the international community are 
hybridised in local contexts at an interface, where “ the everyday activities, needs, interests and 
experiences of local and the goals, norms and practices of international policy-
makers/implementers overlap” (Richmond and Mitchell 2012, 1).  
In terms of hybridity in peacemaking, however, Mac Ginty (2008) posits that the space 
available for indigenous and traditional approaches to peacemaking has been minimised because 
of the dominance of a proto-hegemonic form of internationally supported peacemaking (i.e. the 
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 For the full list of suggestions for developing a post-liberal peace framework, see Richmond (2009, 578-
580). 
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liberal peace); for example, traditional and indigenous forms of dispute resolution, such as 
gathering of the local elders in Afghanistan, has been artificially resuscitated and co-opted by the 
external interveners. This is consistent with what Richmond (2005, 118) has claimed regarding the 
entry of international interveners in a conflict setting, that the entry would often be predicated on 
the conservative end of the liberal peace spectrum. Peacemaking as part of the wider liberal peace 
framework thus may seem the least likely process for hybridisation, particularly in its early stages, 
but in fact there might be particular contexts where peacemaking could also become somewhat 
hybridised. Liberal peace interventions are based on the assumption that there are two distinct 
parties to a liberal peace intervention: the international interveners and the local parties to the 
conflict. And a hybrid peace is conceptualised as emerging where the locals manage to resist and 
forge some changes to the liberal peace blueprint. However, it has not been noticed that in some 
conflicts the only parties to the intervention process are not the local parties and the international 
interveners, but there are kin-states involved as well, and this may further accentuate the 
hybridisation of the liberal peace. As kin-states can be conceptualised as both interveners and very 
close allies of the local parties, this would likely to lead to hybridisation of the liberal peace where 
a kin state becomes both an intervener and a recipient of the intervention. Since its interests are 
closely aligned with a local party, a kin-state is an indirect (or possibly even direct) subject of 
international intervention, and if it is co-opted by third party interveners, a kin-state can also 
become an agent of liberal peace intervention. In short, kin-states could assume a hybrid role 
within the liberal peace framework, which would likely to lead some form of hybridisation of the 
liberal peace. Along with the points raised earlier on kin-states, I will seek to elaborate on this 
point in Chapter 7 by drawing upon the case studies. 
3.8. A Framework for Analysis of International-Kin-state Intervention for 
Power-sharing 
This section provides a series of distinct of questions which will be applied to the cases in the 
subsequent chapters. The framework is essentially chronological and phases based because it 
seeks to explore how a power-sharing settlement is being agreed upon in the context of third 
party peacemaking intervention and kin-state involvement. This cannot be done without studying 
a certain period and exposing what conditions and events have brought about an ultimate 
outcome, as Sisk (2009, 43) has noted: “Critical in any process model of conflict termination is the 
actual sequencing of events that lead to a negotiated settlement, which may contain important 
implications for the outcome.” The questions are formulated on the basis of the discussion in this 
and the preceding chapters.  
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The Conflict’s Context and Analysis 
This initial stage of the analytical framework is about the structure, context and history of the 
conflict. There is also a brief discussion on the existing literature concerning the peacemaking 
intervention. This analytical stage primarily deals with the following questions: 
 What are the main dimensions of the conflict? What are the core issues at stake? 
 What external parties (such as kin-states, international actors) are involved? What roles 
have such actors played in the development of the conflict? 
The Process Leading to Substantive Negotiation 
The second stage of the analysis is to assess the process leading to substantive negotiations. The 
actors and factors involved in this process are very likely to be crucial in determining the course of 
the next stage of peacemaking intervention. The critical questions which guide the analysis are: 
 What actors and factors are involved in leading the process towards substantive 
negotiation?  
 Is the conflict “ripe” for resolution? Are the kin-states or third parties involved in 
“ripening” the conflict?  
 What are the incentives/disincentives which led the parties to move to the substantive 
negotiations phase? 
The Substantive Negotiations: The End Game and Its Dynamics 
Substantive negotiations refer to the period during which the disputants engage each other and 
seek to agree on a negotiated settlement. During this stage, the role of the mediator and the kin-
states are critical, especially towards the culmination of the talks. 
 Who mediates the negotiations? What mediation techniques (facilitation, formulation, 
coercion etc.) are used by the mediator? 
 What specific roles do the kin states and other involved international actors assume in the 
negotiations? 
 Do the kin-states engage in quasi-mediation with their kin communities? 
 Are the parties genuinely after a settlement? What goals, regarding the negotiations, do 
the local parties have? 
Assessment of the Power-sharing Model 
The political settlement’s main features are analysed in this section. Two questions are especially 
important: 
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 Is the political system envisaged by the settlement a particular form of power-sharing? 
 Does it envisage any role for the kin-states and other third party actors? 
Implementation 
Finally, there will be a brief discussion of post-settlement developments. And the following 
questions will be addressed: 
 What roles are assumed by the kin states and other third parties in implementation?  
 How do the roles of kin-states affect the stability of the power-sharing system? 
 Is the power-sharing stable without third party involvement? 
 If no settlement has been reached, what is the current state of the conflict? 
The case studies will be analytically based on this framework but there will be some variation 
across the cases. For instance, there was a full-scale war in Bosnia and the developments 
regarding the war will be a significant aspect of the analysis. And in Cyprus and Bosnia the past 
experiences of power-sharing were important factors and will be separately discussed. As the 
focus of this research is on peacemaking, the case studies primarily investigate the process leading 
to substantive negotiations, the substantive negotiations and then assess the power-sharing 
settlements. However, there will be some brief assessments on the implementation or the current 
state of the conflict. 
3.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on international intervention, especially mediation, as 
well as the currently limited literature on kin-states. It has sought to identify possible roles for 
third party peacemakers and kin-states in their involvements in deeply divided societies. The 
chapter’s analysis indicates that kin-states’ role in peacemaking is understudied. Quasi-mediation 
has been suggested as one of possible roles for kin-states within peacemaking processes. The 
liberal peace paradigm, which underpins international interventionism, is also discussed, and kin-
states’ potential for a hybrid role within a liberal peace intervention is highlighted. Finally, a 
framework for analysis has been developed, which will be used to analyse the cases in the 
following three chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Cyprus: The Never-ending Saga and the Negligence of 
Kin-states 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The Cyprus conflict has been on the agenda of the international community in one form or another 
for more than half a century. Many rounds of negotiations for a power-sharing settlement 
between the divided island’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have been held under 
UN mediation since the fall of the island's last power-sharing government in 1963. Unlike many 
previous rounds of negotiations, the negotiations held between January 1999 and April 2004 was 
one of the closest ever the parties approached a settlement. During this period UN’s involvement 
in the negotiations steadily grew and culminated in a comprehensive proposal that aimed to 
reunify the island under a power-sharing regime. The UN proposal, widely known as the Annan 
Plan, was ultimately put to referendum on the island and rejected by the Greek Cypriot 
community, though approved by the Turkish Cypriot community. 
The chapter first provides an overview of Cyprus’s recent history to posit main dimensions 
of the conflict, views of the parties regarding power-sharing and the roles played by Greece and 
Turkey as kin-states. This is followed by a brief review of the existing literature on the Annan Plan’s 
demise. Upon establishing the main patterns of the existing literature and demonstrating the need 
for an analysis of the role of Turkey as a kin-state involved in the UN peacemaking process (1999-
2004), the chapter proceeds to explore and disentangle the main dynamics behind the process. As 
for the kin-states’ involvement in peacemaking, the chapter argues that there were Turkey’s quasi-
mediation efforts engaging with the Turkish Cypriots, which were later replaced with more 
coercive tactics aimed at subduing the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. Meanwhile, Greece’s 
involvement was solely focused on promoting its kin community’s interests within the EU, 
especially by pushing for Cyprus’s EU membership. In short, the two kin-states were largely either 
negligent or inconsistent in their involvement in the UN peacemaking intervention. The chapter 
also discusses the Annan Plan, particularly the power-sharing system envisaged, and whether it 
was a balanced compromise meeting both communities’ main needs and concerns. Finally, the 
chapter looks at the referenda and its aftermath, and then concludes with an assessment of the 
UN’s role in mediating the Cypriot power-sharing negotiations.  
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4.2. A Contentious History:  Cyprus from a Failed Consociation to De Facto 
Partition 
It is essential to review the main developments in the history of the conflict to understand how 
these historical developments informed the positions of the two communities with regards to 
power-sharing. The island's first attempt at consociationalism in 1960 and the events leading to its 
disintegration in 1963, particularly, had a great impact on the two communities’ attitudes towards 
a future power-sharing deal. 
However, it is also important to note that Cyprus’s independent statehood was result of a 
rather unusual process. The independence of the island in 1960 was not based on a demand 
coming from the islanders but rather imposed on the people of the island by the colonial power 
Britain and the two kin-states, Greece and Turkey.40 In the 1950s when decolonisation movements 
were in full swing globally, the island’s larger community,41 Greek Cypriots, were demanding 
Enosis42 with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots were asking for Taksim,43 the island’s partition 
between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Cypriot struggle for Enosis included both armed 
resistance44 and diplomatic efforts, which involved various initiatives by Greece at the UN 
(Faustmann 2001, 9-13). The armed resistance of the Greek Cypriots to the British rule and the 
Turkish Cypriots’ objection to this also made the British and Turkish Cypriots temporary allies 
against the Greek Cypriots; most Turkish Cypriots were in favour of the continuation of the British 
rule instead of a union of the island with Greece. The relations between the two communities 
were thus deteriorating as the Greek Cypriot attacks on the British authorities also meant attacks 
on the Turkish Cypriots, who were well represented in the police forces of the island. In 1950s, the 
two communities occasionally clashed with each other, which led to scores of deaths on both sides 
and paved the way for an increasing feeling of mutual insecurity. By the late 1950s, the British 
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 Cyprus was a province of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878, until it was leased to the British Empire 
by the Ottomans in return of the British support against the Russian Empire. In 1914, it was annexed by the 
British in reaction to the Ottoman entry into the World War I in alliance with the Germans. In the Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923), in which the borders of the Republic of Turkey as successor state to the Ottoman Empire 
were settled, Turkey recognised the British rule over the island, and in 1925 the island was made a crown 
colony (Mallinson 2005, 9-21). 
41
 The exact composition of the island’s population is heavily disputed by the Cypriot communities, as both 
sides claim higher percentages for their own community in the total population of the island. According to 
the CIA World Factbook,  the composition of the island’s population(2001 est.) is: 77% Greek Cypriots, 18% 
Turkish Cypriots, 5% people with other ethnic backgrounds, such as the island’s native Maronite and 
Armenian communities, and the total population(July 2011 est.) is 1,120, 489. Source: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (accessed 7/8/12). 
42
 “Enosis” means union in Greek. 
43
 “Taksim” means partition in Turkish. 
44
 For a detailed analysis of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959), during which the British struggled to supress 
the EOKA (the Greek Cypriot paramilitary group), see Holland (1998). 
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were no longer keen to keep the island under their colonial rule and they invited Greece and 
Turkey to become their partners in settlement of the conflict. In February 1959, the two kin-states 
of the Cypriot communities bilaterally negotiated an agreement by which Cyprus would become 
independent.45 According to some accounts, even in the late 1950s the British were still reluctant 
to cede their sovereignty over the whole island. But when Greece and Turkey unexpectedly 
reached an agreement in 1959, Britain was forced into, partly due to US pressure, accepting the 
island’s independence and in return maintaining two military bases on the island (Varnava 2010, 
98). 
4.2.1. The 1960 Consociation and Its Demise 
The 196O constitution of Cyprus, built on the provisions set out in the Zurich (1959) and London 
(1960) Agreements, envisaged a consociation between the island’s two main communities, and 
also provided some minority rights for the island’s Maronite and Armenian communities. 
Consociationalism was embedded in almost all aspects of the 1960 political system: powers at 
most organs of the government were to be shared between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities. The executive branch of the government was to consist of a Greek Cypriot President 
and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, both having veto rights over the most crucial issues, such as 
ones relating to security and finance. Distribution of power within the council of ministers, which 
would be headed by the president and the vice president collectively, was also carefully balanced 
between two communities by allocating certain quotas to each community. There were quotas for 
both communities in the army and public sector employment as well, usually 65% allocated for 
Greek Cypriots and 35% for Turkish Cypriots. 
 At international level, the Cypriot independence and constitution were guaranteed by a 
treaty between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in which the three guarantor powers were 
granted the right to intervene, together or unilaterally, in order to restore the 1960 status quo.46 
However, implementation of the 1960 constitution immediately became problematic: for the 
Greek Cypriots, the island’s independence was not a happy turning point as Enosis was banned and 
power in the new state of affairs had to be shared with the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the 
negotiation of the basic terms of the 1960 constitution by the Greek and Turkish governments 
without effective participation of the two communities meant the agreement lacked any 
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 “Zurich Agreement: Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus”, Zurich, 11 February 1959, 
http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/agmt-zurich.html (accessed 7/8/12). 
46
 “Treaty of Guarantee”, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/484B73E4F0736CFDC22571BF00394F11/$file/Treaty%20of%2
0Guarantee.pdf (accessed 7/8/12). 
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legitimacy, particularly the Greek Cypriots considered the constitution as an imposition. The Greek 
Cypriots were particularly displeased with the quotas in public employment and the veto rights of 
the Turkish Cypriots, and perceived these as unfair arrangements which are causing inefficiencies 
in the government (Dimari and Varnava 2011). The first disagreement was about the composition 
of the army battalions: the Greek Cypriots preferred mixed battalions while the Turkish Cypriots 
insisted on each battalion being solely from one community. At the same time, the two 
communities continued to develop their paramilitary forces, which were originally set up in the 
1950s, and those organisations (the Greek Cypriot EOKA47, the Turkish Cypriot TMT48) would 
become major players in inter-communal conflict. Disagreements also emerged regarding the 
provision of the constitution which stipulated the right of Turkish Cypriots to set up separate 
municipalities in the island’s major towns, as well as about implementation of the public 
employment quotas, which were favouring Turkish Cypriots. By 1963, the Greek Cypriots were 
blocking establishment of the separate municipalities and the Turkish Cypriots were retaliating by 
blocking budget and taxation legislation at the Republic’s House of Representatives. In November 
1963, President Makarios suggested a set of amendments to the constitution to deal with the 
deadlock. The set of amendments49 in effect meant curbing the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriots, 
and were promptly rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Baier-Allen 2004, 80-83; Richmond 
1998, 77-80). 
By late December, the tension between the two communities was dramatically high as 
both feared an immediate attack from each other. On 21 December 1963, the inter-communal 
violence broke out in Nicosia and then quickly spread across the island in the following weeks. As a 
result of this situation, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government, but whether this was 
a voluntary or forced withdrawal is still heavily debated. The Greek Cypriots have maintained that 
the Turkish Cypriots vacated their seats at the cabinet and the other government offices in the 
hope that this would trigger a Turkish intervention and they deemed the Turkish Cypriots as 
“rebels” (Kyriakides 1968, 112; Markides 1977, 21-34). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, 
have argued that they were forced to leave their posts because they were either prevented by the 
Greek Cypriots or could not attend their duties due to the security situation. They also have 
regarded the solely Greek Cypriot composed government as “unconstitutional” (Ertekun 1984, 
215-218; Necatigil 1993, 53-56). Although it is hard to establish how it exactly happened, the result 
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 EOKA is the abbreviation for the “National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters” in Greek. 
48
 TMT is the abbreviation for the “Turkish Resistance Organisation” in Turkish. 
49
 “The 13 Points: Suggested Measures for the Removal of Causes of Friction between the Two 
Communities”, 29 November 1963, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.html (accessed 7/8/12). 
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was very clear: the 1960 consociation was dead. From then on, the island’s two communities have 
never participated in the same government. The political situation would be further aggravated 
when the UN Security Council Resolution 186, passed in March 1964 to establish the UN 
Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), explicitly referred to the government of Cyprus.50 This 
was at odds with the Turkish Cypriots’ view that there was no constitutionally legitimate 
government of Cyprus at the time. The resolution thus contributed towards creation of an uneven 
relationship between the two sides in terms of international status: the Greek Cypriots received 
international recognition, while the Turkish Cypriots were denied such status (Richmond 1998, 90-
99). 
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots, following the incidents in December 1963, began resettling 
their population in a few enclaves (covering approximately 5% of the island) and also set up a 
separate administration. With the arrival of the UN peacekeepers in 1964, particularly after 1967, 
the security situation was somewhat stabilised (Lindley 2001, 80). Meanwhile, the first ever round 
of UN mediation (1964- 1965) failed when the mediator’s proposals were rejected by the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey. After a two year gap, the representatives of the two communities began 
holding negotiations in 1968, which lasted until the situation took a turn for the worse in 1974, and 
the UN’s role was, this time, limited with provision of good offices (Richmond 1998, 106). On 15 
July 1974, a Greek backed coup d’état aiming at union with Greece deposed President Makarios 
and installed Nicos Sampson, a Greek Cypriot ultranationalist, as president. On 20 July, alarmed by 
these developments, Turkey militarily intervened, invoking her role as a guarantor of the 1960 
status quo. 
4.2.2. De facto Partition (1974) and Beyond 
As a result of the Turkish military intervention, the partition, which is still prevalent today, took its 
form: a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, separated from each other by an UN-
patrolled buffer zone. In terms of territory, the Greek Cypriots have remained in control 59.74% 
and the Turkish Cypriots 34.85% of the island, while the UN controlled Green Line (i.e. buffer zone 
between the two sides) covering 2.67% and the British Bases 2.74% of the island. Both sides agree 
that in the case of a solution there will be some territorial adjustments favouring the Greek 
Cypriots, though their views substantially differ on the amount and locations of such adjustments. 
The de facto partition of the island has definitely led the paths of the two communities to further 
diverge. The 1974 ceasefire line became almost an interstate “border”, and was maintained as such 
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 UN Security Council (1964), “The Cyprus Question: Resolution 186”, 4 Mar., 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf (accessed 7/8/12). 
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until the Turkish Cypriot authorities largely lifted the restrictions on the freedom of movement 
between the two parts of the island in April 2003.51 Another major development in the post-1974 
era was the Turkish Cypriots’ unilateral declaration of an independent political entity in the north, 
namely the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The international community (except 
Turkey) did not welcome the TRNC’s independence declaration.52 
The trust which was almost completely lost during the episodes of violence in the 1960s 
and the mid-1970s became even more impossible to be rebuilt under the post-1974 de facto 
partition conditions. The two communities’ divergent interpretations of the disintegration of the 
1960 consociation continued to hinder the two sides from reaching a compromise solution. 
Regarding power-sharing, the Greek Cypriots pointed out the imposition of an unfair and 
inefficient constitution on them in 1960 as the main reason for the disintegration in 1963 and 
argued for a more majoritarian political system. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the previous 
regime failed to protect them and demanded a more entrenched and guaranteed form of power-
sharing – i.e. confederation (Olgun 2001). Also, the two sides drew totally conflicting conclusions 
about security and guarantees in a reunified Cyprus: the Greek Cypriots considered continuation of 
the Treaty of Guarantee, which, they claimed, led to the de facto partition, as unacceptable, while 
the Turkish Cypriots maintained that the Treaty of Guarantee prevented the coup d’état achieving 
its goal of union with Greece and therefore should remain in force (Ker-Lindsay 2008). 
The only major agreements ever reached by the leaderships of the two communities since 
the collapse of the 1960 regime are the High-Level Agreement (1977) and the Ten-Point 
Agreement (1979), in which the two communities agreed that a reunified Cyprus would be a 
bizonal, bicommunal federation.53 But the sides repeatedly failed to agree on how to substantiate 
these parameters. The Greek Cypriots, though they accepted bizonality and federalism in principle, 
in negotiations insisted on a centralised and loosely bizonal framework;  the Turkish Cypriots, 
regardless of the fact that they agreed to a reunification in principle, sought a weak central 
government and strictly bizonal structure. In terms of power sharing, the Greek Cypriots argued for 
a majoritarian framework with very limited, or preferably none, veto rights for the Turkish Cypriots. 
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 BBC News (2003), “Emotions as Cyprus Border Opens”, 23 Apr., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2969089.stm (accessed 7/8/12). 
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 The UN Security Council passed two resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 541 and 550) deeming the unilateral 
declaration of the independence of the TRNC illegal and calling upon states not to recognise it as such. 
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 “The High-Level Agreement”, Vienna, 12 March 1997, 
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The Turkish Cypriots, however, demanded an equal say in almost all aspects of decision-making. In 
short, the parties' visions of federalism and power-sharing have often been almost diametrically 
opposed to each other. Many rounds of negotiations between the two sides, therefore, did not 
produce any concrete results during the 1980s and the 1990s, despite all the efforts spent by the 
successive UN Secretary-Generals. As Richmond (1998, 242) underlines, the negotiations process 
was often viewed by each party as “… an agent of legitimation for the international and the 
internal position of each side, and then as an agent of the legitimization of its negotiation 
positions”, and both communities were in fact looking for an ally in the mediation process to 
strengthen their positions towards their unilateral objectives. Thus, the parties’ positions regarding 
a solution to the conflict largely remained stagnant over the years, which in effect led to 
reinforcement of the status quo. 
Moreover, two additional issues emerged and gained significance as the conflict persisted 
and the island remained de facto partitioned. Those are the issues of Turkish “settlers” and 
“properties”. The issue of “settlers”, or Turkish “immigrants”, resulted from the movement of 
people from Turkey to the northern part of the island, which the Greek Cypriots regarded as an act 
of colonisation by Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots view is that such people should be regarded as 
economic immigrants. As many “settlers” are granted citizenship by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, 
their status in a reunified Cyprus has become an issue of contention.54 The issue of “properties”, 
meanwhile, is a direct result of the de facto partition and the subsequent resettlement of many 
people within the island; approximately 100,000 Greek Cypriots moved to south and 40,000 
Turkish Cypriots to north, both leaving their properties behind.55 The two sides hold opposing 
views about a solution to this issue as well. The Greek Cypriots maintain that the original owners 
should have the first say over their properties. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, argue that 
the Greek Cypriot suggestion would not be possible, given the level of development since 1974 as 
well as their preference for a strict bizonality, and instead propose a wholesale exchange of the 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot properties along with some form of compensation.56 
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 The exact number of people that can be labelled as “settlers” is unknown. The Turkish Cypriot side 
disputes the term and therefore does not provide any statistics on it. However, Hatay (2005, VIII), by drawing 
on the TRNC census data and electoral rolls, estimated that the number of those originally from Turkey that 
are citizens of the TRNC is between 32,000 and 35,000 plus offspring. 
55
 The two sides hold different views about the exact amount of the properties in this condition. However, a 
combined analysis of both sides’ claims shows that 60-70 % of the land in the northern part of the island is 
owned by the Greek Cypriots and that between 12-22% of the land in the southern part of the island is 
owned by the Turkish Cypriots (International Crisis Group 2010, 2-5). 
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 The issue has become even more complicated when some Greek Cypriots who left properties in the north 
sued Turkey at the ECHR arguing that northern part of the island is under the Turkish control and their 
property rights are violated. For discussion of one such case, see E. MackAskill (2005), “Turkey Faces Huge 
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In sum, the imposition of the 1960 consociation and the subsequent developments that 
led to the island’s de facto partition has made Cyprus an unlikely candidate for a power-sharing 
regime. As discussed in Chapter 2, Lijphart (1996) posits eight favourable conditions for 
consociationalism: geographical concentration of segments; no majority segment plus segments of 
equal size; external threats; small population size; overarching loyalties; small number of 
segments; tradition of elite accommodation; socioeconomic equality.57 Cyprus seems to have only 
its small population as a favourable condition. Although two other factors may initially appear 
favourable, they are in fact undermined by some other traits of the conflict. The number of social 
segments is just two, however, that is largely weakened as a favourable condition as the Greek 
Cypriot community is far larger than the Turkish Cypriot one. And the geographic concentration of 
the segments is a result of the de facto partition, which is not accepted by the Greek Cypriots. 
However, despite all these bleak prospects, there is still a realist argument that can be made for 
power-sharing on the island. A unitary and majoritarian political system is unacceptable for the 
Turkish Cypriots, and a two-state solution is strongly rejected by the Greek Cypriots and the 
international community, hence a form of power-sharing coupled with federalism becomes the 
compromise solution. 
4.3. Why did the Annan Plan Fail? 
The failure of the UN mediated process to reunify Cyprus under a power-sharing regime prompted 
many scholars to look for the reasons behind this outcome. Many have pointed out a number of 
factors specific to each Cypriot community and their interpretations of the Plan that led to the 
divergent outcomes in the referenda. Some other accounts, however, focus on the role played by 
certain third party actors, the UN in mediating the negotiations leading to the referenda and the 
EU’s involvement through Cyprus’s EU accession process. 
In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, according to Bahceli (2004, 56-58), the 
overwhelming acceptance of the UN Plan was largely because the Turkish Cypriots were 
increasingly convinced that there was no prospect for the TRNC’s international recognition and the 
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Plan was meeting their basic demands, such as autonomy in their affairs and the continuation of 
Turkey’s guarantorship. It has been noted that the Turkish Cypriot business community, civil 
society actors and main opposition parties played crucial roles in shaping the public’s view of the 
Plan (Balkir and Yalman 2009; Kaymak and Vural 2009). A set of domestic considerations are also 
identified as the reasons for the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots. Trimikliniotis 
(2006) argues that the public debate on the Plan among the Greek Cypriot community was lacking 
clarity and objectivity, and was manipulated by some perceptions of the Plan propagated by the 
“No” camp led by the President Papadopoulos and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus. 
Anastasiou (2007, 199) shares the same view and contends that the Greek Cypriot leadership even 
presented the public its own erroneous interpretation of the Plan. Ker-Lindsay (2005, 135) claims 
that the single most important factor behind the Greek Cypriot ‘No’ vote was the stance that 
President Papadopoulos took against the Plan. However, some suggest that the Greek Cypriot 
public overwhelmingly opposed to the Plan due to their concerns about the Plan’s provisions 
regarding the issues of property, settlers, security and guarantees (Faustmann 2009; Lordos 2009; 
Michael 2007). In other words, in the case of Greek Cypriot community concerns about the Plan 
and the opposition of political leadership are widely regarded as the main factors leading to the 
“No” vote. 
The roles of the UN and the EU in the 1999-2004 process have been also analysed. Ker-
Lindsay (2009a, 161) argues that the process could be defined as arbitrated mediation, or in short 
meditration, and the only reason the Plan did not fall unambiguously within the bounds of 
arbitration was the fact that there was not any formal sanctions attached to the Plan.  According 
to Ker-Lindsay (2009b, 231-2), the failure of the Annan Plan process was mainly due to two main 
causes: the international actors concentrated  too hard on the Turkish Cypriots while misjudging 
the Greek Cypriots’ feelings about the Plan, and also the fact that meditration is essentially an 
undemocratic tool and therefore de-legitimising itself in the eyes of the public. As for the EU, Tocci 
(2007, 50) identifies the disconnection of the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus’s EU 
accession process from a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the 2002 Copenhagen 
European Council decisions as the main factor undermining the peace process. It has been also 
argued that the EU lacked conflict transformation tools, such as civil society level conflict 
resolution workshops and track two level diplomatic activities, which could be used for improving 
the conditions for peace on the ground (Akcali 2009; Diez 2002; Eralp and Beriker 2005).  
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This brief review of the existing literature indicates that the kin-states’ role in the 1999-
2004 UN peacemaking intervention in Cyprus has not been fully analysed. Regarding Greece, it is 
often noted that Greece played a significant role within the EU promoting the EU accession of 
Cyprus (Muftuler-Bac and Guney 2005 286; Tocci 2004, 123-134). However, although there are 
often references to Turkey’s role in the case of Turkish Cypriots, the evolution of the Turkish-
Turkish Cypriot relationship vis-à-vis the UN peacemaking process (1999-2004) remains 
unexplored. Therefore, this aspect of the peacemaking intervention will be particularly 
investigated in the following analysis. 
4.4. EU Incentives for Everyone: The Dynamics Behind the Emergence of 
the Plan 
Given the historically entrenched patterns of the conflict, and the dismal record of the previous 
peacemaking interventions, what could explain the UN’s revival of its peacemaking intervention in 
1999? Was this due to a sudden change in the Cypriot communities’ hardened positions? This 
section seeks to disentangle and analyse the main dynamics of the process leading to the Annan 
Plan and its referenda in order address these questions.58  
UN's efforts that culminated in the referenda on the island in April 2004 can be traced 
backed to December 1999. The first phase in this four year process was the proximity talks that 
were held from December 1999 to November 2000; the second phase was the direct negotiations 
from January 2002 to March 2003; and the final phase of the negotiations was between February 
2004 and the end of March 2004. The tabling of the first version of the ‘Basis for Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ (i.e. the so-called Annan Plan I) by the United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan came roughly in the middle of this four year process. 
Although the history of Cyprus negotiations were not encouraging, the UN, and many others actors 
in the international community, was convinced that a set of developments had paved the way for 
reaching a settlement as of December 1999.59 These developments were that in December 1999 at 
Helsinki European Summit the European Council decided that Cyprus would be among the 10 
countries joining the European Union in the next enlargement and Turkey was now officially 
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declared as a candidate for EU accession, and also some other parallel developments which 
improved the long strained relations between Greece and Turkey.60 
Among these developments, Cyprus’s EU membership prospect was the most crucial one, 
which essentially set a deadline for the progress of the talks, as the Helsinki European Council 
(1999) decisions noted: “… a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, 
the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this 
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”61  This statement could be interpreted as 
pointing that a Cyprus settlement would not be required before EU accession and, in that case the 
absence of a solution would mean admitting the Greek Cypriots to the Union while leaving Turkish 
Cypriots outside. The possibility of the accession of a divided Cyprus also carried the eventuality of 
putting a future Turkish EU membership at risk as the Greek Cypriots would be expected to block 
such membership once they joined the EU. However, the reference to consideration of “all relevant 
factors” while a decision to be made on the accession of Cyprus implicated that although 
resolution of the conflict was not a precondition, there was some room left for manoeuvring in 
order to pressure the Greek Cypriots.62 Whereas, for the Turkish Cypriots, it was obvious that they 
would be left out unless there was a solution to the conflict, and as such their accession was 
contingent on a settlement of the conflict. 
The UN’s first step towards initiating a peacemaking process was taken some months 
before the Helsinki European Council Summit, in June 1999, the UN Security Council (1999) 
Resolution 1250 requested the UN Secretary-General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiations 
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in the autumn of the year.63 The resolution also called upon the sides to commit themselves to 
negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General by adhering to the following principles: 
no preconditions, all issues on the table, commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a 
settlement is reached and full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties.64 
Another crucial development in terms of the UN’s efforts to move the process forward came with 
the appointment of Alvaro de Soto as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus in 
November 1999. Before this appointment the post of the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser 
on Cyprus was not a full time one, which reflected the slow pace of the peace process, but with 
the appointment of de Soto the UN’s commitment and involvement were set to grow (Hannay 
2005, 105). The first session of proximity talks were held in New York in early December 1999 
between Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, respectively the leaders and chief negotiators of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The beginning of the talks just days before the Helsinki 
Summit was telling, as it underlined the linkage with Turkish efforts for seeking EU candidacy.65 In 
total, five sessions of proximity talks were held either in the presence of the Secretary-General or 
his Special Adviser. The format of the talks followed the pattern of the UNSG or his representative 
meeting the parties separately. This was the result of the demand by the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
that he would not meet the leader of the Greek Cypriot community face to face unless the latter 
recognized the existence of the TRNC. Handicapped by the format, nevertheless, the proximity 
talks aimed to prepare ground for negotiations. 
When it became clear that the proximity talks would lead nowhere, the UN decided to step 
up its efforts by suggesting a framework for negotiations titled “Preliminary Thoughts”.66 It was 
presented by de Soto to the parties on 12 July 2000, and asked the leaders to respond in the next 
session later in the month. The “Preliminary Thoughts” set the basic outline that would later 
become the basis of the Annan Plan. Some important concepts that came out of this document 
and maintained throughout the process were that the settlement should leave nothing to be 
negotiated after a solution, include binding timetables and commit Cyprus to EU membership. And 
in other respects, it broadly followed the outline set out in the earlier UN blueprints for Cyprus: 
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envisaging a federal Cyprus consisting of two entities, political equality of the two communities, 
emphasizing a balanced solution to property and territory aspects of the conflict. The two leaders’ 
response to the document was to further push for their own respective cases, thus it did not bring 
about a change in the proximity talks towards setting the ground for full-fledged negotiations. On 
the 8 November 2000, the fifth session of proximity talks ended with a statement from the 
Secretary-General. The statement largely followed the “Preliminary Thoughts” document but went 
further in details. Most notably, it introduced a new methodology in the conduct of talks, the 
Secretary-General (as cited in Hannay 2005, 137-138) noted: 
Since no useful purpose would be served by myself or Mr de Soto conveying proposals 
from the parties back and forth, we are working towards a single negotiating text as the 
basis for negotiations. For this process to succeed it is essential that you provide specific 
comments on the ideas put forward by the UN. I would ask you to give us indications of 
what you feel might not be fair or viable in the ideas we put to you, and why. This would 
be more helpful to the process than substitute proposals, position papers or suggested 
amendments. Without your specific comments, and those of the other side, we cannot 
take them on board in revising our submissions, and your participation in shaping the 
negotiating text will be hampered. I ask you to engage with us fully in this way so as to 
enable us to advance on all issues simultaneously. 
 
The novelty of this statement was that the UN hinted its intention to table a proposal in 
the future phase of the talks and asked the parties to contribute towards this in a certain way. 
However, the invitation to sixth session of proximity talks were declined by Denktash and thus the 
proximity talks came to an end. The Turkish Cypriot leader’s reaction was mainly due to two issues: 
the new methodology, which he and the Turkish delegation to the talks described as “UN Diktat”, 
and the internationally unrecognized political status of the Turkish Cypriots outside the negotiation 
framework. The recognition issue was a long-running complaint of Denktash, which he repeatedly 
asked for a remedy. In fact, under the UN talks’ framework, the parties were simply referred to as 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and their leaders respectively as the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders. But, as noted earlier, since December 1963 when the last power-sharing 
government fell apart, the Greek Cypriot leadership was also the only internationally recognised 
government of the island. According to Denktash, at least the acknowledgement of the TRNC was 
needed to put both parties on equal footing outside the UN framework as well. Otherwise, 
Denktash argued, the Greek Cypriots would not need to engage in negotiations fully and instead 
use their international status to put more pressures on the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish 
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government also supported Denktash’s argument and the talks came to a halt in November 2000.67 
The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were also concerned about the Secretary-General’s statement in 
which he suggested that the comprehensive settlement should not constitute an obstacle to 
Cyprus’s EU membership; this part, they claimed, was leading to the conclusion that the EU would 
play a crucial role in the making of the settlement. 
But the international community, led by the UN, the UK and the US, were not willing to put 
an end to the process. The concerted efforts of the UN, the UK and the US to bring Denktash back 
and resume the process were described by Hannay (2005, 144-145) as follows: 
When de Soto sat down with Moses [the US Special Envoy to Cyprus] and myself in New 
York on 18-19 January we had no difficulty in agreeing on the way ahead, even if we had 
no illusions that would it would be easy or quick. There was no inclination to take no for an 
answer. The arguments were pressing on, in particular the approach of the conclusion of 
EU enlargement negotiations, remained convincing. Nor was there any inclination to 
discuss Denktash’s preconditions. …  Since we were aiming to get the Turks and Denktash 
back to the negotiating table without making any concessions of substance, we agreed to a 
division of labour. De Soto would lead on all matters relating to Annan’s 8 November 
statement. … The US and UK would meanwhile use all means possible to bring home to the 
Turks that Denktash’s walk-out was  damaging them to an increasing extent as time 
passed. 
 
 These combined efforts worked, and it was secretly agreed between the US and Turkey 
that the Turkish government would convince Denktash to return to negotiations. In September 
2001, Denktash declined the Secretary-General’s invitation for talks68, and instead went on to write 
a letter to Clerides, in November, proposing to meet face to face without any preconditions. The 
subsequent correspondence culminated into an agreement on starting direct talks, which begun 16 
January 2002 in the presence of the UN Special Adviser Alvaro de Soto.69 
The progression of the direct talks, though, was no different than the prior indirect talks. It 
gradually became clear that the leaders were unlikely to reach any agreement as the talks usually 
turned into discussions about the past rather than full-fledged negotiations. Only some headway 
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was made on a small number of issues by the initial target date of June.70 The lack of progress, 
however, convinced Secretary-General Annan that the best way forward would be a UN proposal: 
It was abundantly clear by this time that, left to their own devices, the two leaders would 
not be able to reach an agreement. The process had, however, given the United Nations a 
detailed understanding of their positions, and the time to generate ways of bridging them 
in a manner which sought to meet the legitimate underlying concerns, needs, interests 
and aspirations of each side in manner consistent with those of the other. I therefore gave 
careful consideration to the question of submitting a written proposal.71 
 
 The Secretary-General’s meeting with the leaders on the island as well as in Paris and New 
York, held respectively in May, September and October, also did not result in much progress. In 
New York, the leaders agreed to create three technical committees: one working on international 
obligations of the new Cyprus, another focusing on the laws of the common state, and last one on 
the technicalities of territorial adjustments and property issues.72 After the New York meeting, 
Denktash had his heart surgery in the city and the direct talks did not resume until January 2003. 
Meanwhile, the UN presented the first version of the Anan Plan under the title of “Basis for 
Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”.  The Plan was given to the 
two Cypriot communities and the guarantor states on 11 November 2002, a week after the early 
general election in Turkey. The timing of the Plan seem related with the EU accession process of 
Cyprus and the upcoming Copenhagen European summit, and according to Palley (2005,33), the 
UN was manipulated by the EU: 
… it will be recollected that in October 2002 the two sides agreed to an enhanced role for 
the Special Adviser in relation to making “bridging proposals”. His team of lawyers then 
devised a Draft Plan, on which they had long been working. The document was a patch-
work of compromises, and was later to be known as “the Annan Plan”. By later dated 6 
November 2002, the President of the European Union, the then Prime Minister of 
Denmark, Mr Rasmussen, requested that the Plan be presented, and the Special Adviser 
on 11 November 2002 presented the first public version of the Plan (Annan I). This was a 
UN construction following bi-lateral talks, and it had not been negotiated between the 
parties concerned. 
 
The result of Turkish election was likely to affect the course of negotiations, the outgoing 
DSP/ANAP/MHP government, led by Prime Minister Ecevit who ordered the Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus in 1974; Ecevit’s government often tended to have hardline policies, e.g. supporting the 
Turkish Cypriot leader’s insistence on separate statehood and sovereignty for Northern Cyprus. 
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Whereas the incoming AKP government was hinting a rather moderate stance, as Tayyip Erdogan - 
the AKP chairman at the time due to ban preventing him becoming the PM yet- remarked: 
Hawkish policies will get us nowhere. ... I cannot understand the logic behind claims that 
we would lose Cyprus. What is gaining and what is losing? That should be figured out in 
the first instance. We are talking about a new state in Cyprus based on two equal, 
sovereign states. … This problem has not been solved for decades. We want a solution 
now, not new problems.73 
  
 The AKP leader was signaling a policy change despite Denktash and his Turkish allies' 
resistance.74 But whether that change would be implemented soon was not still clear. The account 
of the negotiations thus far points the existence of EU accession incentives for all of actors 
involved in the conflict acted as the prime catalyst behind the start and continuation of the 
negotiations and then the emergence of the Annan Plan. In short, the EU helped furthering the 
process by offering incentives to all those concerned: EU membership prospects for both sides of 
Cyprus and Turkey. Moreover, some state actors, such as the UK and the US, were also crucial in 
moving the process forward, especially when the UN's ability as a mediator was not sufficient to 
put it back on track. 
4.5. The Copenhagen and The Hague Summits: The End of the Road? 
With the Annan Plan I, the Secretary-General asked the parties to respond to his proposal within a 
week. But as Denktash was hospitalized in New York after his heart surgery, the Turkish Cypriot 
reaction was not prompt. The Turkish government was also newly formed and still in the process of 
acquainting itself with the developments, hence not yet ready to make substantial changes in 
Turkish policy regarding the Cyprus conflict. In the end, the Turkish Cypriot response arrived on 27 
November 2002 and was rather lukewarm, though agreed to negotiate on the basis of the plan. 
The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, responded much earlier, on 18 November 2002, that they 
would be ready to negotiate on the plan, given that the formal decision about their EU accession 
was going to be made in a month’s time; they, after all, had to seem conciliatory to get the final 
approval from Copenhagen European Council for EU the membership. However, according to 
Palley (2005, p.33 footnote no. 1): “Upon discovering the Plan’s likely contents, President Clerides 
vehemently objected in letters of 24 October and 5 November, threatening not to sign”. In other 
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words, the Greek Cypriots were aware of the contents of the plan before they officially received it 
and their objections to the Plan were already conveyed to the UN. 
  After receiving the parties’ initial reactions to the Plan, the UN Secretary-General tabled a 
revised version taking into account concerns of both sides on 10 December 2010, only two days 
before the Copenhagen European Council. The Secretary-General also asked both leaders to be 
present in Copenhagen for negotiating and then signing the Plan. However, Denktash sent in his 
foreign minister instead; though he had authority to sign an agreement should Denktash make 
such a decision.75 Although some negotiation took place as de Soto shuttled between the parties. 
The negotiations did not show any sign of progress. The Turkish Cypriots raised their concerns, 
while Greek Cypriots took advantage of this: “Mr Clerides took a non-committal position; in view 
of the negative attitude of Mr Denktash the question whether the Greek Cypriot side would sign 
became theoretical.”76 No agreement was reached on the Plan in Copenhagen, but the EU 
membership of Cyprus, along with nine other candidate states, was decided to take effect on 1 
May 2004. Both the EU and the UN this time called on the Cypriots to reach an agreement by the 
end of February 2003, the date set in the Annan II for finalizing the Plan. Also, the Copenhagen 
European Council (2002) noted that Turkey's EU accession negotiations would start immediately 
upon her completion of political reforms needed for satisfying the EU's Copenhagen criteria, thus 
providing further incentives for Turkey to substantially change her Cyprus policy.77   
The Cypriots resumed negotiations in early January, and the technical committees also 
started working on laws and treaties that would be binding for the future state. This round of 
negotiations continued until the end of February, with only a briefly interruption when the Greek 
Cypriots held their presidential election in mid-February. The result was no different than the 
previous rounds. Meanwhile in the Greek Cypriot presidential election Glafcos Clerides lost to 
Tassos Papadopoulos, the immediate effect of this change in leadership was expected by the UN 
Secretary-General (UNSG) to be minimal as Papadopoulos indicated to him that the process would 
continue along the lines it had been going on.78 However, Papadopoulos, in his letter to the UN 
Secretary-General on 28 February 2003,79 expressed a long list of concerns and finished stating 
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that he reserved his right to further comments. Then, on contrary to the UN Secretary-General’s 
claim, Papadopoulos seems to have, early on, indicated that he had some substantial objections to 
the Plan. 
The UNSG presented the third version of the plan on 26 February, and with the third 
version, the methodology of how the plan would be adopted was changed. Until the third version, 
the leaders’ signatures were required before putting the plan to referendum but, with the Annan 
III, the leaders were now asked to only agree that they would put the Plan that would come out of 
the negotiations to referendum. That is to say, they were going to commit that there would be a 
referendum over the Plan. This change was clearly intended to prevent Denktash from blocking the 
process going ahead. Since last December there had been many mass demonstrations80 in 
northern Nicosia in favour of the plan, which probably led the UN to conclude that Turkish Cypriot 
public opinion was mostly in favour of the plan and Denktash was losing his people’s support. In 
order to respond to the new UN proposal, the two leaders were called to The Hague to meet the 
Secretary-General. In The Hague, Papadopoulos said he would accept to put the plan to 
referendum; his only condition was that the plan that would be voted on should be complete in its 
entirety.81 However, according to the UNSG, “The conditions which Mr. Papadopoulos laid down to 
submitting the plan to referendum were stringent. … Mr. Papadopoulos also argued that one or 
two months were required between the completion of the negotiations and the referendum; this 
would have exceeded the time frame and prevented the signature of the Treaty of Accession by a 
reunited Cyprus. In the event, Mr. Denktash’s rejection of my request to submit the plan to 
referendum made it pointless to press Mr. Papadopoulos on these issues.”82 Given Papadopoulos’s 
earlier mentioned long list of objections stated in his 28 February 2003 letter, it can be claimed 
that Papadopoulos’s conditional acceptance was most probably strategically motivated, as he was 
secure in the knowledge of Denktash’s rejectionist stance.  
Denktash, on the other hand, said that he had objections about the basic principles of the 
plan and was not ready to put the plan to referendum.83 At this point, Turkey also indicated its 
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inability to make a commitment regarding the part of the plan, which required the signatures of 
the guarantors as well, on the grounds that such a commitment would require an approval from 
the Turkish parliament. This was an issue that was not mentioned before but came up at The 
Hague, and therefore confused the UN and the others involved, the US, the EU and the UK, 
whether it was a genuine issue or a tactical one, and Papadopoulos underscored that such a 
commitment from the guarantors was necessary before a referendum could be held.84 During The 
Hague summit, the UN’s aim was to have an agreement before the signing of the Cyprus’s 
accession treaty to the European Union on 16 April. Eventually, however, the UN offered the 
parties to extend negotiations until 28 March and deciding about holding the referendum by then. 
Denktash rejected this proposal as well, and the summit ended without any progress. The UN 
confirmed that the process was over, though suggested that the plan were to remain on the table 
as the Secretary-General noted: “… the process had reached the end of the road … I made clear, 
however, that my plan remained on the table, ready for the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish 
Cypriots to pick it up and carry it forward if they could summon the will to do so.”85 
The process seemed to have died for the remainder of the 2003. But in December 2003 
general election in Northern Cyprus political parties in favour of the plan strengthened and 
managed to gain exactly half of the seats in the Turkish Cypriot parliament. The leader of the 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) Mehmet Ali Talat formed a government with the Democratic Party 
(DP) of Serdar Denktash -the son the Turkish Cypriot leader- and became prime minister of the 
TRNC. The outgoing National Unity Party (UBP) government was traditionally a backer of the 
Turkish Cypriot leader; whereas Talat led CTP was arguing that Denktash had missed two historic 
opportunities: one at the Copenhagen summit and another one at The Hague summit. According 
to Talat, the Annan Plan was mostly acceptable and could be improved through further 
negotiations.86 Nevertheless, these political changes in the Turkish Cypriot politics were not 
sufficient to resume the negotiations: Denktash was still the Turkish Cypriot president, and 
therefore the chief negotiator, and his term would not expire until 2005, and his son was the 
foreign minister of the new Turkish Cypriot government. 
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In terms of the dynamics moving the process forward, in the run up to the Copenhagen 
and The Hague summits, Cyprus’s EU accession was still the prime catalyst again, and the UNSG’s 
strategy largely rested on the assumption that the Greek Cypriot side was committed to the Plan, 
though, in fact, there were some early signs that they had some substantial objections as well. On 
the UNSG’s part, the mediation strategy seems to have focused too much on Denktash while 
neglecting the concerns of the other side and by doing so losing the chance to develop a strategy 
which would be needed to tackle Papadopoulos in the future. Likewise, the EU also seems to have 
neglected the Greek Cypriot side, especially when it did not attach any conditions to its decision 
approving the Cypriot accession to the Union at the Copenhagen Council. 
4.6. Enter Erdogan: Reconfiguration of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the 
Reemergence of the Annan Plan 
Although the political developments on the island were not totally promising, the AKP government 
in Turkey was pondering a change in Turkey’s long maintained Cyprus policy. The AKP government 
grew dissatisfied with Denktash’s intransigence which, they believed, led the negotiations process 
to a collapse and paved the way for the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus’s accession to 
the European Union.87 The Turkish government was keen to begin its own EU accession 
negotiations and Cyprus’s accession to the EU was set to be a problem for Turkey as Turkey did not 
recognize the Greek Cypriot government. In January 2004 the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met 
the UN Secretary-General Annan at the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland.88 In that meeting, Erdogan asked Annan to restart the process and assured him that 
his government would support it and also pressure the Turkish Cypriots to do so as well: 
For its part, the Government of Turkey was putting together the elements of a new policy 
on Cyprus, which was conveyed to me by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when we 
met in Davos on 24 January 2004. He told me that Turkey supported a resumption of 
negotiations. He expressed preferences for dealing with the main issues by 1 May 2004, 
and for a political figure to handle the negotiations, but was open to discussion on these 
points. He added that, as far as Turkey was concerned, it had no objection to my “filling in 
the blanks” in the plan should the parties not be able to agree on all issues. He assured me 
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that, henceforth, the Turkish side, including the Turkish Cypriots, would be “one step 
ahead” in the effort.89 
 
 Subsequent to this meeting, the Secretary-General met Greek Cypriot leader who also 
assured him about his willingness to negotiate on the basis of the plan. The Secretary-General then 
asked Denktash and Papadopoulos to meet him in New York and restart the process. Once he 
received the letter, Denktash travelled to the Turkish capital and met the Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan. Erdogan sought to persuade Denktash to attend the New York meeting and they 
negotiated a five-page list of changes the Turkish Cypriots would demand on the Annan Plan.90 In 
other words, this meeting was a quasi-mediation process led by Turkey as a kin-state. Erdogan's 
public statements and the evolution of the process after the Ankara meeting indicate that the 
Turkish government also tightened its grip on Denktash. On 13 February, on the first day of the 
New York meeting, Erdogan declared that if Denktash would not stick to the road map agreed in 
Ankara “... the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will pay for that”.91 It was not clear 
exactly what consequences were there for the Turkish Cypriots. However, it was no secret that the 
Turkish Cypriots were dependent on Turkey for both military aid and economic assistance.92 The 
Turkish government thus initially engaged in quasi-mediation and then turned to coercion to deal 
with its kin community’s intransigent leader. Denktash responded the Turkish government’s 
strategy by seeking to form a public opinion against the Plan through his statements to the Turkish 
media and occasionally in his addresses to public gatherings in Turkey organised by his allies in the 
Turkish opposition parties, but the support received from the public was far less than he 
expected.93 
At the New York meeting which took place 10-13 April, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister 
Talat, widely seen as an ally of the Turkish government, was with Denktash. When Denktash 
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attempted to side with Papadopoulos to reject the procedure about finalisation of the plan by 
UNSG and the commitment to hold a referendum on the finalised Plan, the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
in the face of the pressure from the Turkish government and his own Prime Minister, changed his 
mind overnight and accepted the framework.94 After seeking some clarifications, Papadopoulos 
also changed his mind and agreed to the UN’s framework. Palley (2005, 103), a member of the 
Greek Cypriot diplomatic team at the summit, claims that the ultimate reasoning behind the Greek 
Cypriots’ acceptance of the UNSG’s new procedure was that “… they knew that the final word on 
the Secretary-General’s conduct would be by the people of Cyprus through citizens direct and 
personal votes at the referenda.” More strikingly, Palley also notes (2005, p. 103 footnote 19) that: 
“The international furore had his [UNSG] good offices been rejected would have been so damaging  
that the Republic of Cyprus’s [i.e. the Greek Cypriot government] position as the State of Cyprus 
could have been thrown to reconsideration by angered States.” In sum, in both cases the leaders 
submitted to the process as they were motivated by likelihood of certain sanctions from other 
states or a kin-state, rather than a genuine commitment to a settlement through the UN’s 
procedure. It should also be noted that the United States was noted as playing a key role, at the 
request of Turkey, in convincing the UNSG to restart negotiations and also bringing about a deal at 
the New York summit.95 
The UN’s new proposal was that both leaders would follow a three phase procedure: first, 
they would negotiate until 22 March; and if there is no agreement then an international 
conference, attended by Greece and Turkey as well, would be convened to finalise the plan; and if 
there is still no agreement, the UN Secretary-General was to finalise the plan that was going to be 
submitted to referendum in April. This procedure effectively meant arbitration by the United 
Nations, though it was not clear whether the leaders would accept the outcome of the arbitration 
and campaign for its acceptance by their respective communities in the referendum. Moreover, 
the international conference was to be attended by the EU as well and hence creating more 
pressure on the parties to agree on finalising the plan. The three phase procedure in place, Weston 
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(the US representative to the Cyprus talks) believed the settlement was definitely within reach: ''It 
is almost certain now that there will be a settlement on the island of Cyprus.''96  
4.7. The End Game: the International Conference and Finalisation of the 
Plan by the UNSG 
The negotiations restarted on the island 19 February. As the Turkish Cypriot team included Prime 
Minister Talat, his Foreign Minister Serdar Denktash, in addition to the Turkish Cypriot leader, the 
Turkish Cypriots were more engaged. But the Greek Cypriots were increasingly non-cooperative, as 
the UNSG noted: 
The Greek Cypriot side regularly insisted on full satisfaction of its demands, while arguing 
that the Turkish Cypriot paper of 24 February was outside the parameters of the plan and 
thus precluded engagement with Turkish Cypriot proposals. When the Turkish Cypriot side 
produced a priority list on 18 March, this did not alter the Greek Cypriot attitude to Turkish 
Cypriot concerns. (That paper, together with the letter of transmittal from the United 
Nations to the Greek Cypriot side, found its way into the press.) The Turkish Cypriot side 
argued that the Greek Cypriot delay in exposing the extent of their demands was 
preventing the beginning of real negotiation, and amounted to filibustering. … An 
additional factor inhibiting frank discussions at the table was the regular public disclosure 
of the contents of the negotiations, usually with a negative spin, either by Greek Cypriot 
leakage, or by the daily oral briefings of Mr. Denktash to the press, ostensibly for the 
Turkish Cypriot public.97 
 
At the end of the first phase of negotiations, which took place on the island, the progress 
at the leaders’ level was limited and far from completion, though there was quite substantial 
progress at the technical committees’ level.98 The leakages to the press and the negative spin 
accompanying those were, in fact, the signals that the parties were sending their constituents in 
order to shape the referendum outcome. It can even be suggested that both the Greek Cypriot 
leadership and Denktash regarded the negotiations as a platform to form a public opinion against 
the Plan, which was not even yet finalised. Also, Denktash decided not to attend the UN convened 
international conference by claiming that “I don't believe [the situation] will change. Therefore I 
won't go to Switzerland”.99 
As the final agreement could not be reached through the negotiations on the island, the 
international conference convened in Bürgenstock, Switzerland on 24 March. The Turkish Cypriots 
                                                          
96
 Thomas G. Weston quoted saying in “Cyprus Greeks and Turks Agree on Plan to End 40-Year Conflict”, The 
New York Times, 14 February 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/14/world/cyprus-greeks-and-turks-
agree-on-plan-to-end-40-year-conflict.html (accessed 7/8/12). 
97
 UN Security Council (2004), op. cit., paragraph no. 22-23.  
98
 Ibid, paragraph no. 29-30. 
99
 “Leader to snub UN's Cyprus talks”, The Guardian, 18 March 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/18/eu.turkey?INTCMP=SRCH (accessed 7/8/12). 
97 
 
were represented by Prime Minister Talat and his Foreign Minister Serdar Denktash. During the 
Bürgenstock conference, again the Turkish Cypriot team was engaged in the process and promptly 
provided a short list of changes the UN asked parties to submit. Whereas the Greek Cypriot leader 
Papadopoulos was present but not willing to negotiate and sometimes even inaccessible to the UN 
team; the Greek Cypriot side also refused to hold direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots, and 
failed to produce a short list of crucial demands, instead producing a 45 page document.100 All 
these, in effect, meant the rejection of the UN led process by the Greek Cypriots. 
There was not any agreement in the end of the second phase either. In the following third 
phase of the agreed procedure, the UN submitted a fourth version of the plan on 29 March and 
after consultations with the parties finally presented the very last version -Annan Plan V - on 31 
March. In his closing remarks to the conference, Secretary-General Annan portrayed his plan as the 
only realistic option available: “Let me be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and 
some other magical or mythical solution. In reality, at this stage, the choice is between this 
settlement and no settlement.”101 Whether the Cypriots would chime in with this view and support 
the Plan would be decided in the referenda held separately on both sides. The power-sharing 
system envisaged by the Plan, as well as whether it was a fair and workable compromise meeting 
the two sides’ main concerns, will be discussed next. 
4.8. The New State of Affairs: Consociational Power-sharing? 
There were five different versions of the Annan Plan presented to the parties over two years. The 
provisions of the plan regarding the power-sharing system of the united Cypriot state were mostly 
maintained across the five versions of the Plan. The following analysis will be based on Annan Plan 
V, which was the final version which went to the referenda.102 
The Plan’s provisions were not only about detailed workings of the political system, there 
were also provisions concerning the other crucial aspects of the conflict as well. Those other 
provisions included the continuation of the international guarantee regime for maintenance of the 
new state of affairs by Greece,  Turkey and the United Kingdom (satisfying the Turkish Cypriot 
demand); a Property Board composed of equal number of members from each constituent state 
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and non-Cypriots members for settling the property disputes within some parameters (striking a 
balance between the two sides’ view), some territorial adjustments between the two Cypriot 
states (benefiting the Greek Cypriots by transferring approximately 7% of the whole island’s 
territory from the Turkish Cypriot control to the Greek Cypriots), and a number of regulations 
regarding the number of Greek and Turkish troops that would remain on the island (bringing the 
numbers down to the 1960 levels over a ten year process, partially satisfying both sides). These 
provisions of the plan could be regarded largely balanced, given that both parties could not 
achieve all of their key demands in case of a compromise solution. 
The overarching federal political entity of the reunited Cyprus under the Annan Plan was 
named “the United Cyprus Republic” (UCR).  The UCR itself would be constituted by two 
communal level political entities: the Greek Cypriot State and Turkish Cypriot State. Article 1 of the 
constitution of the United Cyprus Republic (UCR) was defining the new state as follows: “The 
United Cyprus Republic is an independent and sovereign state with a single international legal 
personality and a federal government and consists of two constituent states, namely the Greek 
Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State.” The emphasis on the single international personality 
and sovereignty of the UCR was meant to appease the Greek Cypriot fear that a united Cyprus 
based on a federal political structure would be used as a stepping stone by Turkish Cypriots to 
achieve separate statehood in the future. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot fear was that a 
strong federal government would be used by Greek Cypriots to get to a unitary state in future, and 
their fear was tackled by the architects of the plan through a set of articles of the constitution 
which underscored the federal nature of the UCR and prohibited amendments to change the basic 
terms of the constitution.103 The pattern of relations between the constituent states and the 
United Cyprus Republic was clearly defined in the constitution of the United Cyprus Republic 
insomuch that there was no hierarchy between federal and state laws.104 
At the legislative level, the constitution stipulated two chambers: the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies. According to Article 22 of the Constitution, the Senate would have equal 
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numbers of Greek and Turkish Cypriots members who would be elected separately by their 
respective communities. Here, it should be pointed that the constitution explicitly refers to Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots rather than citizens of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot constituent 
states.105 This provision could be interpreted as guaranteeing equal representation of the two 
communities regardless of future demographic changes in composition of their respective 
constituent states. To accommodate the Plan’s provisions into the European Acquis 
communautaire, particularly those with respect to the demographics of the constituent states, a 
draft act was also included in the annexes of the Plan for adoption of the European Union.106 
Article 2 of this draft act noted that either constituent state may impose restrictions to ensure that 
no less than two-thirds of its permanent Cypriot citizens speak its official language as their mother 
tongue. Although this measure was against one of the main principles of the EU, particularly the 
freedom of residence within the Union, and was likely to be challenged at the European Court of 
Justice, it was included in the Plan to solidify the bicommunality and bizonality of the UCR. 
The composition of the Chamber of Deputies, which was to be based on the principle of 
proportionality, stipulated that at least a quarter of the Chamber’s members should hail from each 
constituent state. Given that the Turkish Cypriots were around 18% of the island’s population, this 
provision implied their overrepresentation. The presidents and vice presidents of both legislative 
bodies were also required to be not from the same community at the same time, and a similar 
principle would apply to selection of the two vice chairs of both the president of the Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies. In terms of voting procedures, each decision of the Parliament would 
require approval of the Senate with a quarter of the senators from each constituent state being 
present and voting. Moreover, some specific set of issues would require a special majority of at 
least two fifths of sitting senators from each constituent state, as well as a simple majority of 
deputies present and voting. The issues within this realm most crucially included approval of the 
federal budget, ratifications of international treaties, and election of the presidential council, 
citizenship, immigration, and taxation laws.107 In short, it can be said that a complicated veto 
mechanism was deeply entrenched in legislative process. The situation was no different at the 
executive level as Article 26(6) provided that at least one third of its voting members and one third 
of its non-voting members must hail from each constituent state, and Article 26(7) stating that at 
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least one member from each constituent state voting in favour of a decision required for its 
adoption. 
Similar provisions for guaranteed representation of both communities were also envisaged 
for the Central Bank, the offices of Auditor General and the Attorney General. At the federal 
judiciary level, the Supreme Court of the island would be composed of equal number of judges 
from the two constituent states in addition to three non-Cypriot judges.108 Supreme Court 
decisions would be taken by simple majority and this makes it the only crucial element of the 
political system of the UCR in which there is no qualified majority or veto mechanism embedded. It 
can be said that the presence of three non-Cypriots and simple majority decision making 
mechanism are provisions that are meant to achieve effective decision-making as the Supreme 
Court was envisaged as the arbitrator of the disputes that may emerge between the federal state 
and one or two of the constituent states and between the constituent states. According to Article 
36(2) of the constitution, any such disputes would be in exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was given the authority to make an interim decision when 
a deadlock in a matter of vital importance for functioning of the federal state or one of its 
institutions arises.109 This meant the Supreme Court would ultimately become an arbitrator in 
executive disputes as well. However, as Cypriot judges are likely to vote along with their respective 
communal allegiances, the ultimate arbitrator would be the three non-Cypriot judges. In order to 
prevent a deadlock emerging due to disagreement between the Cypriots, third party arbitration 
was thus provided at the Supreme Court level. 
Three of the main institutional features of consociational power-sharing (grand coalition, 
proportionality and mutual veto) were embedded in the UCR’s legislative and executive decision 
making bodies and procedures. And the fourth institutional principle, segmental autonomy, was 
provided by giving authority to the constituent states in areas of policy making that were not 
specified in the constitution within the jurisdiction of the federal state; the list includes, among 
others, education, health, and security within their territories.110 Furthermore, the article 15(2) of 
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the constitution notes that such jurisdictional competencies would be exercised “sovereignly” by 
the constituent states.111 
Overall, the Annan Plan envisaged a consociational political system which would create an 
entrenched power balance between the Cypriot communities. Achieving a power balance under 
consociationalism usually requires smaller group (or groups) getting overrepresented in a number 
of political institutions. Accordingly, the Annan Plan provided for Turkish Cypriot 
overrepresentation at legislative, judicial and executive organs of the federal state. As noted in 
Chapter 2, consociational theory posits that overrepresentation through quotas and mutual veto 
rights are essential elements of the elite level bargain to stabilise a divided society as the elites 
realise that there is no other sustainable alternative for achieving stability. In the case of Cyprus, 
the elites were not motivated to reach such bargain; initially the Turkish Cypriot leadership and 
then the Greek Cypriot leadership were not convinced of the necessity of sharing power with each 
other. A bargain was ultimately struck by the UN Secretariat General’s team of experts, who tried 
take into account the gravest concerns of both sides, and seems to have largely succeeded in doing 
so. However, whether their consociational blueprint for Cyprus would be approved in the 
referenda was still dependent upon the role of Cypriot elites in persuading their respective publics. 
4.9. The Referenda and Its Aftermath 
On 24 April 2004, only a week before the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the Annan Plan was put to 
simultaneous referenda in the two parts of the island. The Greek Cypriot community 
overwhelmingly rejected the plan, with a 75.83 per cent ‘No’, whereas the Turkish Cypriot 
community approved with a 64.90 per cent ‘Yes’.112  
Annan Plan V met fierce opposition from the Cypriot leaders. The Greek Cypriot leader, 
Tassos Papadopoulos, supported by a group of political parties and the Greek Orthodox Church of 
Cyprus, led a fierce ‘No’ campaign.113 The Greek Cypriot leader’s main argument was that the 
Greek Cypriot community’s EU membership was set to be materialized soon, precisely one week 
after the referenda, regardless of the outcome thereof, and the Greek Cypriots, according to 
Papadopoulos and his political allies, would be getting a new leverage against the Turkish Cypriots 
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and Turkey to secure a better deal in the future.114 Some anticipated that the Plan would be 
supported by the communist AKEL, the largest Greek-Cypriot political party and also a member of 
the political coalition which supported Papadopoulos in his presidential bid. In the event, the party 
demanded security guarantees for implementation of the Plan from the UN Security Council. The 
efforts to provide such guarantees failed when a resolution with a reference to Article 7 of the UN 
Charter was vetoed by Russia at behest of Papadopoulos.115 
On the other side of the divide, Denktash and the main opposition UBP campaigned 
against the Plan. Their main objection was that that there were no sufficient guarantees for the 
Turkish Cypriots, during his “No” campaign Denktash also alleged the Turkish government and 
media of putting immense pressure on his people.116 In the run up to the referendum the ruling 
AKP of Turkey also called on Denktash to resign if the referendum succeeded.117 Meanwhile, the 
Turkish Cypriot prime minister, Mehmet Ali  Talat, worked very closely with the Turkish government 
during the Annan Plan negotiations and led a ‘Yes’ campaign in the referendum.118 In April 2005 
TRNC presidential election, Denktash did not seek re-election and was replaced by Talat.119  
In 2006, Talat and Papadopoulos began a new round of negotiations under the UN 
mediation, which soon proved fruitless.120 A glimmer of hope emerged when Papadopoulos lost his 
re-election bid in 2008 and Dimitris Christofias of AKEL became the Greek Cypriot leader. The fact 
that Christofias was known to be more conciliatory towards the Turkish Cypriots than 
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Papadopoulos led many to suggest that a deal was within reach. However, no such deal was 
materialised, and in the April 2010 Turkish Cypriot presidential election Talat lost to Dervish Eroglu 
of the UBP, a nationalist veteran of Turkish Cypriot politics.121 The negotiations between Christofias 
and Eroglu reached a deadlock by early 2012 and were suspended in May 2012, and there seems 
to be no prospect of a deal until at least February 2013 Greek Cypriot presidential election.122 
4.10. Conclusion 
The Cypriot elites’ lack of commitment towards a power-sharing agreement was the most 
important factor in the failure of the UN peacemaking intervention. But the account of the process 
(1999-2004) also demonstrates that the organisation was not able to play a significant role at many 
critical junctures in the talks because it was often devoid of means to motivate parties towards a 
compromise solution, and the UNSG’s efforts seeking to instil a sense of urgency on the parties 
towards a settlement largely failed. This case study of Cyprus underlines the complexity of 
relationships between the Cypriot communities, their kin-states and the third party peacemaker. 
The Turkish-Turkish Cypriot interaction was largely shaped by Turkey’s desire to join the EU, which 
led the Turkish leadership to seek initially a quasi-mediation role and then a coercive role in 
shaping the Turkish Cypriot policy vis-à-vis the UN peacemaking process. And the UN seems to 
have sought to deal with its lack of clout with the Turkish Cypriots by taking advantage of Turkey’s 
EU accession process and deep involvement as a kin-state in the conflict. Meanwhile, in the case of 
Greece and Greek Cypriots the kin-state-kin-community relationship was predicated on Greece’s 
support for the latter’s EU process, and a role similar to Turkey’s was not assumed by Greece in the 
peacemaking process for two main reasons. Since the Greek led coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974 
triggered the Turkish intervention and the island’s de facto partition, Greece’s influence over the 
Greek Cypriots was substantially reduced, and also there was no direct consequence for Greece 
from the continuation of the Cyprus conflict. However, within the EU, Greece promoted the Greek 
Cypriot interests and even threatened to block the EU’s eastern enlargement if Cyprus were not 
included (Tocci 2004). 
During the Copenhagen summit in 2002, the Turkish Cypriots were not prepared to engage 
fully in the process, and when they were ready to do so at the Bürgenstock conference in 2004, 
this time the Greek Cypriots were not willing to negotiate. These developments reflected a pattern 
of the Cyprus conflict: both sides alternately acted as spoilers of peace processes ever since the 
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beginning of the conflict. Both Cypriot communities have certain strengths that enable them to 
pursue the conflict rather than agreeing to a compromise solution. Since the disintegration of the 
1960 consociation in 1963, the Greek Cypriots have been recognised as the government of Cyprus 
(and hence a member of the UN) and there has been a few quite strongly worded UNSC 
resolutions against international recognition of the TRNC. The UN’s general policy towards the 
conflict is thus firmly established, with almost no room for flexibility. The status quo leaves the 
Greek Cypriot side with only one major incentive for a solution: recovering the Greek Cypriot 
properties in the north. As for the Turkish Cypriots, they have been denied an international status 
since 1963 and become dependent on Turkey for sustenance of their de facto statehood. But their 
negotiation positions have often been as hardened as the Greek Cypriot ones, especially as long 
they did not clash with Turkey’s wider foreign policy objectives.  
In terms of the mediator’s role, the 1999-2004 peacemaking process was not essentially 
shaped by the UN. The process was instead manipulated by the EU and Turkey. Turkey, through its 
influence on the Turkish Cypriots, and the European Union, through the accession processes of 
Cyprus and Turkey, were the crucial players. As discussed, Turkey’s desire to join the European 
Union was the main reason why Denktash agreed to participate in the UNSG mediated process and 
subsequently submitted to the UNSG's finalisation of the Plan and the referenda. For the most 
part, the Greek Cypriots tried to appear conciliatory in order to keep their EU accession on track. 
However, when the accession was guaranteed, they stopped engaging in the UN led process. 
According to Alvaro de Soto, the UNSG’s special adviser on Cyprus, the failure was ultimately due 
to the fact that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots changed their course rather late, when there was 
no incentive left for the Greek Cypriots: 
The problem is it all happened rather late: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots turned around, 
but they turned around too late and by the time the negotiation had been going for a 
couple of years the Greek Cypriots had got the impression the Turkish Cypriots, particularly 
their leader Rauf Denktash, were being their usual obdurate selves. By then Greek Cypriot 
public opinion had pretty much given up on it and when the presidential election came 
they elected someone they knew to be much more of a hardliner and much less 
committed to a settlement than the person who had been leading them until then. So, the 
EU decided to enlarge the Union with ten states, and the Greek Cypriot leader made a 
speech a few weeks before the referendum on the settlement plan in which he said 
something like, 'why should I agree to a compromise that I don't particularly like when I 
will be able - once we are in the EU in a few weeks - to exert pressure on Turkey in order to 
get a better deal.' And that proved to be a killer argument. In other words we ran out of 
time. The incentive was there, which for the Greek Cypriots was entering Europe reunified, 
but after a certain point, whether it was late 2002 or early 2003, we had probably missed 
the boat because they were already in a position where they could get the reward 
contained in the incentive without having to pay anything for it (Accord 2008, 26). 
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De Soto does not explain whether the UN team took into account the weakness of the 
incentive structure after late 2002 and tried to deal with it. Manipulation of the incentive structure 
(i.e. EU's enlargement policies) was most probably not within the UNSG’s reach. It should be, then, 
questioned why the UN invested almost five years in a process which was inherently flawed. The 
most likely explanation is that the UN’s focus on Denktash made it harder for them to notice that 
there might be some other potential spoilers, e.g. Papadopoulos. Also, it could be argued that the 
UN committed a strategic mistake by not pushing for the leaders’ consent to the Plan at the New 
York summit in February 2004. The referenda mechanism was devised to get around Denktash’s 
intransigence, but the UN failed to see that without a requirement to commit to the outcome of 
the process (i.e. Annan V) the leaders could continue to undermine the UN’s work through their 
influence over their publics. As the Cypriot elites were neither willing nor ready to compromise, 
the UNSG’s mediation efforts should have been supported with a combination of strong incentives 
and disincentives to motivate the Cypriots. Maintenance of the conditionality of reaching a 
settlement for EU accession beyond Copenhagen and indicating the international community’s will 
to take some steps towards legitimising the Turkish Cypriot statehood could have been very 
effective incentives/disincentives. Both options, though, would require consent and cooperation of 
a number of states, the EU, including Greece, for making the Cypriot accession conditional and the 
UN Security Council in legitimising the statehood. 
The efforts spent by the UNSG and his team of experts towards piecing together the Annan 
Plan were huge and the Plan itself was largely successful in striking a balance between the basic 
needs of both sides. The case of Cyprus indicates that power-sharing regimes cannot be built solely 
through the efforts of a third party peacemaker. A feeling of urgency should also be shared by the 
local elites. The de facto partition of Cyprus and the subsequent relative stability of the conflict 
seem to have led the Cypriot elites to believe that there is no urgent need for a political 
settlement. As long as the Cypriot elites continue to pursue their idealistic goals and are still 
enjoying their publics’ support, it is unlikely that there will be a power-sharing settlement. 
Moreover, the role of kin-states was ultimately inconsistent or negligible and, at times, 
counterproductive for peacemaking purposes. Without consistent and considerable kin-state 
pressure on their co-ethnic allies to enter into a compromise agreement, the position of the 
Cypriot elites is not likely to change, and such pressure currently seems improbable as the conflict 
is a matter of secondary importance to both Greece and Turkey. 
106 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Bosnia: Kin-states from Quasi-mediators to Enforcers 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The disintegration process of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia caused a number of 
conflicts among its constituent entities and peoples. The war in Bosnia123 was the most brutal one 
of those conflicts: the cruelty of warfare and civilian suffering reached to the levels that had not 
been witnessed on the European continent since the end of the Second World War. The war 
ended on 21 November 1995 with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA was not merely a 
peace agreement, it also provided for an intricate power-sharing regime among Bosnia’s three 
main ethnic groups, namely the Bosnian Muslims (who are also known as Bosniaks), the Bosnian 
Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. The process leading to the DPA was very convoluted and the 
agreement was ultimately reached at the very last moments of the Dayton conference. The 
conference took place against the backdrop of many failed rounds of negotiations mediated by 
several international bodies since 1991.  
This chapter looks at the international peacemaking interventions in Bosnia (1991-1995), 
which culminated at Dayton. In order to do so, the chapter first discusses the unravelling of 
Yugoslavia and, in particular, how this unfolded in Bosnia. That is followed by a brief overview of 
the literature on peacemaking during the Bosnian war. The substantive analysis first focuses on 
European Community (EC) and the ICFY (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia) led 
collective mediation efforts. Subsequently, the US policy on Bosnia with a focus on its interaction 
with kin-state actors within the context of peacemaking intervention is analysed. The latter part of 
chapter investigates the Dayton conference, especially the mediation strategy and tactics used by 
the US mediators to coerce the parties towards an agreement. Finally, some assessments on the 
power-sharing model envisaged by the Dayton settlement and its implementation are provided. 
The chapter finds that the role of kin-states in the peacemaking process in Bosnia was initially 
limited with quasi-mediation. However, as the conflict intensified and the international 
community put more pressure on Croatia and Federal Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro), the 
two kin-states, in an implicit alliance with the American peacemakers, took over their respective 
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kin community’s leadership. The Croat and Yugoslav governments thus assumed the role of 
enforcing their kin-groups’ submission to the Dayton process and agreement. 
5.2. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the Birth of Bosnia as an Independent 
State 
The first Yugoslavia was formed at the end of World War I as a multinational state for the south 
Slavs.124 International context continued to play a major role in Yugoslavia’s history as its socialist 
successor was constituted during the Second World War in 1943 by the Partisans, a communist led 
resistance movement who fought against the invading Nazis and their local collaborators. The 
socialist state would be officially declared in 1945 as the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
and renamed as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963. The Partisans, and also the 
Yugoslav federation, was led by Marshall Tito. Josip Broz Tito himself was of Croat and Slovenian 
origins and the socialist Yugoslavia, like its founder, was multi-ethnic in its composition. The main 
ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia included Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Hungarians, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians, Serbs, and Slovenians.125 
According to its 1974 federal constitution, the socialist Yugoslavia was composed of six 
republics and two autonomous provinces. These six republics were Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, and there were two autonomous provinces of Serbia, namely 
Vojvodina and Kosovo (Singleton 1989, 260-264). As this part of the Balkans historically had very 
heterogeneous demographics, there were significant numbers of ethnic minorities in all the 
Yugoslav republics, except Slovenia. And in Bosnia, which was the most multi-ethnic of the 
Yugoslav republics, no ethnic group formed a majority: the Muslims were the largest group but 
they were closely followed by the Serbs and there was also a sizeable Croat minority.126 At the 
federal level, the 1974 constitution established a collective presidency which included 
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representatives of all the six republics and the two provinces. However, as Tito was made 
president for life of the collective presidency, the collective presidency remained as a rather 
symbolic institution until his death in 1980 (Baylis 1989, 115). There were also republic-level 
collective presidencies and thus political power seemed very much diffused at many levels in the 
intricate political system of Yugoslavia. In fact, federal politics and power was essentially 
maintained by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which was the overarching political 
organisation of all the republics’ communist parties until its dissolution in January 1990. In short, 
the overwhelming role of Tito and the unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia managed 
to sustain a modicum of stability in the Yugoslav politics for almost four decades. However, there 
were two major destabilising factors throughout Yugoslavia’s history. These were the rival ethnic 
nationalisms, which maintained their vigour despite Tito’s efforts at forging an overarching 
Yugoslav identity, and the country’s failing socialist economic system. It is often argued that Tito’s 
rule kept a lid on the rival nationalisms but did not tackle the underlying historical animosities 
among the Yugoslav peoples, especially the one between the Serb and Croat nationalists.127 The 
economic malaise of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was mainly caused by the inefficiencies of 
Yugoslavia’s socialist economy which made the country dependent on external borrowing to 
maintain a modicum of economic stability.128 
By the mid-1980s, these two main problems were aggravated when Tito’s death left a 
power vacuum at the federal centre and the country’s economic woes were rapidly deteriorating. 
This provided a fertile ground for political agitation and upheaval and nationalists in the Yugoslav 
republics were becoming more vocal and active. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic exploited the tense 
situation between the majority ethnic Albanians and minority Serbs in Kosovo to further his 
political career by championing Serbian nationalism and establishing his control over Serbia’s two 
autonomous province (Silber and Little 1995, 36-48). In Slovenia, the economically most advanced 
and the politically most liberal of the Yugoslav republics, the republic’s secession from the 
Yugoslav federation was debated within intellectual circles and the liberal attitude of the 
                                                          
127
 The animosity was largely a result of the developments during the Second World War. During the war the 
Croat fascist Ustaša movement was allied with the Nazis and many Serbs were victimised by this alliance. At 
the end of the war many Ustaša members, along with some Croat civilians, were summarily executed by the 
predominantly Serb Partizans (Tomasevich 2001, 397-412). 
128
 By 1982, Yugoslavia was often on stand-by agreements with the IMF. This was largely the result of 
borrowing internationally and investing that money in big public projects for years, which actually did not 
help improve the country’s poor export performance. For an analysis of this economic malaise, see Z. Antic 
(1982) “Yugoslavia’s Foreign Debts”, Radio Free Europe Background Report no. 58, 10 Mar., 
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/85-4-126.pdf (accessed 28/8/12). 
  
109 
 
Slovenian political leadership towards this debate was enraging the military and political 
leadership of the federal state (Ibid, 49-59). Alarmed by the fact that Milosevic was empowering 
himself as he now controlled three (or four if his influence over Montenegro taken into account) 
seats at the eight seat federal presidency and also unhappy with the slow paced and limited 
liberalisation of the economy, the Slovene communist party leadership proposed changes to the 
Slovene constitution which included the right to secede from Yugoslavia and limit their 
contribution to federal budget. Despite the tumultuous public and private quarrels the proposed 
changes caused with the Yugoslavia’s other national political elites, the Slovenes went ahead and 
adopted the changes in their parliament. At federal level, only the Croatian members of the 
federal party’s central committee eventually sided with the Slovenes and the growing 
disagreements within the federal political elite ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the League 
of Yugoslav Communists in January 1990 (Pavkovic 2000, 112-121). Each Yugoslav republic then 
went on to hold its first multiparty elections, and the newly founded nationalist parties came to 
power in all of them. 
The nationalist electoral victories soon paved the way for the disagreements between the 
Croat- Slovene block (both republics were now seeking independence) and the Serbs (who were 
already arming the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia) to turn into open hostilities. On 25 June 1991, 
both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. In Slovenia, this led to a ten day war 
between the Slovenian forces and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The quick end to the 
Slovenian conflict was mainly due to the facts that Slovenia’s ethnic composition was almost 
totally Slovenian and that it was geographically situated in the most far away part of the country 
from Serbia (Bennett 1995, 101-106). Therefore, it was not considered integral to Milosevic’s plans 
for a greater Serbia. In Croatia, however, there was a sizeable Serbian minority (12.1 % of the 
Croatia’s population in 1991). The Croatian Serbs, or Krajina Serbs as they called themselves, were 
mostly settled on the Croatian side of the Bosnian border and were now being armed and 
supported by the JNA, which was in effect controlled by the Serbian leadership (Ibid, 131-137). In 
April, the Croatian Serbs acted to pre-empt the approaching Croatian independence by declaring 
their own autonomous entity in order to secede from Croatia and unite with Serbia.129 The military 
conflict initially began with the clashes between the Croatian Serb paramilitaries and the Croatian 
police force. But it soon turned into a full-scale war when JNA attacked Croatia in order to stop its 
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secession.  Eventually, in January 1992, a ceasefire was agreed between Milosevic and Tudjman, 
the Croat leader, and this was followed by the deployment of UNPROFOR (United Nations 
Protection Force) and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, and its heavy weaponry, from the 
region in May 1992.  
As the war in Croatia deepened, mediation efforts were undertaken by the European 
Community (EC) to seek a resolution to the conflict.130 In September 1991, the EC convened a 
peace conference on Yugoslavia, which would be chaired by a British peer, Lord Carrington.131 The 
Carrington conference failed to achieve its primary goal, which was to keep the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia together, when Milosevic, the Serbian president at the time, rejected the 
proposals which envisaged a looser Yugoslav federation. Along with the conference, the Council of 
Ministers of the EC also set up an arbitration commission to provide legal advice to Lord 
Carrington. This legal advice commission, the Badinter Arbitration Commission, delivered a series 
of opinions regarding Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The most prominent of these was its Opinion No. 3 
which argued that internal borders of Yugoslavia should be maintained and become international 
borders if its constituent republics were to choose becoming independent states. This opinion was 
particularly significant for Bosnia where its Bosnian Serb and Croat populations were respectively 
seeking union with Croatia and Serbia (Pellet 1992). 
The nationalist fragmentation of Bosnian political party system resulted in creation of 
three main ethnic parties: the Muslim SDA (Party of Democratic Action), the SDS (Serbian 
Democratic Party) and the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) BiH – the Bosnian branch of the HDZ 
of Croatia. The Bosnian independence was not initially argued by any of the Bosnian groups and 
the Bosnian government did not take a concrete position towards the wars in Croatia and Slovenia 
(Malcolm 1994, 228). By the mid December 1991, however, the Bosnian government’s 
determination for preserving Yugoslav’s unity was eroded by the EC’s policy shift towards 
recognising Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, which was primarily advocated by 
Germany, and there were now two options for the Bosnian government, both with equally 
substantial negative consequences.132 The first option was to remain in a rump Yugoslavia which 
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was very likely to be dominated by Serbia. And the second option was to secede and become an 
independent country; though it was evident that the Bosnian Serbs would object to this. As 
Bosnia’s independence looked like a more palpable option, the Bosnian Serb party SDS’s 
leadership counteracted by increasing its demands and withdrawing from the Bosnian 
government: they first argued for the secession of the large parts of northern and western Bosnia 
to unite with the Serbian held regions in Croatia, then declared four Serbian autonomous regions 
within Bosnia with the help of the JNA and backing up of Belgrade, and later set up a Bosnian 
Serbian parliament and eventually declared their own republic, the Republika Srpska (RS), on 27 
March 1992 (Ibid, 230-233). The Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders, on the other hand, argued in 
favour of an independent Bosnia and a referendum, as demanded by the EC as a precondition for 
recognition, was held on 29 February - 1 March 1991 and 98% of those participated voted in 
favour independence (the Bosnian Serb leadership prevented the referendum to take place in the 
areas of the country it controlled).133 The independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was formally declared on 3 March 1992 by the Bosnian government in which the Bosnians Serbs 
were no longer represented. And on 6 April 1992 Bosnia was recognised as an independent state 
by the EC and soon after by many others, including the US. 
In other words, Bosnia’s birth as an independent state was a result of its Yugoslav 
neighbours’ actions and the EC’s recognition of them134 and the rising tide of Serbian nationalism. 
The recognition of the Bosnian independence by the EC, the US, and its accession to the UN, 
however, did not solve the major problem facing the Bosnian government, which was the 
objection of the Bosnian Serbs, and instead led the Bosnian Serbs to intensify their armed 
campaign and thus a fully-fledged war accompanied the Bosnian independence.135 Although the 
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outbreak of the war was not totally unexpected, the Muslim led Bosnian government was not 
prepared for it. And this was mainly because of the arms embargo imposed by the UN in 
September 1991 on Yugoslavia, which was being upheld for its successor states as well. With the 
independence of Bosnia, the Bosnian government asked JNA to leave the country and the JNA 
complied, though its Bosnian Serb members along with substantial heavy military equipment were 
left behind. The Bosnian government’s only organised forces were its territorial defence force, 
which largely drew on reservists. Thus, the Muslim led Bosnian government had international 
recognition but lacked any effective military force to control and protect its territory, and neither 
had access to international arms market, while the Bosnian Serbs had superior military equipment 
and troops but very few friends among the international community (Silber and Little 1995, 245-
255). The actions of the international community, and particularly the EC, played a significant role 
in Bosnia’s descent into war. Moreover, the international community still maintained significant 
tools (such as the arms embargo and the international isolation of the RS) to influence the parties, 
so the international actors’ role in the conflict was not reduced with the onset of war but became 
rather more critical, especially in shaping the parties strategies in peace negotiations. 
5.3. Why did the Dayton Conference Succeed? 
This section provides a brief review of the existing literature on the European and the US led 
peacemaking interventions in Bosnia. The literature largely seems to agree on the main reasons 
why the Americans succeeded where the Europeans had repeatedly failed. The literature mostly 
emphasises the use of coercive means by the Americans. Beriker (1995) suggests that the 
mediators acted as manipulators in all the mediation initiatives during the conflict. She argues that 
the European mediators, like their American counterparts, used their own resources and power in 
order to change the structure of the conflict, but the difference between the US and other 
mediation attempts was the extent of the US leverage and when it was used. According to Burg 
and Shoup (1999, 316), “it was the United States that ultimately took on the role of hegemonic 
actor in the Balkans: taking sides, projecting power in the form of air strikes (in NATO guise), and 
isolating the local violator of the preferred status quo [emphasis in the original]”. Likewise, Touval 
(2002, 167) contends that the Americans engaged in ripening the conditions on the battleground, 
through their help and influence on the Bosnian Muslims and Croat in particular. 
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Many weaknesses of the collective mediation initiatives are extensively pointed out in the 
literature as well. The disagreements within NATO, between the US and its allies, are identified as 
a factor undermining the peace initiatives (Papayoanou 1997; Neville-Jones 1996). It has been also 
argued that Europe’s nascent common foreign and security was rather unprepared and ill-
equipped to deal with the complex situation in Bosnia (Paczulla 2004, 258-259). Leigh-Phippard 
(1998, 315) claims that the Contact Group (which comprised of the US, Russia, the UK, France and 
Germany) mainly failed because there were serious divisions among its members over which 
policy they should adhere to in their mediation, whether partition or federation should be the 
framework for negotiations. 
However, although there are often references in the literature to Milosevic’s quarrels with 
the Bosnian Serb leadership136, the role of kin-states within the context of international 
intervention for peacemaking remains understudied. The Croat and Serb leaders’ deep 
involvement at Dayton negotiations is widely noted. But the kin-states’ role in the wider process 
leading to Dayton and their interactions with third party peacemakers with respect to their kin has 
not been fully explored. The following analysis will therefore seek to analyse the successive 
mediation efforts in Bosnia with a particular focus on kin-state involvement. 
5.4. Collective Mediation in the Bosnian War 
During the first two years of the Bosnian war, five major collective peacemaking initiatives were 
undertaken. All these mediation processes were backed by the EC (later EU) but the United 
States’, though supportive at rhetorical level, was often either disengaged or unsupportive. 
Although they all eventually failed, assessments of these five initiatives are essential for analysis of 
the subsequent US led process. 
5.4.1. The Carrington-Cutileiro Plan  
As keeping the Yugoslav federal unity became unattainable, Lord Carrington asked Jose Cutileiro, a 
Portuguese diplomat, to hold talks with the three Bosnian communities. The Portuguese diplomat 
held several rounds of talks in Lisbon and Sarajevo with the leaders of the Bosnian political parties 
and on 23 February 1991, just six days before the independence referendum, an agreement, which 
would become known as the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan, was reached. But Alija Izetbegovic, the 
Bosnian Muslim leader, withdrew his signature when he came under heavy pressure from his 
community’s public opinion. In March, Cutileiro renewed his mediation and the parties agreed 
that Bosnia would be “a state composed of three constituent units, based on national principles 
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and taking into account, economic, geographic and other criteria.”137 The statement did not 
specify what territorial adjustments would be made but set out substantial provisions for a power-
sharing regime.138 This time the Bosnian Croats were the first to reject the Carrington-Cutileiro 
Plan. Touval (2002, 110) argues that the Bosnian Croats’ prime goal at the time was to maintain 
their alliance with the Muslims and the Muslims should be regarded as the main force behind the 
plan’s ultimate rejection. According to Burg and Shoup (1999, 112), the Croats were concerned 
about ethnic cantonisation provided by the plan, fearing that most Bosnian Croats, whose 
population was scattered,  would become a national minority. The Muslims were also worried 
about the establishment of ethnically dominated cantons; they regarded the plan a step towards 
official partition of the country. Izetbegovic’s initial assent could be interpreted as appearing 
conciliatory in order to secure international recognition, but when he subsequently noticed that 
the US was unhappy with the plan, this prompted him to reject the blueprint.139 
The plan was essentially undermined by the patchy international support, both within the 
EC and from the US. The US was pressing for Bosnia’s international recognition, regardless of the 
outcome of the negotiations; Bosnia would be recognised on 7 April without any agreement 
achieved between the Bosnian groups.140 Carrington and Cutileiro continued to push for an 
agreement on their plan and finally ended their efforts in June, when Izetbegovic refused to 
continue the talks unless the basis for negotiations changed.141 In other words, the first EC backed 
mediation process failed mainly due to fact that the impending recognition of Bosnia emboldened 
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the Muslims to demand a better deal and, with the recognition, the mediators lost the most 
effective diplomatic tool they had to convince the Muslims. On the battleground in Bosnia the 
plan’s provisions as well as the approaching independence encouraged all the fighting groups to 
try to acquire and ethnically cleanse more territory so that they could claim it for their territorial 
unit in the future (Burg and Shoup 1999, 117-120). The incoherent and uncoordinated state of the 
Western policy, or its lack thereof, did not help the mediators achieve their goal and instead rather 
worsened the armed conflict. 
As the war deepened, the Bosnian Serbs acquired control over half of the Bosnian 
territory. The siege and bombardment of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb forces and the suffering 
this caused was shocking to the international public opinion.142 The need for a new diplomatic 
strategy was clear. The EC and the UN backed London conference took place in August 1992; its 
aim was to formulate the international community’s policy towards the Bosnian conflict and 
reinvigorate the peace talks. The agreed parameters for a solution to the conflict were put 
together in a public statement which was read out by the British Prime Minister John Major. The 
statement provided that a political settlement to the conflict must preserve Bosnia’s territorial 
integrity and independence, unless mutually agreed otherwise; and must include recognition of 
Bosnia by all the former Yugoslav republics.143 The conference also decided to turn into an ad hoc 
international body which would remain in being until a final political settlement reached to all the 
Yugoslav conflicts. 
5.4.2. The Vance-Owen Plan 
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)144 would be co-chaired by Cyrus 
Vance (a former US Secretary of State, representing the UN) and Lord David Owen (a former 
British Foreign Secretary, representing the EC), who would be later replaced by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg (a former Foreign Minister of Norway) in 1993. In January 1993, the ICFY co-chairmen 
put forward a peace proposal. The Vance-Owen Plan (VOP) outlined a decentralised Bosnian state 
where its three constituent peoples would exercise substantial autonomy at provincial level.  
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According to the VOP, Bosnia would be reconstituted into ten proposed provinces, though 
not ethnically marked for one group, often were to be dominated by one of three ethnic groups, 
except Sarajevo which would have power-sharing between the three groups. The Bosnian Serbs 
would control three provinces, though those three would not constitute a single block, as this was 
something they always demanded in order to constitute a Serb controlled territory from the 
Bosnia-Serbia border to the Serbian dominated regions of Croatia which are adjacent to Bosnia, it 
soon became one of their prime objections to the plan. While the Bosnian Muslims would 
dominate three provinces, the Bosnians Croats have two provinces under their control, and in one 
province Muslims and Croats would share power.145 The Bosnian state would continue to remain 
as a single international legal personality, which was a key Muslim demand. There would be a 
collective presidency at national level, where all three groups would be represented; this was 
clearly a continuation of pre-war inter-ethnic power-sharing arrangements. The plan was requiring 
the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from almost half of the territory they controlled at that stage of the 
war, which was some 70% of Bosnia. This meant that the Bosnian Serbs would have 42.3% of 
Bosnia, giving up their de facto control over another 38.6%, and the Bosnian Muslims and the 
Croats would have control over the remaining territory, respectively 32.3% (including Sarajevo) 
and 25.4% of the country (Klemenčić 1994, 49).  
By February, the parties were nearing to accept the constitutional framework and the 
Bosnian Croats were happy with the map as well. However, both the Muslims and the Serbs raised 
grave concerns about the map and demanded substantial changes on it.146 The Bosnian Muslims’ 
leader Izetbegovic was particularly concerned about the VOP map because some historically 
Muslim dominated areas, he argued, would be ceded to the Serbs who had just ethnically cleansed 
those area (Owen 1996, 98-100). Izetbegovic kept delaying to make a decision on the plan but the 
ICYF mediators were eager to push the process forward at least by getting the Muslims on board, 
in addition to the Croats, and thus leaving only the Serbs as the last one to be convinced to 
consent to the VOP. In order to achieve this goal, Lord Owen went on publically pointing the lack 
of US pressure on the Muslims as the main reason for the Muslim’s lack of willingness to accept 
the VOP. On 3 February, Owen was quoted by The New York Times claiming that: 
Against all the odds, even against my own expectations, we have more or less got a 
settlement. But we have a problem. We can't get the Muslims on board. And that's largely 
the fault of the Americans, because the Muslims won't budge while they think Washington 
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may come into it on their side any day now. What do they want down there, a war that 
goes on and on? This isn't just the best act in town, it's the only act in town. It's the best 
settlement you can get, and it's a bitter irony to see the Clinton people block it.147 
A week after Owen’s public denouncement, the US position regarding the plan begun 
shifting towards supporting the VOP.148 In late March the Bosnian Muslims signed up to the VOP, 
which could be explained both by the US pressure and the Bosnian Croats’ threat to break up their 
then military alliance with the Muslims.149 As the Bosnian Croats were already on board, now the 
only remaining party needed to consent to the VOP was the Bosnian Serbs. The UN Security 
Council imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to pressure the Serbian 
leadership to cut off their supplies to the Bosnian Serb forces. Among the UNSC resolutions 
imposing sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, the Security Council Resolution 820 was particularly 
broad and effective and set to cripple the country’s economy.150 In Belgrade on 26 April and in 
Athens 1-2 May, the Serbian president Milosevic, along with the federal president Cosic and the 
Montenegrin president Bulatovic, held meetings with the Bosnian Serbs leadership (Silber and 
Little 1995, 309-314). On 2 April, the quasi-mediation process culminated in the Bosnian Serb 
leader Karadzic’s signing of the VOP in Athens.151 This was the first instance of a successful quasi-
mediation by a kin-state in the conflict. However, there was a condition attached to Karadzic’s 
acceptance: his signature would only be valid upon the Bosnian Serb parliament’s ratification of 
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the VOP.152 Although the same parliament did reject the plan a week earlier, many anticipated 
that the RS parliament was going to ratify the VOP because of Milosevic’s growing pressure on 
them (Owen 1996, 159). 
On the early morning of 6 May, after hours-long debate which was attended by the 
Serbian leadership as well as the Greek Prime Minister, who all spoke to the parliament pleading 
for VOP’s ratification, the Bosnian Serb parliament overwhelmingly decided in favour of holding a 
referendum on the VOP on 15-16 May, which was very likely to deliver a “No”.153 Owen(1996, 164) 
recounts that Milosevic told him that General Mladic’s (the top Bosnian Serb commander) 
intervention was the main reason behind the parliament’s decision which helped the parliament’s 
speaker Krasnic, who was the only member of the Bosnian Serb elite openly opposing the VOP, to 
garner more support among the members of the parliament.154 In other words, the Bosnian Serb 
military was eager to continue the war which it thought it was going to win. The session of the RS 
assembly was the first major clash over policy between the Bosnian Serbs and their kin-state 
leadership. Milosevic’s quasi-mediation efforts with the Bosnian Serb military and political elite 
through persuasion failed, and he was reported to have stormed out of the assembly building 
(Owen 1996, 167). The referendum result was overwhelmingly against the VOP which, Karadzic 
declared, was now dead.155 
Lord Owen and the new ICFY co-chair Stoltenberg continued their efforts and argued for 
“progressive implementation” of the VOP (Owen 1996, 176-177). The ICFY co-chairmen essentially 
were asking for imposition of the VOP on the Bosnian Serbians. But the “progressive 
implementation” would require use of substantial military force which neither the US nor the EU 
countries were willing to undertake such a task. The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
already declared, in late April to the US Congress, that: 
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... President Clinton will not authorize military action in Bosnia unless he is certain the 
United States can avoid getting more deeply involved than it wants. Mr Christopher laid 
out four strict tests for the use of force: the goal must be stated clearly, there must be a 
strong likelihood of success, there must be "an exit strategy" and the action must win 
sustained public support.156 
And the VOP suffered an ultimate blow when The New York Times reported, on 21 May, 
that the US and Russia agreed to negotiate a new common strategy with Europeans that would 
accept more territory could be retained by the Bosnian Serbs in a Bosnia peace settlement.157 In 
sum, the VOP failed due two main reasons: it often lacked support of the US, which was essential 
for its implementation, and the conditions on the battleground for the Bosnian Serbs were not yet 
ripe for a settlement. 
5.4.3. The Invincible Plan 
During April and May 1993, the war got another dimension when tensions between the Bosnian 
Croat and the Muslim forces increasingly turned into violent confrontations leading to a rift in the 
military alliance between the Muslims and the Bosnian Croats.158 Taking advantage of this new rift 
between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, the mainland Serb and Croat leaderships 
increased their secret contacts to reinvigorate their pre–Bosnian war consultations regarding a 
partition of Bosnia amongst Serbia and Croatia (Silber and Little 1995, 339-342). Negotiations were 
held between the Serbian and Croatian delegations, under guidance of their respective presidents 
Milosevic and Tudjman, and they agreed on turning Bosnia into a very loose federation of three 
ethnic states.159 Subsequently, the ICFY co-chairmen Owen and Stoltenberg took over the initiative 
from Milosevic and Tudjman and proposed a new peace plan based on the tripartite and loose 
federation framework agreed by the Serb and the Croat leaders. The first all-party negotiations, 
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with participations all the three Bosnian parties as well as the Croats and Serb leaderships, were 
held in Geneva in June and the final negotiations took place on the British aircraft carrier Invincible 
at the Adriatic Sea in September. The Invincible Plan, also known as the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, 
envisaged a union of three ethnic republics. The multi-cantonal federation suggested in the VOP 
was abandoned in favour of a tripartite federation which could easily lead to a break-up of Bosnia 
into three ethnic states in the future. The Bosnian parties reached an agreement on the 
constitution for “the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in late July; accordingly, the 
union would be composed of the Muslim, the Croat and the Serb constituent republics.160 
Although the power-sharing arrangements provided by the constitutional agreement which was 
signed by the parties were less complex than the intricate VOP provisions, there were firmly 
entrenched mechanisms for inter-ethnic power-sharing at the central government level. There 
would be a three-member presidency of the union, where decisions would be made by consensus, 
and the union’s prime minister and foreign minister posts would be from different constituent 
republics.161 
An agreement on territorial adjustments to reconstitute Bosnia as a tripartite union, 
however, proved much more elusive. The Serbs and the Croats were proposing to only provide just 
around 30% of Bosnia for the Muslim republic which would require the Bosnian Serbs handing 
over approximately 18% of the territory they controlled back to the Bosnian Muslims. But the 
extent of territorial gains for the Bosnian Muslims was less than what was proposed in the VOP, 
which led the Bosnian Muslims to insist on demanding more territory for the Muslim constituent 
republic.162 Moreover, the Bosnian Muslims also demanded their territory to have access to sea 
and navigable rivers. During the negotiations on the HMS Invincible, the Bosnian Muslims’ 
demands were partially met: the Bosnian Serbs agreed to hand back 0.4 more territory (the 
Muslim demand was 4%) and the Croatian President Tudjman agreed to guarantee access to sea 
for the Muslims through Croatia (Owen 1996, 233-234).163 At the end of negotiations on the 
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Invincible Izetbegovic appeared ready to accept the plan. But after consultations with his military 
commanders Izetbegovic changed his mind and the Muslim dominated Bosnian Parliament 
subsequently demanded substantial changes in the plan.164 According to Owen (1996, 237), the 
Bosnian Muslims chose to continue to the war in the hope that “sanctions would soften up the 
Serbs and, on the advice of their military commanders, that they could defeat the Croats in central 
Bosnia.” The Bosnian Muslims’ decision to reject the plan was also encouraged by the US’s 
lukewarm support to the plan and the recent Muslim successes in the Muslim-Croat war (Burg and 
Shoup 1999, 280-281; Touval 2002, 125; Owen 1996, 236-237). 
The lukewarm US support to the Invincible Plan was evident in President Clinton’s and his 
envoy’s comments on its rejection. President Clinton was quoted remarking that: “You know, I 
think they're [the Bosnian Muslims] entitled to some territory, but I don't know if they can get it”; 
and the US Envoy to the peace talks Charles Redman described the rejection as “democracy in 
action”.165 In short, the US, the only power with substantial influence on the Bosnian Muslims, was 
reluctant about the Invincible Plan. Although it cannot be suggested that had the US pressed for 
the plan it would be accepted by the Bosnian Muslims, but it can be argued that a clear US support 
would have substantially increased the chances of acceptance by the Muslims. The EU’s stance 
regarding the Invincible Plan was also not totally supportive: the Germans argued that the 
Invincible Plan was in violation of the London Conference principles and the Dutch EC 
Commissioner for External Affairs, van den Broek, accused the ICFY chairmen of legitimising 
“aggression” and following a policy “capitulation” (Owen 1996, 228). 
5.4.4. The EU Action Plan 
The Invincible Plan was followed by an EU initiative. On 7 November, a week after the 
inauguration of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, a German-French letter was sent to 
the Belgian EU Presidency proposing an EU initiative regarding the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Sudetic (1993b)“Once Again, Bosnian Peace Talks Appear to Crumble”, The New York Times, 21 Sep., 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/21/world/once-again-bosnian-peace-talks-appear-to-crumble.html 
(accessed 28/8/12); and C. Sudetic (1993c), “New Progress Reported in Bosnia Talks”, The New York Times, 
22 Sep., http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/22/world/new-progress-reported-in-bosnia-talks.html (accessed 
28/8/12). 
164
 J. F. Burns (1993a), “Bosnians Seem Likely to Demand Peace Plan Changes”, The New York Times, 29 Sep., 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/29/world/bosnians-seem-likely-to-demand-peace-plan-changes.html 
(accessed 28/8/12); J.F. Burns (1993b), “Bosnia Legislators Reject Peace Plan in a Lopsided Vote”, The New 
York Times, 30 Sep., http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/30/world/bosnia-legislators-reject-peace-plan-in-a-
lopsided-vote.html (accessed 28/8/12); and J. F. Burns (1993c), “Sarajevo May Be Settling Into Stalemate”, 
The New York Times, 1 Oct., http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/01/world/sarajevo-may-be-settling-into-
stalemate.html (accessed 28/8/12). 
165
 J.F. Burns (1993b), op. cit. 
122 
 
Krajina region.166 For Bosnia, the letter argued for pressuring the parties to continue their 
negotiations on the basis of the Invincible Plan and offering the parties clear incentives for doings 
so, and also making clear to the parties what measures against them would be in place if they 
were not cooperating. The Bosnian Muslims would be warned that international support to them 
would decline if they rejected a proposal which satisfied their territorial demands on the Invincible 
map (i.e. 3 -4 % more of Bosnian territory), and the Serbs would be asked to show flexibility 
towards the Muslims demands and, in return, offered suspension of the international actions and 
a modus-vivendi in the occupied areas of Croatia. The EU was to pursue a carrot-and-stick 
strategy. 
The French-German initiative soon became the EU policy, and the parties (including 
Milosevic and Tudjman) even held negotiations in Brussels with participation of the EU foreign 
ministers in November 1993. Although the ICFY chairmen were also participants in the EU 
initiative, the process was now directly managed by the EU foreign ministers acting collectively. 
The EU policy initially seem to have worked as the Bosnian Serbs agreed that the Muslim republic 
would have 33.3 per cent of the land, but the Brussels negotiations failed as the Bosnian Serbs and 
the Muslims could not agree on exactly which territories were to be handed over to the Bosnian 
Muslims. And again the US support was lacking, the Americans argued that sanctions should not 
be abandoned until all the former Yugoslav conflicts were settled, thus indicating their support to 
the Muslims demands on the map (Burg and Shoup 1999, 282; Owen 1996, 258). After the failed 
EU collective mediation efforts in Brussels, the negotiations were again being mediated by the 
ICFY co-chairmen. According to Owen (1996, 268-269), these negotiations yielded some results but 
eventually failed when it became apparent that the Bosnian Muslim side “… neither had nor 
wanted the authority to reach a final settlement at this round of the negotiations”.  
5.4.5. The Contact Group Map 
Another attempt at collective mediation during the Bosnian war was the Contact Group. The 
group was formed by the US, Russia, France, Germany and the UK, which were the most involved 
international actors in the conflict. The United States was considered to have diplomatic leverage 
over the Muslim controlled Bosnian government and Croatia, while Russia had influence on the 
Bosnian and mainland Serbs, and France and the UK were the two leading troops’ contributors to 
the UNPROFOR, and Germany carried considerable weight with Croatia, which itself was the main 
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backer and kin-state to the Bosnian Croats (Owen 1996, 295-299). Between April 1994 and June 
1995, the Contact Group assumed the role of the international community’s collective mediation 
agency and the ICFY was relegated to a secondary and subservient role to the Contact Group 
mediation.  
Since the group collectively represented five major powers which had some considerable 
direct or indirect influence on the Bosnian parties, it was anticipated that the Contact Group 
would be more influential than the ICFY. But the group often failed to formulate a common 
position on many issues and its emphasis on group unity often led to minimalist strategies (Leigh-
Phippard 1998, 313-316). The Contact Group never managed to formulate any constitutional 
proposals to the Bosnian parties; its only substantive mediation initiative came in the form of a 
map proposal. The map proposed a 51% to 49% territorial division between a recently formed 
Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats accepted the 
map while the Serbs rejected.167 As the Contact Group could not agree on a common policy to 
either renegotiate the map or use military force to impose on the Serbs, the Contact Group 
process remained mostly stalled for more than a year (Owen 1996, 306; Bildt 1998, 18). The main 
reason for the group’s failure in producing a collective mediation strategy can be explained by the 
fact that its members lacked enough common denominators amongst them, particularly its 
leading members the US and Russia grossly disagreed over how to pressure the Bosnian Serbs.168 
In short, the Contact Group proved to be as inefficient as the ICFY. The Contact Group’s inaction 
and the stalemate in negotiations also paved the way for the Bosnian Serbs attacks on the two 
large Muslim Enclaves in eastern Bosnia in July 1995. The Fall of Srebrenica was a particularly 
poignant example of the human cost of the failing international response to the conflict.169 
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However, although the Contact Group’s map proposal was not accepted in the end, its 
efforts led Milosevic to sanction the Bosnian Serbs.170 By halting supplies to the Bosnian Serbs,171 
closing the border with them and banning some Bosnian Serb political leaders from entering 
Yugoslavia, Milosevic sought his kin community’s acceptance of the Contact Group plan. The 
Bosnian Serbs were, for the first time, being harshly criticised in their kin-state’s media due to 
their intransigence (Burg and Shoup 1999, 306). The sanctions and the media furore did not alter 
the Bosnian Serbs’ decision regarding the map. But Milosevic was growing more impatient with 
the Bosnian Serb leaders, especially with Karadzic, and the sanctions on Yugoslavia were having 
their effect on his policy over Bosnia.172 This widening political rift between the Bosnian Serbs and 
their kin-state would be taken advantage of by the Americans in the process leading to the DPA. 
5.5. The Washington Agreement: US Mediation with Kin-state 
Involvement  
On 24 March 1994, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims signed the Washington 
Agreement establishing a Muslim-Croat federation which would be called the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.173 The federation would have a cantonal structure and it was envisaged that the 
federation would form a confederation with Croatia. Although implementation of the federation 
agreement soon proved problematic and many essential issues, such as the borders of the new 
federation, were only going to be settled with an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs, the 
federation agreement achieved its primary goal, which was ending the Muslim- Croat conflict.174 
The formation of a Muslim-Croat military alliance was of particular importance to the 
Muslims. Because, as they had to bring in their arms shipments through Croatia and the Bosnian 
Croat dominated areas of Bosnia, the renewed alliance meant the Muslims would now be able to 
smuggle in more weapons through Croatia. For the agreement, the Bosnian Croats were coerced 
                                                          
170
 S. Kinzer (1994a), “Belgrade Appears to Be Cutting off the Bosnia Serbs”, The New York Times, 8 Aug., 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/07/world/belgrade-appears-to-be-cutting-off-the-bosnia-serbs.html 
(accessed 28/8/12). 
171
 Silber and Little (1995, 382) claim that the border between Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb areas 
remained porous for essential military supplies. 
172
  See Silber and Little 1995, 373-383; and S. Kinzer (1994b), “Serb vs. Serb, Belgrade vs. Bosnia: Two Men 
Battle over Peace”, The New York Times, 11 Aug., http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/11/world/serb-vs-
serb-belgrade-vs-bosnia-two-men-battle-over-peace.html (accessed 28/8/12). 
173
  E. Sciolino (1994a), “Bosnia Muslims and Croats To Discuss Proposal in U.S.”, The New York Times, 25 
Feb., http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/25/world/bosnia-muslims-and-croats-to-discuss-proposal-in-
us.html (accessed 28/8/12); and S. Greenhouse (1994), “Muslims and Bosnian Croats Give Birth to a New 
Federation”, The New York Times, 19 Mar., http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/19/world/muslims-and-
bosnian-croats-give-birth-to-a-new-federation.html (accessed 28/8/12). 
174
 This section is based on the following accounts of the Croat-Muslim negotiations: Rudman (1996); Burg 
and Shoup (1999, 292-298); Silber and Little (1995, 354 -359); and Szasz (1995, 371-373). 
125 
 
by the Croatian government, which itself was pressured by the US, while the Bosnian Muslims 
were also under US pressure.175 The Croat-Muslim agreement on federation was the first 
significant achievement of the US diplomacy in Bosnia. After two and a half years of EC (later EU) 
led mediation efforts through the ICFY, the US now seemed more involved in mediation efforts in 
Bosnia. The core element of US mediation for the federation was the US strategy of focusing on 
kin-state involvement in the conflict. Croatia and Federal Yugoslavia had been part of peacemaking 
processes before; however, this was the first time a kin-state (Croatia) became the official 
negotiator for its kin community.176 This was not wholly an American initiative: the Croat Foreign 
Minister Zubak and the Bosnian Prime Minister Siladzic were already willing to engage each other 
and bypassing the Bosnian Croats (Rudman 1996, 530-31). The Americans, however, predicated 
their efforts on the fact that the Croats were willing to negotiate on behalf of their kin in Bosnia in 
order to extricate themselves from the consequence of the Bosnian war. Although the Washington 
Agreement was its first entry of the Bosnian conflict as a mediator, the US was not yet ready for 
taking over the whole peacemaking intervention. The deep US involvement, therefore, did not last 
long and instead, as discussed above, the US participated in the Contact Group and remained 
rather disengaged until August 1995. 
5.6. Reformulating the US Policy on Bosnia 
For the first three years of the conflict, US policy on Bosnia was often vacillating between two 
competing policies favoured by different groups of the Clinton administration members.177 The 
default policy of the administration was “detachment” from the conflict on the grounds that 
Bosnia was a European problem which Europe should assume responsibility for its mediation. The 
detachment policy also included a containment component as the administration was trying to 
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limit Bosnia’s effect on its wider foreign policy and relations with its European allies. Another 
policy which occasionally gained momentum, as the conflict deepened, was “lift and strike”. The 
“lift and strike” policy essentially meant lifting the arms embargo and helping the Muslims acquire 
weapons and at the same time protecting the UN declared safe havens through airstrikes at the 
Bosnian Serb targets by the NATO forces. But the “lift and strike” policy often run into European 
opposition, as the Europeans, particularly the British and the French who had their troops as UN 
peacekeepers on the ground, argued that this would only deteriorate the conflict and put their 
troops at the risk of being attacked or kidnapped by the Serbs (Daalder 2000, 11-19).  
Even as late as 1994, the Clinton administration officials were still divided over the course 
of US policy despite the fact that there were two successful American initiatives in mediating the 
conflict in early 1994. In February, after a Bosnian Serb mortar attack that killed 68 people, the US 
managed to convince its NATO allies to issue a strong ultimatum, threatening use of airpower, 
which led the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weapons from the vicinity of the city.178 And in 
March, as discussed above, the US successfully mediated between the Croats and the Muslims. 
However, according to Daalder (2000, 85), it was only in early 1995 that Anthony Lake, Clinton’s 
NSC chief, concluded that a “workable” US strategy for Bosnia was needed. By early August 1995, 
the US strategy was agreed within the Clinton administration and Lake then set off to Europe to 
visit the Contact Group countries and a few other crucial allies, such as Italy and Turkey.  
The main plan was that there would be all-out negotiations to reach a comprehensive 
settlement in Bosnia which would be based on the Contact Group but also taking into account the 
recent territorial changes. The sanctions on Yugoslavia would be suspended once agreement 
reached, and completely lifted when the agreement had been implemented; there would be 
three-way recognition between Croatia, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia; and a solution for eastern 
Slavonia, a Croatian Serb controlled part of Croatia bordering Serbia. In short, the primary goal 
was to tackle all the former Yugoslav conflicts within a comprehensive settlement which would be 
attained through sustained pressure, particularly on the Serbs. There was also an alternative 
strategic action plan in the event that no settlement was reached at the end of the all-out 
negotiations. According to this alternative plan, if the negotiations were to fail, the UNPROFOR 
would be withdrawn and the arms embargo lifted; and military support would be provided to the 
Bosnians Muslims, while the no-fly zone would still be maintained. However, if the Bosnians were 
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deemed to be as uncooperative during the all-out-negotiations, the US would simply lift the arms 
embargo and leave.179 The US strategy was widely welcomed in Europe, though not every aspect 
of the US strategy was liked (Daalder 2000, 114). The US strategy was essentially based on 
coercive measures: there would be severe consequences for the party or the parties which did not 
show cooperative behaviour during the negotiations.  
5.7. The Road to Dayton:  The Military Stalemate and the Implicit Alliance 
with Milosevic 
On 28 August 1995, a second deadly Sarajevo marketplace mortar attack triggered the NATO 
Operation Deliberate Force. The NATO operation was not the first aerial attack targeting the 
Bosnian Serb forces, - there were some earlier attacks by NATO in 1994 and during the first half of 
1995-, but it was definitely the most sustained, effective and crucial of the NATO air campaigns in 
Bosnia with important consequences for the negotiations.180 On 11 September, when Holbrooke 
(1998, 144-5) was questioned by President Clinton about whether the time has come to end the 
campaign, he explained: 
No, Mr President. There may come a time when continued bombing would hurt the peace 
efforts, but we’re not there yet. The negotiating team believes we should tough it out. Our 
leadership position is getting stronger. We should use it or we will lose it. It is hurting the 
Bosnian Serbs, and helping us. As for Milosevic, he is not making a big point of it. 
Some other major strategic changes on the battlefield, which would help towards the 
effective implementation of the US endgame strategy, were also afoot. In August, the Croatian 
government forces took over most of the Croatian Serb controlled areas; this was a significant 
development especially in the light of the fact that Milosevic did not send the Yugoslav Army to 
the Krajina Serbs’ rescue and left them on their own.181 Meanwhile, since mid-1994, the Bosnian 
Muslims were receiving large numbers of arms shipments; these shipments were also known by 
the US government which chose to ignore them, and according to some reports, even secretly 
took part in the shipments.182 The arms shipments helped improve the military capabilities of the 
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Bosnian Muslims, and the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and the Croatian government forces 
cooperated in an offensive against the Bosnian Serbs in September and succeeded in regaining 
most of western Bosnia. By late September, even the main Bosnian Serb city Banja Luka was on 
the verge of falling to the Muslim-Croat forces. The map on the ground was now looking like what 
it was suggested in the Contact Group map, which envisaged 51% of the Bosnian territory for the 
Muslim-Croat federation and the remaining 49% under the Bosnian Serb entity (Holbrooke 1998, 
167-8). 
After the visit by Lake to the European capitals, Richard Holbrooke, who was the Assistant 
Secretary of State, was put in charge of Bosnia mediation efforts.  Holbrooke and his Bosnia team’s 
first trip to Sarajevo, in August, ended with a deadly road accident. Three members of the 
American diplomatic team died in the accident, including Robert Frasure who held talks with 
Milosevic in May.183 Frasure’s bilateral negotiations with Milosevic, which was part of a failed 
Contact Group initiative, were an early manifestation of the American policy of not directly dealing 
with the Bosnian Serbs. This policy would be maintained by Holbrooke and was not objected by 
Milosevic. It was an implicit alliance of the US and Milosevic against the intransigent kin group 
leadership. In Geneva, on 8 September, the first round of American shuttle diplomacy culminated 
in a principles agreement, Bosnia would remain as an independent country with its current 
international borders. The Contact Group map would be the basis for territorial adjustments; and 
the country would consist of two entities: “the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
established by the Washington Agreements and the Republika Srpska (RS)”.184 Earlier on the day of 
signing, however, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs raised last-minute problems with 
pre-agreed text, but both were eventually pressured into agreement. The US mediator Holbrooke 
(1998, 138-9) recounts that he told Sacirbey, the Bosnian Muslim Foreign Minister, in certain 
terms that the US would hold him responsible if he insisted on demanding to modify the text to 
include a reference saying his government would retain the name “Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina”. At the signing ceremony the Bosnian Serbs delegation’s leader Koljevic protested 
the proceedings arguing that they should have direct representation in the negotiations table. This 
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led Holbrooke to remind the Bosnian Serbs that in the negotiations framework their interests were 
now represented by a six-member joint delegation headed by Milosevic, who had the ultimate 
authority in cases of disagreement.185 Holbrooke (1998, 139-40) went on to threaten the Bosnian 
Serbs that they could leave the negotiations but that would result in a situation that they have no 
involvement at all in the negotiations. The US diplomat’s coercive tactics worked and the 
agreement was signed by the foreign ministers of the Bosnian government (which was de facto 
Muslim controlled), the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Croatia. In other words, 
the Bosnian Serbs were subdued through an implicit collaboration between Milosevic and US 
diplomacy. 
The second and much more significant diplomatic breakthrough came with the agreement 
in New York on 26 September. The “New York Principles” were also negotiated and signed by the 
three foreign ministers, and also there was another last-minute drama: the Bosnian Muslims were 
demanding a direct elections clause for presidential elections in the agreed text. This led the 
Americans to issue another ultimatum to Sarajevo that they either accept the agreement, or 
would publicly be denounced for their stubbornness leading to the failure (Holbrooke 1998, 180-
83). And the result was no different: faced with the choice of losing their biggest and most 
important ally, the Bosnian Muslims dropped their last minute demand. With the New York 
Principles, the main parameters of political settlement were elaborated: there would be a power-
sharing executive and guaranteed ethnic representation in the national parliament.186 The 
agreement also described how “vital interests” of each group would be protected at executive and 
legislative bodies, mostly through some ethnic vetoes which were, though disguised and indirect, 
were effectively embedded in the decision-making mechanisms.187 The Geneva and New York 
Agreements, however, were: 
… only initial steps. Alone they could not assure a lasting peace. But they did bring the 
parties closer together, and the US hoped that each side would view them as a reason to 
engage in further negotiations, possibly at an international conference. Holbrooke 
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planned to return the region in two days, hoping to begin to lay the groundwork for the 
final stage of the negotiations.188  
On the battleground, by 2 October, the progress of the Muslim-Croat alliance was halted 
and the Bosnian Serbs were on a counter offensive recovering the lands they lost in the previous 
month.189 The Holbrooke team was aware of this development and considered it as the best time 
to push for a ceasefire along with setting a date and venue for all-out-negotiations (Holbrooke 
1998, 185-200). On 5 October, the Americans achieved an agreement on both of their objectives: a 
ceasefire would be coming into effect in the next five days and this would be followed by tripartite 
negotiations, which were set to take place in November in the United States. 
5.8. Negotiations at Dayton: A Settlement through Coercive Diplomacy 
The tripartite negotiations took place at Wright- Patterson Air Force Base in November 1995 in 
Dayton, Ohio. Officially, the ICFY’s new Co-Chairman Carl Bildt was one of the two Co-Chairmen of 
the Dayton Peace Conference along with American representative Richard Holbrooke and Russian 
representative Igor Ivanov, and there were also representatives of the Contact Group countries at 
Dayton. However, Bildt, Ivanov and the other Contact Group representatives’ had no clear role 
during the negotiation as the American controlled and managed the negotiations.190 But this was 
not necessarily due to the facts that the Americans were the hosts and main force behind the 
recent initiative. It was also because the EU representatives were unable to coordinate a common 
negotiation position and Bildt was being undermined as the EU’s collective representative, and 
Russian involvement in the negotiations was also limited (Bildt 1998, 124-125; Holbrooke 1998, 
241-242; 311).191 As the chief British representative at Dayton, Pauline Neville-Jones (1996, 48) put 
it, the Europeans “… were informed but not consulted, and their primary role was to assist so far 
as needed, witness and ratify the outcome. But they were not to interfere.” The negotiations were 
expected to last two weeks, but in the event they lasted three weeks, and the agreement could 
only be reached when the Americans were actually getting prepared to announce that the talks 
failed. 
The parties agreed to three principles in advance of the talks regarding the procedure at 
Dayton, and in effect these principles put the Americans firmly in control of the process. Those 
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principles were: the three presidents would have the full authority to sign an agreement, without 
any further consultation with their parliaments; they would stay in the process as long as needed 
without threatening to walk out; and they would not be talking to the press during the media or 
outsider while there (Holbrooke 1998, 199-200). During their stay in the Air Base, the parties 
mostly held proximity talks through American mediators, but towards the end of the process there 
were more direct negotiations between the parties. Initially, the American mediators focused on 
two relatively more attainable tasks: an agreement on Eastern Slavonia (an area of Croatia still 
controlled the by Croatian Serbs) and an agreement on the Muslim-Croat federation, which was 
yet an entity which existed more on paper than in reality. The first issue concerned the Croatian 
government most; in fact, establishing Croatian control over Eastern Slavonia was the sole priority 
of the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman during the negotiations (Holbrooke 1998, 238). Tudjman 
was the undisputed overlord of the Bosnian Croats as the leader of their kin-state and played a 
major, though indirect, role in Bosnian Muslim- Bosnian Croat negotiations at Dayton over the 
federation as well.192 On 10 November the first success of the process was declared: a new 
federation agreement, between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, was reached.  And a 
day later, on 11 November, the Eastern Slavonia issue was settled when Milosevic and Tudjman 
agreed on a one-year, once renewable, transitional period under the UN administration before 
Eastern Slavonia reverting back to Croatian sovereignty (Ibid, 262-7). 
The next week at Dayton, however, was not a particularly productive one; many 
secondary issues were being settled but the parties continued to fiercely argue over the map, 
which was by far the most contentious issue, without entering into negotiations in earnest on the 
issue. As noted above, some most essential political provisions for power-sharing (such as a three 
member presidency and national vetoes) were already agreed at the Geneva and New York 
Agreements, and that seems probably why drafting a power-sharing constitution for post-Dayton 
Bosnia did not become a major issue during the Dayton negotiations.193 However, there was one 
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issue indirectly affecting the nature of power-sharing system envisaged: the regulation of 
refugees’ right to vote. The Bosnian Muslims argued for the refugees’ right of vote to be used back 
in their pre-war constituency, which would weaken the political dominance of the Bosnian Serbs in 
some parts of the Bosnian Serb entity (Ibid, 289-290). This issue remained unsettled until the very 
end of the Dayton conference. It was eventually resolved by a mutual compromise: the refugees 
would be able to vote back in their pre-war constituency or could seek to vote in another part of 
the country (Ibid, 309). 
The main issue that remained as contentious throughout the conference was “the map”. 
Although the percentages were agreed by the parties before Dayton, drawing the inter-entity 
boundary line between the two Bosnian entities was a very complex issue, often leading to 
lengthy, cyclic and unproductive discussions on importance of a certain location to one or another 
party. During third weekend of the conference, Holbrooke sought to influence the parties by 
making it explicit that the Americans were considering closing down the conference if the parties 
did not show more determination and be flexible about their positions.194 Milosevic then began 
gradually agreeing to the most crucial Muslims demands, which included leaving Sarajevo under 
the Muslim-Croat federation and establishing a land corridor between the federation and 
Goražde, a Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia. This was most probably due to Milosevic’s 
determination to make a deal at Dayton, which was definitely further galvanised by Holbrooke’s 
reminder to Milosevic that the only way Milosevic could achieve lifting of the sanctions on his 
country, which required US assent at the U.N. Security Council, was having an agreement at 
Dayton (Ibid, 280). Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs, in Holbrooke’s terminology, were “nonpersons” 
at the negotiations, often their delegation was simply ignored by Milosevic who conducted the 
negotiations on their behalf (Ibid, 256).  
The Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were harder to handle for the Americans during 
the negotiations, not least because there was infighting within their delegation.195 They were also 
the party with the hardest choices to make. They were the largest ethnic group but were expected 
to formally concede many areas of Bosnia which had pre-war Bosnian Muslim majorities, which 
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were now ethnically cleansed by the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, they were going to share 
power with the Bosnian Croats at the Muslim-Croat federation as well as at the central state level 
with both the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. As they already agreed to power-sharing 
institutions at Geneva and New York, at Dayton they essentially focused their efforts on regaining 
as much as territory possible and hoping that extending the negotiations would lead to more 
pressure on the Serbs. But the Americans were not willing to extend the negotiations beyond third 
week.196 On the evening of 20 November, Secretary Christopher delivered the American ultimatum 
to the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims had two choices: they were either going to accept 
the deal that seemed to have emerged last night or the conference would close down in the 
morning. The Bosnian Muslims responded that they would agree if Brcko (a strategic town linking 
two otherwise separate territories of the Republika Srpska) was also returned to them. In the 
morning the Americans, considering this last minute demand as quite unlikely to have been 
accepted by the Serbs, were getting prepared for their failure announcement when Milosevic 
proposed arbitration for Brcko as a final offer (Ibid, 305-8). And Izetbegovic at last agreed to the 
deal by remarking: “It is not a just peace. But my people need peace” (Ibid, 309). In short, the 
American pressure made the Bosnian Muslims to clarify their minds and state their final demand, 
which led Milosevic to make a final offer in response. 
The American success at Dayton was essentially due to the coercive strategy pursued, 
which succeeded in turning the Dayton conference into an endgame. First, the Americans got the 
parties agreement to a set of principles regarding the procedure at tripartite negotiations, which 
essentially limited the parties’ manoeuvrability. Second, the Americans repeatedly made it clear to 
the parties, before and during the Dayton negotiations, that there were consequences for each 
side if they failed to cooperate during the negotiations. Those consequences were also obvious to 
the parties. The Bosnian Muslims were already a recipient of US military aid, allegedly through 
some indirect channels, and their relationship with the US was one of vital importance. Therefore, 
although they pushed this relationship to its limit during the final days of the negotiations, they 
knew that that if the negotiations failed, their chances of achieving a better settlement, without 
the US backing through NATO airstrikes and military aid, would be considerably limited. The 
Bosnian Serbs were, meanwhile, were in trouble at two fronts at the same time: their relationship 
with their kin-state, and especially with its leader Milosevic, was severely strained, and they were 
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now also losing ground in the war due to the NATO strikes and the strengthening Croat-Muslim 
military alliance. In the process leading to Dayton, the Bosnian Serbs also lost their direct say in 
negotiations, which enabled Milosevic with more flexibly in their absence. And Milosevic himself 
was aware of the fact that lifting the sanctions on Yugoslavia, which was crippling the country’s 
economy, was now only possible through a settlement in Bosnia, which the Americans often 
reminded to him. Finally, the Bosnian Croats were effectively controlled and manipulated by their 
kin-state’s leader who wanted a deal in Bosnia in order not to put at risk his diplomatic victory in 
Eastern Slavonia, which was his top priority in Dayton negotiations. 
5.9. Dayton Peace Agreement: A Thoroughly Consociational System 
The DPA (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
which was initialled in Dayton, was formally signed by the parties in Paris on 14 December, 
1995.197 The DPA provided that Bosnia and Herzegovina would consist of two loosely connected 
political entities: the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). The DPA 
elaborated a thoroughly consociational system for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and established third 
party supervision and enforcement mechanisms for the agreement’s implementation and 
maintenance. 
According to the DPA, a multitude of inter-ethnic power-sharing institutions exist at both 
constituent entity and central level political system of the country. The two constituent entities 
(i.e. the Federation and the RS) are granted with all residual powers not expressly assigned to the 
common state institutions.198 However, in the case of the federation, which is predominately Croat 
and Muslim Bosniak, most entity level decision-making and powers are decentralised to a number 
of cantons (some predominantly Muslim, some Croat or mixed). The cantons, for example, are 
equipped with jurisdiction over many core government functions, such as policing, education, 
public housing, culture, information and broadcasting, land use, and regulation of business. In 
addition to the cantons, there are also municipal and federal level institutions in the federation.199 
The federation’s constitution also requires that The House of Peoples of the Federation Parliament 
should have the same number of representatives from each constituent people.200 Thus, the 
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political equality of the Bosnian Muslim, the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian Serb populations of 
the federation are firmly enshrined in the constitution. The emphasis on the decentralized 
character of the federation is evident in the clause that delegates to the House of Peoples are to 
be elected by the Cantonal Assemblies. In other words, no direct elections are to be held for the 
House of Peoples, it can be argued that the House of Peoples is subordinate to cantonal 
administrations. The second organ of the legislature of the federation is the House of 
Representatives which is sharing the legislative authority with the House of Peoples. Decisions of 
the federation legislature require the approval of the each house so they have equal legislative 
authority. The constitution speaks rather less strictly regarding the national composition of the 
House of Representatives. It only stipulates that a minimum of four representatives of the total of 
ninety-eight delegates should hail from each of the three constituent peoples.201 However, the 
constitution of the federation guarantees the “vital national interest” of the constituent peoples in 
the decision-making of the legislature. Vital national interests are, notably, the rights of 
constituent peoples such as their adequate representation in legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities, constitutional amendments, territorial organization, and organization of public 
authorities. The vital interest mechanism also gives ultimate authority to the Constitutional Court 
in deciding whether a law is of vital interest issue to any of constituent peoples. If the court 
decides to deem it non-vital interest issue, the law can be adopted by simple majority. The vital 
interest cases can be brought to the court either by one chairman or vice-chairman of the House 
of Peoples. The vital interests’ mechanism in effect creates a disguised veto tool for the Croats and 
the Muslims in the federation.202 Rather interestingly, the wording does not include the term veto 
but the mechanism practically constitutes a veto that is far more time consuming than a usual 
veto. The Republika Srpska, on the other hand, unlike its Muslim-Croat counterpart, is not 
cantonised. It is fundamentally a centralized state, only a few of the articles of its constitution 
speaks of the role of local authorities, the municipalities. The constitution of the RS only stipulates 
that vice presidents should be from the other constituent peoples.203 After the “Constituent 
Peoples” decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which stipulated that 
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ethnic group based power-sharing should be guaranteed all over the country, the RS has adopted 
some power-sharing mechanisms but that still remains limited compared to the federation.204 
At the national level, the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the DPA, 
provides the three constituent peoples with veto powers and reserved seats at most of the 
Bosnian state level political institutions; the Presidency, the Constitutional Court, the House of 
Peoples (i.e. the upper house of the Parliamentary Assembly) and most national level 
commissions. Three of the four consociational principles, mutual veto, grand coalition and 
proportionality are thus evident at almost all levels of the political system. And the fourth 
principle, segmental autonomy, is provided through cantonal arrangements. At jurisdictional level, 
the core policy areas such as taxation and education are left to the two political entities, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, and most importantly, until 2003, 
even defence was one of those areas that are under the policy domain of the entities.205 The 
Bosnian state institutions are responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, 
monetary policy, finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter 
entity criminal law enforcement, regulation of inter entity transportation, and air traffic control.206  
The protection of vital interests of the three constituent peoples is also ensured through a 
three member presidency of the Bosnian state. The constitution provides that the presidency is 
composed of one Bosniak (i.e. Bosnian Muslim), one Croat elected by the people of the federation 
and one Serb elected by the people of the Republika Srpska. The presidency can take decisions by 
majority rule but it is obliged to seek consensus for all decisions. However, a dissenting member of 
the presidency could declare a decision against the vital interest of it entity, which triggers an 
ultimate vote on the decision at the National Assembly of Republika Srpska or the House of 
Peoples of the Federation.207 The council of ministers of the Bosnian state is also another 
microcosm of the power sharing arrangements between the three constituent peoples. The 
presidency nominates the chair of the council of ministers and the chair nominates both ministers 
and deputy ministers. The constitution stipulates that no more than two-thirds of ministers can be 
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from the territory of the Federation and the deputy ministers cannot be from the same 
constituent people as their ministers.208 
Another crucial institution of the post-Dayton Bosnian power-sharing regime is the 
constitutional court. The court is composed of nine judges, of whom four selected by the 
federation’s House of Representatives, and two of the others by the National Assembly of 
Republika Srpska. The other three judges are appointed by the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) in consultation with the Bosnian presidency.209 The court decides by majority 
principle rather than consensus, which makes it the only Bosnian state level institution doing so. In 
sum, the DPA provided for power-sharing at all levels of government and created a thoroughly 
consociational system. 
5.10. Implementing the DPA: Success or Failure? 
The DPA did not envisage any role for the kin-states in post-Dayton Bosnia. The military 
implementation and enforcement of the DPA was first entrusted to a NATO led coalition of forces, 
and was taken over by an EU led force in 2004. The civilian enforcement of the DPA, however, still 
remains administered through the Office of High Representative (OHR). The High Representative’s 
powers were detailed in Annex 10 of the DPA, though the Annex did not state what would 
constitute the benchmarks for implementation. This obscurity was clarified by the formation of 
the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)210 in the first peace implementation conference held in 
December, 1995. The PIC provides political guidance to the High Representative and sets 
benchmarks towards full implementation of the DPA, which would end the mission of the High 
Representative. The PIC’s 1997 Bonn session has enabled the High Representative (HR) with 
authority to dismiss elected and unelected Bosnian officials if they are obstructing the peace 
process. 
Analysts of post-Dayton Bosnia point out that despite short term successes nationalist grip 
on power is largely unshaken and there are severe legitimacy and ownership problems resulting 
from the fact the settlement was agreed by the local parties under immense international 
pressure (Chandler 1999; Bose 2002; Belloni 2007). Richmond and Franks (2009) argues that 
international actors have sought to implement a conservative version of the liberal peace 
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paradigm in their top-down efforts of post-conflict statebuilding. A major problem in post-Dayton 
Bosnia seems to stem from the unfinished nature of the power sharing arrangements: the DPA 
provided a constitutional power-sharing framework for Bosnia but did not clarify whether Bosnia 
would be a firmly consociational system or one evolving towards a more integrative system in the 
future. The system specified by the DPA was consociational; however, the three ethnic groups’ 
perspectives on the DPA substantively differ from each other. On one hand, the Muslims (now 
often referred to as Bosniaks) tend to see the current arrangements as a preliminary step towards 
a more centralized and integrationist system. On the other hand, the Serbs and Croats seek a 
much more decentralized Bosnian state that would possibly enable them to seek partition in the 
future.211 Since the Bosnian political actors did not share any common vision regarding the nature 
of power-sharing, the international actors used to play a decisive role, albeit an ambivalent one. 
In the Bosnian context international agencies have been pushing an integrative agenda 
into a deeply consociational system. This is precisely why, despite timid sponsorship of 
timid integrationist electoral devices, they have had limited success in sustaining multi-
ethnic politics. Without alternating the consociational structure of BiH institutions, any 
positive effects of electoral engineering can occur only under the most unusual and 
unpredicted circumstances (Belloni 2004, 339-340). 
The role of OHR in recent years, however, has been described as “light touch”212, and the 
Bosnian politics have currently been deadlocked over the issue of constitutional reform.213 
Although a significant amount of progress has been made since the end of the war,214 it still 
remains to be seen whether Bosnia would ultimately become a stable polity which requires no 
external involvement. 
5.11. Conclusion 
During the Bosnian war, the three ethnic groups had fundamentally conflicting political goals. The 
Bosnian Muslims preferred a unitary Bosnia which they could dominate, while the Bosnian Croats 
and the Bosnian Serbs sought to have their own states or join their kin-states. The only realistic 
alternative was power-sharing. However, the parties’ lack of trust towards each other, now also 
aggravated by the war, prevented them from reaching at this alternative. This chapter has sought 
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to explain why the EC (and later EU) led collective mediation processes failed but the subsequent 
American led process succeeded in reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Bosnian conflict. 
Each collective attempt at mediation in Bosnia failed due to a different set of reasons, but there 
was one particular reason contributed to all these failed processes, which was the lack of 
collective will or resources, on part of the Europeans, to pressure the Bosnian parties. The United 
States’ lack of a clear policy towards the Bosnian conflict also further complicated the European 
led efforts. 
Eventually, in August 1995, the United States formulated its strategy and took the lead in 
the mediation of the conflict. In parallel with the developments on the battleground, which were 
helped by the NATO, the American mediators managed to get the parties agree on a set of main 
parameters for a power-sharing framework. These parameters were, in fact, many times before 
agreed as such by the same parties in the earlier mediation processes. One of the fundamentally 
different aspects of the US strategy that enabled the Americans to achieve an agreement at 
Dayton was the use of a wide range of coercive tactics to ripen the conflict, which included NATO 
air strikes, manipulation of the arms embargo and continuation of the crippling sanctions on 
Federal Yugoslavia. The preceding collective mediation initiatives lacked the unity and agility 
required to maintain such incentive and disincentive structure to influence the parties in Bosnia. 
Another crucial aspect of the US strategy was its implicit collaboration with the Croat and Federal 
Yugoslav leaders against their intransigent kin community leaderships. Thus the kin-states’ 
involvement in the peacemaking process in Bosnia ultimately shifted from their initial quasi-
mediation role to enforcement. Formally the kin-states’ leaders were treated as the 
representatives of their kin communities in Bosnia, whilst, in practice, they took the role of 
enforcers who would demand compliance with the terms of the agreement. The findings of this 
chapter underline that kin-states’ role in a conflict could be substantially altered by third parties’ 
policy and manipulation, e.g. sanctions. Moreover, third party peacemakers and kin-states could 
even form implicit alliances within the context of a peacemaking intervention. 
The efforts for stabilisation of the politics of Bosnia are still an on-going process, in which 
the international community plays a major role. The fact that the international actors involved in 
Bosnia are often ambivalent in their policies regarding the nature of the power-sharing institutions 
further complicates the precarious situation. Nevertheless, this should not delude us to believe 
that the DPA was not an important achievement. The DPA succeeded in its primary goal, which 
was ending the war, and also laid the foundations for a power-sharing regime. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Northern Ireland: Anglo-Irish Mediation 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The Northern Ireland conflict, which was long considered among the world’s most intractable 
conflicts, is currently regarded as a success story of Anglo-Irish cooperation. Although it cannot be 
said that the conflict between the Northern Ireland’s nationalist and unionist communities has 
been resolved, observers of this deeply divided society would overwhelmingly agree that the 
conflict has now moved into a mostly non-violent and stable political stage as a result of the peace 
process that begun in the early 1990s. The substantive negotiations that began in June 1996 
between the Northern Irish parties led to the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on 
10 April 1998, and the GFA was approved in the referenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic on 23 May 1998. 
This chapter seeks to analyse the peacemaking interventions of the British and Irish 
governments in Northern Ireland in paving the way for the Northern Irish all-party talks in 1996 as 
well as their roles in the successful culmination of that process in 1998. The chapter initially 
provides a brief historical background of the conflict in order to posit the main dimensions of the 
conflict. The historical account particularly looks at the violent transformation of the conflict in the 
late 1960s and the first attempt at power sharing in 1973-1974. There is also a brief review of the 
literature on the GFA process. This is followed by analyses of three Anglo-Irish initiatives which 
collectively set out the parameters for the GFA: the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement; the 1993 
Downing Street Declaration; and the 1995 the Framework Documents. Along with these initiatives, 
the origins of peace process and the emergence and evolution of the all-party negotiations 
process are discussed. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the last phase of the negotiations 
leading to the GFA. Finally, the GFA and its implementation are assessed. The chapter concludes 
that peacemaking was effective when the two kin-states agreed upon and implemented a 
common mediation strategy. Such cooperation between kin-states is unprecedented in the 
mediation of power-sharing, making the GFA an attractive model which is very difficult to 
reproduce for other deeply divided societies. 
A theoretical clarification should be made here. The status of Ireland as a kin-state to the 
Northern Irish nationalist community is clear, whereas the same cannot be said about the 
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relationship between Britain and the unionist community. As Northern Ireland is part of the United 
Kingdom, Britain, by definition, cannot be a kin-state to any Northern Irish community. But the 
British state and the unionist community’s relationship in many ways resemble to one between a 
kin-state and its kin community. The unionists, as the term itself suggests, strongly identify 
themselves with Britain. However, Northern Ireland’s status within the UK has always been 
disputed, and even a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland was occasionally contemplated by 
the British governments.215 Guelke and Wright (1990, 52) claims that “[t]his is because Northern 
Ireland is not perceived as an integral part of the national territory, nor is the British identity of its 
Unionist majority accepted at face value by most people on the UK mainland. In short, the way the 
notion of British withdrawal is generally interpreted implies that Northern Ireland is expendable to 
Britain.” Thus, Britain’s status in Northern Ireland could rather be described as one of a “reluctant” 
sovereign. And the British-Unionist relationship’s main similarity to a kin-state-kin-community 
interaction is that the latter identifies itself with the former and the former (though does not 
share exactly the same affinity) maintains a concern for the latter. As will be pointed out below, 
although Britain is a reluctant sovereign, in effect, it usually acts like a kin-state which aims to 
disengage itself from the conflict but not at all costs. 
6.2. A Brief History of the Troubles 
This section discusses main aspects of the conflict and the parties’ views regarding the conflict and 
its settlement. The Northern Ireland conflict is no different than many other intractable conflicts in 
the sense that the parties to the conflict heavily disagree over the nature of the conflict and its 
possible resolution. The conflict’s historical roots can easily be traced back to the 19th century 
political debate in Ireland over the question of whether Ireland should seek home rule (i.e. 
autonomy) or maintain the union with Britain, or even back to the 16th century when many English 
and Scottish settlers arrived on the island. However, it is widely accepted that the conflict’s 
modern period began in the late 1960s with the eruption of widespread and sustained inter-
communal political violence following the build-up of social unrest for many decades since the 
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formation of Northern Ireland as a political entity in 1921. This modern period of the conflict is 
often referred to as “the Troubles”.216 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the political developments since the beginnings of the 
Troubles to the emergence of the peace process, it is essential to discuss two questions: How did 
Northern Ireland, as a political entity, come into being? And what issues did divide its people? In 
answer to the first question, it can be said that the partition of the island of Ireland into two 
political entities came as a result of the Irish Independence War (also known as the Anglo-Irish 
War). Whilst the Irish War of Independence was going on, the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
passed the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and partitioned Ireland into two home rule regions, 
Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland.  Due to intensity of the on-going war in the south the Act 
never took effect in southern Ireland, however, in the north a separate Northern Ireland 
administration with its parliament was formed by May 1921. The Irish Independence War ended 
with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921 and provided an opt-out clause for 
Northern Ireland. As expected, the Northern Ireland Parliament invoked this clause at the earliest 
date possible and broke up with the newly formed Irish Free State and maintained its union with 
Great Britain. 
6.2.1. The Government of Northern Ireland and the Catholics 
The obvious reason for Northern Ireland’s opt-out from Irish unity was the fact that the 
demographics of Northern Ireland and its Protestant majority’s political affiliation were 
significantly different than the rest of Ireland, which was overwhelmingly Catholic. Northern 
Ireland was constituted by six of the nine counties of the Ulster province of Ireland, which existed 
under the British rule, and among its six counties four were overwhelmingly Protestant, whose 
forefathers came from England and Scotland and settled in Ireland from 16th century onwards, and 
only two had Catholic majorities, who mostly had native Irish descent. In short, Northern Ireland’s 
overall demographic composition was a majority Protestant community and a minority Catholic 
community.217 The Protestant community would overwhelmingly identify with Britain and prefer 
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the continuation of the union with Britain, while the Catholic community would regard themselves 
Irish and were largely in favour of Northern Ireland becoming part of the Irish state (Tonge 2006, 
12-18). Politically, supporters of the former view are known as the unionists, as they want to 
maintain the union with Britain, and the latter’s supporters are called the nationalists or, more 
precisely, Irish nationalists. It should be noted that not all Protestants are “unionists” and not all 
Catholics are “nationalists” and there is now a substantially large number of people who refuse to 
identify themselves with either of these two ethno-political communities.218 The terminology of 
the conflict is actually more complicated: paramilitary groups undertaking violence in the name of 
these two ideologies (i.e. unionism and nationalism) are referred to as “loyalists” on the unionist 
flank and in the case of nationalism known as “republicans”. Historically, most republican 
paramilitaries were under the banner of the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army); though there 
were some other much smaller groups as well, such as the INLA (the Irish National Liberation 
Army) and later in the 1990s the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA which emerged as splinter groups 
from the Provisional IRA. Loyalists traditionally belonged to a few major organisations: mainly, the 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA)/the Ulster Freedom Fighters 
(UFF)219 (Dixon and O’Kane 2011, 3-17). 
In the first few years following the establishment of the Northern Ireland government in 
1921, and later in 1950s, the IRA (the one preceding the Provisional IRA) opposed to the partition 
of the island and attacked the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the then 
predominantly Protestant police force of Northern Ireland, but these IRA attacks were not 
sustained for long. Meanwhile, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), overwhelmingly supported by the 
Protestant community, firmly entrenched its grip on power from the late 1920s onwards and 
monopolised the government of Northern Ireland. The UUP would run Northern Ireland between 
1921-72 and the party’s dominance of the Northern Irish government would often mean 
discrimination against the Catholics in many respects, particularly in allocation of social housing, 
voting rights (as it was tied to property ownership), and public employment.220 During this period 
the Catholic community were mostly introvert, though there were a few violent IRA campaigns, 
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especially along the border, in 1930s and 1950s but most of the Catholics did not participate and 
stayed away from politics. It can be said that an overwhelming majority of the Catholics did not 
see the Northern Irish state as legitimate from the outset, and as they were often discriminated 
against by the Northern Irish state, they largely withdrew from the political scene (Tonge 2006, 18-
22). Although Northern Ireland was mostly stable until the late 1960s, there were occasional 
outbreaks of political violence and communal divisions were festering.  
6.2.2. The Violent Transformation of the Conflict 
By the late 1960s, Northern Ireland was a deeply divided society with plenty of potential for 
political turmoil.  This potential would soon turn into violence with a series of violent incidents. 
The initial incidents were: the attacks on the Catholics by the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966; 
the violent clashes between the Catholic protesters and the RUC forces during the October 1968 
marches organised by Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which was campaigning 
for fair access for Catholics in political, social, cultural and economic fields; and finally the Battle of 
Bogside, which took place in Derry/Londonderry on 12-14 August 1969 between the local 
nationalist community and the RUC forces. As a combined result of these violent incidents, the 
Northern Irish state was regarded increasingly illegitimate and repressive by most Catholics, and 
the IRA fighters were raising their credibility as defenders of the Catholic communities. A cycle of 
violence which was manipulated by radicals on both sides thus emerged in 1969 and quickly led to 
“ … a process of intensification and polarisation sharpened identities, closed communal 
boundaries and made every sector of the society an arena of power struggle”(Ruane and Todd 
2007, 449). 
As the Belfast government’s inability to impose an order became increasingly clear, 
especially with the Battle of Bogside, a crucial turning point came in the conflict in August 1969. 
The British government, upon Belfast’s request, deployed the British army in Northern Ireland to 
restore order on 14 August 1969, which inevitably meant that the London government would 
become more directly involved in Northern Ireland’s affairs. The nationalists initially regarded the 
army’s deployment as a positive development as they hoped it would protect them against the 
violence perpetrated by loyalist paramilitaries which, they believed, was condoned and even 
helped by the RUC (Dixon 2001, 105-107). But, for some in the nationalist community, the 
deployment of the British army was yet another display of the fact that the British were the real 
occupying force in Northern Ireland. And within the ruling Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) political 
forces divided between those who were arguing for some moderate reforms for improving the 
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situation of Catholics and those who wanted a tougher stance from the government and 
preservation of the status quo; the latter group also included the powerful ethno-religious 
organisation Orange Order, which was institutionally linked to the UUP (Dixon and O’Kane 2011, 
27-30). As divisions between the two communities were strengthening and becoming increasingly 
violent, these internal debates would gain more importance and relevance. The UUP government 
initially tried to strike a balance by declaring its intent on reforming the Northern Irish state and 
also by taking tougher security measures. 
At the same time, the IRA members of the Catholic community were divided over how to 
react in the face of increasing repression by the security forces. Within this context, Provisional 
IRA (which would later become known as the IRA) was founded by those who blamed the original 
Dublin based IRA (also known as the official IRA) of being unprepared for protection of the 
Catholic neighbourhoods (Moloney 2002, 74-78). The Provisional IRA argued for employment of 
exclusively violent means against the British and Northern Irish security forces in order to bring 
about a removal of Northern Ireland from the union with Britain and criticised the Official IRA of 
becoming more politically oriented and socialist.221 By early 1970s, the Provisional IRA, which 
became the main faction and often simply referred to as the IRA, was attacking the British troops 
and known loyalists. In the meantime, it was becoming clear that the Northern Ireland’s Unionist 
government was not able to deliver radical reforms and its security measures (including 
internment without trial) were not effective. The British government was pondering whether to 
end home rule in Northern Ireland and bring the province under London’s direct rule.222 In March 
1972, the British government proceeded with this option and suspended the Northern Ireland 
government that existed since 1922. The year 1972 also saw the largest number of lives lost to the 
conflict which included civilians, loyalist and republican fighters and members of the British and 
Northern Irish security forces. The perpetrators of the violence were universal as well: the 
paramilitaries and the security forces were all blamed for losses of lives.223 
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6.2.3. The First Attempt at Power-sharing with Kin-state Involvement 
With the introduction of the direct rule, the British government intensified its search for a political 
solution. The first talks between the British and IRA were secretly held in Northern Ireland and 
London in 1972 and failed. The Northern Ireland Office then produced a green paper titled “The 
Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion”, in which the British government argued for a 
power-sharing regime to be adopted in Northern Ireland.224 On 8 March 1973, a referendum was 
held to ask people of Northern Ireland whether they were in favour of remaining part of the UK or 
joining the Republic of Ireland to form a united Ireland outside the UK. As the nationalist 
community boycotted the referendum, the result was not surprising: 98% of those who 
participated were in favour of maintaining the union with Britain.  
Subsequent to the referendum, the British government published a white paper, Northern 
Ireland Constitutional Proposals, which included some concrete proposals on how power could be 
shared in a proposed assembly and executive branches of a future Northern Ireland government, 
mostly through delegation of many powers to committees which both communities would be 
represented.225 The white paper also suggested the establishment of an arrangement for 
consultation and cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This issue 
would soon become known as “the Irish dimension”. The Irish dimension was, in other words, the 
kin-state’s involvement. The British parliament then turned the bill incorporating the provisions of 
the white paper into law and elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly held. The composition of 
power-sharing executive was eventually agreed between the parties. The agreement was that 
there would be a multiparty coalition government of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which was 
the main unionist party, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which was the main 
nationalist party, and Alliance of Northern Ireland Party (APNI), then a moderately unionist smaller 
party. The main political forces in Northern Ireland were thus going to participate in the executive. 
However, the same could not be said about the more radical and militarised factions, such as the 
DUP and the loyalist and republican paramilitaries. And more worryingly, the UUP was once again 
divided within, though the party’s leader Brian Faulkner initially succeeded in getting his party’s 
approval for the power-sharing executive (McKrittick and McVea 2001, 98-117). 
There was one more issue which the parties should negotiate: the form of relationship and 
cooperation between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. The UUP was against establishing 
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any political links between the north and the south. But it was a key SDLP demand that such a link 
was necessary. In order to deal with the issue, the British government decided to convene a 
conference that would be attended by the UUP, the SDLP, the APNI leaderships as well as the 
British and Irish governments. In December 1973, the conference convened in Sunningdale, 
Berkshire and negotiations between the parties and the two governments resulted in an 
agreement.226 The agreement included statements from the British and Irish governments 
regarding the future of Northern Ireland which confirmed the status quo and made it clear that 
there would be a change only if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland would like so.227 This 
was a very limited victory for the unionists as it fell short of declaring any intention on part of the 
Irish government to amend the Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, which laid claims for 
sovereignty over the whole island of Ireland, including Northern Ireland, for the Republic of 
Ireland. The Sunningdale agreement stipulated that there would be a Council of Ireland. The 
Council of Ireland itself would consist of two bodies: a Council of Ministers with executive and 
harmonising functions and would be composed of seven of the members of the Northern Ireland 
Executive and an equal number of ministers from the government of the Irish Republic 
participating and acting by unanimity, and a Consultative Assembly with advisory and review 
functions, which would comprise of 30 members of the Dáil Éireann (the lower house of the Irish 
parliament) and 30 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.228 The provision for Council of 
Ireland was largely satisfying the SDLP’s insistence that there should be a form of co-sovereignty in 
Northern Ireland between the UK and Ireland. It was not, however, specified what areas would be 
under the Council of Ireland’s jurisdiction.229 The council would act only by unanimity which, in 
effect, provided the unionists with a veto; nevertheless, most of the unionists regarded the 
Council of Ireland a step towards the nationalist goal of reunifying Ireland. So why did the UUP 
leadership sign up for the Council of Ireland then? It is argued that the UUP leader Faulkner was 
pressured by the British Prime Minister Heath that the Irish dimension was the price to be paid for 
maintenance of the union (Kerr 2005, 46). It is also claimed that Faulkner underestimated the 
symbolism of the Council of Ireland (Dixon 2001, 146). The particular importance of the 
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Sunningdale Agreement for the Irish government was that for the first time since the partition it 
officially became a party to the Northern Ireland conflict and acquired a role in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland through the proposed Council of Ireland. This was also a first in terms of kin-state 
involvement for peacemaking in Northern Ireland. The two states’ cooperation during the 
conference, however, was limited with their efforts to deliver the Northern Irish parties which 
were respectively closest to them. 
A few weeks after the signing of the agreement, the Ulster Unionist Council (the UUP’s 
main policy body) voted to reject the Council of Ireland and Faulkner resigned as the UUP leader. 
Then, the anti-Sunningdale unionists won 51.1% of the valid votes and 11 of the 12 Northern 
Ireland seats at the Westminster elections in February 1974 by building their electoral campaign 
on rejection of the agreement, particularly the Council of Ireland under the banner of their 
election slogan “Dublin is just a Sunningdale away”.230 The elections also resulted in the 
Conservative Heath’s government’s replacement with a Labour government headed by Harold 
Wilson. There were some other political developments undermining Sunningdale as well. One of 
these was a case against Sunningdale at the Irish Supreme court, during which the Irish 
government argued that Sunningdale was merely a policy declaration. Consequently, the Irish 
government implicated the Irish constitution’s territorial claim to Northern Ireland was intact (Bew 
2007, 513). The Irish government also did not deliver on its proposed cooperation regarding 
extradition of those that committed crimes in the north. Moreover, some leading SDLP members 
and the Irish Prime Minister, Liam Cosgrave, in their public statements indicated that Sunningdale 
was a step towards a united Ireland (Dixon 2001, 146-147). These developments further strained 
the Faulkner unionists, who did not have anything other than some ambivalent statements from 
the Irish government regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as a unionist gain. In other 
words, the Irish government tried to uphold the hope of Irish unification, as exemplified by its 
court defence, and the Wilson government, instead of seeking cooperation of the Irish 
government in allaying the fears of unionists and tackling the unionist strikers, quickly moved on 
to exploring other policy options. The final stage unfolded in May when the Ulster Workers’ 
Council strike paralysed political and economic life in Northern Ireland. Responding to the strikes, 
British Prime Minister Wilson gave a televised speech in which he referred to the strikers and their 
supporters as “spongers”. The effect of the speech was detrimental for Sunningdale as it had a 
galvanising influence on the unionist community and increased their support to the strikers (Dixon 
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2001, 153; Kerr 2005, 68). The Wilson government was not hopeful about Sunningdale’s chances 
and therefore already considering other options, namely withdrawal or partition, among which 
the Prime Minister himself was in favour of withdrawal (Bew 2007, 516-518). The unionist 
members of the power-sharing Executive sought renegotiation of the Council of Ireland, but that 
failed due to opposition from the nationalists, and they collectively resigned and brought the end 
of the Northern Ireland’s first attempt at power-sharing. 
It is worth questioning whether the unionist resistance to Sunningdale was primarily due 
to a public or elite based reaction, as this question has implications for the feasibility of building a 
power-sharing regime in Northern Ireland through an elite consensus. Dixon (2001, 149-150) 
argues that opinion polls taken at the time indicates there was an overall majority, both among 
Protestants and Catholics, in favour of power-sharing; however, he also points out that a majority 
of Protestants were against the proposed Council of Ireland. Dixon (1997a; 1997b; 2001 151-152) 
contends that the organisers of the strike were non-party loyalists and politicians gave their full 
backing once it became clear that public support for the strike was growing, and hence the 
opposition to the Sunningdale Agreement was originally from the public. Kerr (2005, 58) 
underscores that although there was a majority of Protestants accepting power-sharing, the 
unionist elite’s lack of will was the main obstacle to the political settlement with nationalists, not 
the unionist striker’s resistance. Kerr (2005, 71) also claims that “[i]n terms of the political climate, 
the Agreement did not fail due to implementation difficulties or the strength of anti-Agreement 
coalition. Its collapse was the result of internal and external elite instability, which enabled the 
unionist intransigence, and republican and loyalist violence, to undermine the peace process”. On 
the other hand, Clancy (2010, 38) points out that the divisions within the segments were greater in 
the process leading to the GFA and the Sunningdale’s collapse “... can largely be attributed to the 
British government’s failure to counterbalance the SDLP and Irish government during a time of 
deep constitutional instability”. It is clear that Sunningdale did not sufficiently address the 
unionists’ anxiety stemming from the Council of Ireland as its possible use for furthering a united 
Ireland generated an anxiety among the unionists and the Irish government’s constitutional 
ambivalence furthered strengthened this anxiety. Sunningdale was a power-sharing deal with an 
exclusive nature as it lacked participation of anti-Agreement unionists, loyalists and republicans in 
its making process and did not envisage their re-entry either. The exclusion of the anti-power-
sharing unionists, loyalist and republicans from Sunningdale negotiations was understandable; 
these three were all uncooperative at the time and would possibly not attend, if invited, or, if 
attended, would try to undermine negotiations. But Sunningdale also failed in providing any route 
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for a future entry of these factions into power-sharing executive and hence enabled these three 
factions to fully commit themselves in undermining Sunningdale. In sum, Sunningdale was beset 
by mainly three problems. First, it was imbalanced as it did not address the major unionist 
concern. Second, its power-sharing executive was not inclusive in its composition and also quickly 
lost its majority support from the unionist community and hence became unrepresentative. Third, 
the Anglo-Irish support for power-sharing was, at best, ambivalent as both British and Irish 
governments faltered in their support for the agreement. The British government’s pressure over 
the UUP leadership was the prime catalyst of the agreement reached at Sunningdale and 
continuation of that involvement was essential for survival of the power-sharing regime. However, 
the new British government was not willing to prop up Sunningdale by using force to stop strikers 
taking control of the streets and halting the economy, while the Irish government was not helpful 
in clarifying the ambiguity regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and did not deliver on 
extradition. The Anglo-Irish cooperation over Northern Ireland was not fully developed yet. 
6.3. Explaining the Good Friday Agreement 
This section briefly reviews the existing literature on the GFA. There is an extensive literature on 
the Northern Ireland conflict. The peace process, the official negotiations and the GFA institutions 
have all been studied by legions of scholars. Therefore, the review is by no means exhaustive, 
given the vastness of the literature, but it identifies and discusses the main strands of the 
literature explaining the achievement of the GFA. 
A military stalemate between the IRA and the British army is often stressed as one of the 
main factors leading to the GFA. It has been argued that the republicans’ inability to achieve their 
goal at the military level led them to call a ceasefire and seek a negotiated settlement (Neumann 
2003; English 2003; Alonso 2006). Another strand of the literature puts the emphasis on 
ideological change and points out that by the early 1990s most of the Northern Irish political 
parties, including Sinn Féin, were in the process of adopting new political discourses and 
embracing concepts like pluralism, recognition and equality (Coakley ed. 2002; Bourke 2003; 
Ruane 2004). The activities of civil society and other social organisations aiming to help the public 
see beyond the divide is also underlined as an important factor compelling politicians to negotiate 
a settlement (Hargie and Dickson eds. 2003; Guelke 2003; Todd 2006). Another major strand of 
the literature sees Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation, in particular a common strategy of 
conflict management pursued by the two governments, as critical to the success of the peace 
process (Ruanne and Todd 1999; Wolff 2001). Kerr (2005, 110) sums up this argument succinctly: 
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The consolidation of Anglo-Irish intergovernmental interests and structures, fortified by a 
synchronisation of efforts from London and Dublin in regulating the conflict, led directly to 
the materialisation of a unity of purpose that, by the mid-1990s, had become the driving 
force behind the peace process. 
Tannam (2001) notes that British and Irish policymakers’ cooperation involved a learning 
process as there has been evidence of policy adaptation, critical reassessment and evaluation over 
the years. The role of the international mediators involved in the all-party talks is also assessed 
(Curran and Sebenius 2003). But although there are often references to the two governments’ 
deep involvement in the GFA negotiations process and their engagements with the local parties, 
the role of the two governments has not been regarded as peacemaking. The fact that two 
governments are also directly or indirectly parties to the conflict seems to have led analysts to this 
omission. The following analysis concurs that the driving force behind the process was Anglo-Irish 
intergovernmental cooperation. However, it also suggests that the two governments were in 
effect engaged in mediation of the conflict, and it seeks to assess mediation of the two 
governments by focusing on their kin-state(s) level interaction as well as their interactions with the 
local actors and the international mediators. 
6.4. The Rebirth of Anglo-Irish Cooperation and the Origins of the Peace 
Process 
The next phase of Anglo-Irish cooperation towards a political settlement in Northern Ireland began 
with the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council in 1981. However, this was 
only a forum where two governments could meet and it took four years to further develop this 
into a mechanism of conflict management and cooperation.231 The framework of cooperation and 
its mechanisms were later set out in an international treaty. The international treaty, the Anglo-
Irish Agreement (AIA), was signed between the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the 
Irish Taoiseach Garrett FitzGerald on 15 November 1985. The AIA was an important step in terms 
of proving both governments’ determination to work together for a power-sharing solution in 
Northern Ireland, regardless of local opposition. 
                                                          
231
 In the late 1970s, the British pursued a security-focused policy and also toyed with the idea of full scale 
integration of Northern Ireland into the UK (Hennessey 2000, 26). In the early 1980s, a rolling devolution 
model, which predicated on the idea of a Northern Irish Assembly which would gradually get more powers, 
depending on the level of cross-community cooperation, was introduced, but failed as it was opposed by 
most of the Northern Irish political parties. Source: “Northern Ireland Assembly (November 1982 to June 
1986) - Summary of Main Events”, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/summary.htm (accessed 
9/9/12). 
152 
 
The immediate reasoning for the agreement was pragmatic, as the two governments 
agreed that something had to be done in the face of increasing IRA popularity. By the mid-1980s, 
the IRA’s political wing Sinn Féin (SF) was participating in elections, both in north and south, and in 
the north it had been closing the gap between the leading nationalist party SDLP.232 The Irish 
Taoiseach Fitzgerald was totally aware of the situation, as he later explained: "I had come to the 
conclusion that I must now give priority to heading off the growth of support for the IRA in 
Northern Ireland by seeking a new understanding with the British Government, even at the 
expense of my cherished, but for the time being at least clearly unachievable, objective of seeking 
a solution through negotiations with the Unionists" (FitzGerald 1991, 410). The British concern, on 
the other hand, was mainly security driven, as the Prime Minister Thatcher noted: “I started from 
the need for greater security, which was imperative. If this meant making limited political 
concession to the South, much as I disliked this kind of bargaining, I had to contemplate it” 
(Thatcher 1993, 385).233 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) tried to tackle the constitutional aspects of the conflict by 
reaffirming that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only happen 
with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The AIA noted that there was not 
such a majority at the time; however, if there would be such a majority in favour of a united 
Ireland, the two governments declared that they would undertake necessary legislation, in their 
respective parliaments, to bring that into effect.234 As such the principle of consent for a possible 
Irish unification was enshrined as an international legal obligation for the two governments. The 
AIA was also a particularly significant development in the sense that the Irish government 
achieved a permanent role, though advisory, in administration of Northern Ireland through its 
participation at the Intergovernmental Conference in which it would represent the interests of the 
nationalist community, and this would happen regardless of the local opposition.235 The AIA’s 
stipulation that the intergovernmental conference would assume its responsibilities in the case of 
impossibility of devolution with widespread acceptance - i.e. power-sharing government- was 
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intended to induce unionists into a power-sharing deal. But the main unionist parties, the UUP and 
the DUP, and Sinn Féin, the republican party, were quick to denounce the agreement (O’Leary and 
McGarry 1996, 222). The SDLP leader Hume, who was involved in the making of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement through his close relationship with the Irish government, expected that in the 
aftermath of the AIA the unionists would negotiate a power-sharing agreement with them by the 
end of 1986. Meanwhile, the British government hoped that Sinn Féin’s electoral support would 
collapse and the security situation would improve with increasing cooperation of the Irish 
authorities. All of these expectations failed to materialise: the unionists were angry at the SDLP’s 
role in the agreement and protested heavily, while the SF’s votes declined only slightly in 1987 
general election, from 11.8% to 11.4%, and the security gains from the agreement from the 
agreement soon proved to be overestimated, as the IRA received massive shipments of weaponry 
from Libya (Bew 2007, 534-535). 
Although the AIA failed to bring about an immediate breakthrough or providing a push for 
starting power-sharing negotiation between the Northern Irish parties, it can be said that the AIA 
set out the framework for the eventual settlement. The GFA, after all, would be a confirmation of 
the consent principle and the role of the Irish Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland. However, 
the agreement’s short term results were limited, as all the unionist parties opposed to it and 
demanded its abolition for entering into any negotiations. The unionists tried to tackle the AIA the 
way they dealt with the Sunningdale, through strikes and political protests, and stepped up their 
campaign by resigning as MPs at Westminster (Owen 1994). But the unionist campaign against the 
AIA failed to bring down the agreement, as the British and Irish governments were already 
expectant of their actions and the Anglo-Irish cooperation as set out by the AIA did not depend on 
unionist cooperation to function and instead it was designed to endure lack of such cooperation. 
However, by refusing to participate in any negotiations for power-sharing while the AIA remained 
in force, the unionists blocked the AIA’s ultimate goal of pushing unionists to enter into 
negotiations with nationalists for power-sharing. Among nationalists the initial widespread 
support for the AIA waned, as the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference did not deliver rapid 
reforms in Northern Ireland, and much nationalist support for the AIA started originating from the 
fact that it was opposed by unionists (O’Leary and McGarry 1996, 250-260). The AIA thus 
succeeded in showing the capability of the two governments to sustain their cooperation against 
unionist opposition and it marked: “… the abandonment of attempts to achieve consociation 
through voluntary means. It was, in part, a new experiment in coercive consociationalism” 
(O’Leary 1989, 580). The AIA’s immediate effect, though, was creation of a stalemate, as the 
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unionist parties refused to enter in any negotiations while the treaty is in force and the 
nationalists ruled out such possibility. The sustenance of Anglo-Irish cooperation, despite bitter 
unionist opposition, would eventually lead a moderation in unionist opposition to negotiations. 
The political stalemate that followed the AIA would be overcome through 1988-1991 “talks about 
talks”, which were held between the local parties and the British Northern Ireland Secretary,  and 
the parties would agree to hold full-fledged negotiations. 
The full-fledged negotiations would start in April 1991, when the unionist opposition to 
the AIA was circumvented when there was a six week period with no Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference sessions planned. The Brooke-Mayhew talks were the first 
negotiations with participation of almost all of the major political actors in the conflict. The talks 
involved the British and Irish governments and four of Northern Ireland's main political parties - 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP), and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). The sole major non-
participant was the SF, which was not invited, as IRA attacks were going on. The Brooke-Mayhew 
talks lasted until November 1992 and ended without any substantive results mainly due to 
disagreements between the unionist and nationalist representatives regarding North-South 
relationships (O’Leary and McGarry 1996, 227-8). Main legacy of these talks was that the parties 
agreed on a three strand framework for negotiations of substantial issues. This three strand 
framework, which would remain as basis in future negotiations, divided negotiations into three: 
strand one negotiations for relationships between the parties within Northern Ireland; strand two 
negotiations for relations between North and South; and strand three negotiations for relations 
between London and Dublin. Also, it became clear during these talks that the unionists were 
conceding in principle both power-sharing and an Irish dimension, which meant increasing 
flexibility of the unionist position (Bew 2007, 539). Although the negotiations ultimately failed in 
producing any agreement on substance, a format for future negotiations and some convergences 
between the parties emerged. 
There were some other crucial developments in the second half of the 1980s and the early 
1990s that also paved the way for the peace process. By the late 1980s, the republican leadership, 
and particularly IRA’s political wing led by Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and his faction, realised that 
the prospects for the IRA’s strategy which rested on carefully planning and mounting a massive 
attack against the British security forces in Northern Ireland that would force a British withdrawal 
were getting low; the British were getting better at foiling the IRA attacks and preparations for the 
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massive attack.236 In other words, a military stalemate between the IRA and the British was largely 
in place by 1989, which would be confirmed by the Northern Ireland Secretary Brooke in a 
newspaper interview (Moloney 2002, 247). Another major development during this period was the 
establishment of a secret communication channel between The SF leader Adams and the British 
authorities through Father Alec Reid (Ibid, 247-260). According to Moloney (2002, 253-254) the 
basic three principles (all-party negotiations, an IRA ceasefire, and adherence to the peaceful 
consent) of the peace process that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement was already put 
forward to Adams by the British in their correspondence dating as back as 1986-7. Also, there 
were parallel contacts between Adams and the SDLP leader Hume aiming to forge a common 
nationalist front that would convince the republicans to halt their military campaign (Ibid, 277-
282). It can be said that the Adams faction was getting prepared for a deeper involvement in 
politics, instead of further pursuing the IRA’s military strategy. 
 On 28 November 1993, the Observer newspaper disclosed the secret contacts with Sinn 
Féin (as an intermediary for IRA) and the British officials (Bew 2007, 541). And in the same year 
contacts between the SF leader Adams and SDLP leader Hume led to issuance of a series public of 
statements which were short on content but indicative of the ideological rapprochement between 
the SDLP and the SF.237 During the 1980s, the SF’s radicalism and increasing popularity was often 
pushing the SDLP, for electoral reasons, to lean towards articulating Anglo-Irish co-sovereignty as a 
solution instead of internal power-sharing, but as the SF toned downed its radicalism and a Sinn 
Féin-SDLP dialogue developed, the SDLP was more able to stick to consociational power-sharing as 
its position (Morisi 2006). By the early 1990s, there was also a secret communication channel 
established between the SF and the Irish authorities (Kerr 2005, 79). All these communication 
channels and efforts were aiming to convince the IRA that the British were neutral with respect to 
the question of Irish unification and IRA should abandon its armed campaign and seek its goal 
through constitutional politics. There were also efforts aiming at getting the loyalists on board as 
well. The loyalist politicisation process was essentially different than the one undertaken with the 
republicans. The loyalist paramilitaries were not a threat to the mainstream unionism because 
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their youthful leadership had little interest in politics and also they were successfully stepping up 
their military campaign. Nevertheless, communication channels between them and the British and 
Irish governments were also established (Kerr 2005, 80). In short, the two states succeeded in 
establishing contacts with all of the main factions and parties, which would prove essential in 
managing the negotiations ahead. 
 On 15 December 1993, the British Prime Minister John Major and the Irish Taoiseach 
Albert Reynolds issued a joint declaration titled “Joint Declaration on Peace”, also known as the 
Downing Street Declaration (DSD). The DSD was the product of a period of negotiations between 
the British and Irish governments and the two governments were forming their negotiations 
positions taking into account communications they received through the channels mentioned 
above. There was also a dialogue between the UUP leadership and the British Prime Minister, 
which succeeded in keeping the UUP unionists on board (Kerr 2005, 81). There were two major 
innovations in the DSD. First, the document tried to strike a balance between the main demands 
of the unionists and the nationalists: “The British Government agree that it is for the people of the 
island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of 
self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to 
bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish”238. The unionists were reassured that an Irish 
unification would only come about if there’s a majority supporting it in Northern Ireland, while the 
nationalists were assured that the British government would be neutral with respect to Irish 
reunification. The DSD also clarified that all parties with an established commitment to exclusively 
peaceful methods would be able to join the peace process.239 
The DSD was the first document in the peace process that all major factions, except the 
DUP, would eventually accept or acquiesce. The UUP and the main loyalist paramilitary groups, the 
UVF and the UDA, would acquiesce into the declaration by neither formally accepting nor rejecting 
it. The UUP leader Molyneaux would argue that the DSD was not a sell-out of the union. The 
nationalist leadership of the SDLP would welcome the declaration, and the SF would demand 
clarifications from the British government (Dixon 2001, 240-241). The British government, through 
a communication channel maintained by the Irish Taoiseach Reynolds, offered some explanations 
regarding the DSD to the republicans, and the republican movement entered into a period of intra-
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republican debate over an IRA cease-fire. The Adams faction won the intra-republican debate and 
the IRA’s declaration of ceasefire came on 31 August 1994 (Moloney 2002, 392-427). The IRA 
ceasefire was the first in twenty years and was followed by a loyalist declaration of ceasefire on 13 
October 1994.240 In retrospect, it can be said that these ceasefire declarations marked the 
beginning of the end of the Troubles. Meanwhile, with the election of Bill Clinton as the US 
president the US government was also interested in playing a role in Northern Ireland (O’Dowd 
2007). The first major indication of this was the US visa granted to Adams, despite British 
objections, which helped Adams strengthen his political standing within the republican camp and 
also symbolised his wider acceptance at international level.241 
6.5. Deepening Anglo-Irish Cooperation: The Framework Documents, the 
Decommissioning Issue and the All-party Negotiations 
The peace process’s origins, as argued above, can be traced back to the late 1980s, however, it 
only became clear with the IRA’s ceasefire declaration that the process was entering a critical 
stage which could either end with a peace settlement or a failure which would definitely wreck 
prospects for peace in the near future. The British government initially reacted with hesitation, as 
it questioned the permanence of the IRA ceasefire, but it later came to accept the ceasefire.242 The 
British and Irish governments then moved on to negotiate a common document setting out 
parameters of a settlement. 
On 22 February 1995, the British and Irish governments issued “The Framework 
Documents”. The Framework Documents, according to the two governments, presented “... a 
shared understanding between them on the parameters of a possible outcome to the Talks 
process, consistent with the Joint Declaration and the statement of 26 March 1991”.243 The 
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documents included an outline of all the issues at stake in all three strands and possible solutions 
to them. The strand one (concerning domestic arrangements within Northern Ireland) were 
prepared by the British government, whereas the controversial North-South arrangements, i.e. 
strand two, were the result of the negotiations between the two governments (Bew 2007, 545). 
The strand one proposals were short and generic; the political parties in Northern Ireland were 
expected to negotiate and substantiate them. But there was an explicit and strong emphasis on 
cross-community consensus as requirement for establishment and operation of the political 
structures of Northern Ireland.244 In short, power-sharing between the two communities was 
entrenched as a principle for negotiations.  The strand two proposals were much more detailed: 
these included a long list of areas for possible cooperation between two parts of the island and 
suggested the North-South bodies would have consultative, harmonising and executive 
functions.245 Overall, the documents sought to convince the nationalists and republicans that a 
settlement would be a further step towards Irish unity, while once again assuring the unionists 
that Irish unity would only come about if there is a Northern Irish majority in favour of it. 
The republicans received the Framework Documents with content but grew impatient 
when the British government insisted on decommissioning before getting all-party talks started.246 
Most of the unionists immediately raised substantial concerns about the documents, particularly 
opposing the suggestions for all-Ireland bodies. However, unionists later toned downed their 
opposition and argued for making decommissioning of paramilitary arms a precondition for 
beginning all-party negotiations.247 Meanwhile, Prime Minister Major’s increasing lack of control 
over the parliamentary Tory party made him reliant upon Unionist MPs support for maintaining a 
majority.248 By the end of 1995, the peace process was stalled and decommissioning of 
paramilitary arms became the main issue that should be tackled to further the process. The United 
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States official entry into the peace process came at this critical juncture, the Clinton administration 
was very interested in playing a major role in the peace process and the decommissioning 
stalemate provided them with an opportunity. President Clinton pushed for establishment of an 
international commission to tackle the decommissioning issue.249 The commission would be 
headed by the former US Senator George Mitchell and also include a Canadian and a Finn, 
respectively chosen by the British and Irish governments.250 President Clinton further underlined 
his interest and willingness to influence the process by visiting Northern Ireland in December 
1995.251 
After a series of meetings with the parties, governments, and leaders of many segments of 
the Northern Irish society, the international commission delivered its report on decommissioning 
in January 1996 and argued for parallel decommissioning, i.e. decommissioning during talks.252 The 
report’s recommendation was a compromise between the prior decommissioning, demanded by 
the unionists and the British government, and the republican and nationalist calls for starting the 
talks without any preconditions. It was suggested that an international commission should be 
established to oversee decommissioning process. The international commission’s report also 
proposed a set of principles that the parties should affirm to participate in negotiations: 
a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; b. To the 
total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; c. To agree that such disarmament 
must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; d. To renounce for 
themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to 
influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; e. To agree to abide by the 
terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and 
exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they 
may disagree; and, f. To urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take 
effective steps to prevent such actions.253 
The “Mitchell Principles” were essentially aimed at addressing unionists concerns in the 
absence of prior decommissioning. Although the British government was not happy with the 
                                                          
249
Clinton’s efforts were coordinated by his National Security Adviser Tony Lake and, as the Irish had always 
strived for internationalisation of the conflict and the US’s involvement, the efforts were focused on getting 
the British consent to the American plan. Source: C. O’Clery (1995), “Lake visit to finalise new arms 
proposal”, The Irish Times, 16 Oct., and Mitchell (1999, 25-26). 
250
 The British chose John de Chastelain, who was about to retire as the chief of Canadian Defence Forces 
General, and the Irish picked former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. 
251
 G. Kennedy (1995), “Clinton pledges US will be a partner for peace”, The Irish Times, 2 Dec. 
252
 “Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (22 January 1996)”, paragraph no. 20, 
http://www.nio.gov.uk/iicd_report_22jan96.pdf (accessed 9/9/12). 
253
 Ibid, paragraph no. 20. 
160 
 
report’s dismissal of prior decommissioning, the Prime Minister Major’s public reaction to the 
report aimed to deflect attention from decommissioning issue and instead focused on one of the 
report’s minor suggestions, regarding holding elections in Northern Ireland specifically for 
designation of parties that would take part in all –party negotiations (Mitchell 1999, 40-41). The 
unionists had been demanding such elections, so the British government decision was a partial 
compromise to them as well. In sum, everything seemed to be on track for starting all-party 
negotiations following an election in Northern Ireland. 
The IRA, however, could not hold on its fire any longer and an IRA bomb went off in 
London on 9 February 1996, which marked the end of an 18 month ceasefire.254 A few weeks after 
the IRA bombing, the British and Irish government held a meeting in London and declared 10 June 
as the date for starting all-party negotiations. It is also agreed that the SF would be excluded from 
these negotiations, unless the IRA reinstated its ceasefire.255 The election for Northern Ireland 
Forum took place in May and, thanks to the electoral regime adopted for the occasion, the result 
was very inclusive: ten parties got into the Forum, including the small loyalist parties.256 The Forum 
was an ad hoc assembly for wider debate between the Northern Irish political parties. The parties 
were required to appoint a few of their members, among those elected to the Forum, as delegates 
to actual negotiations. In addition to such delegations from ten Northern Irish parties that got into 
the Forum, the British and Irish governments would also take part in the negotiations.257 And the 
negotiations would be mediated by Mitchell and his two colleagues from the decommissioning 
body.258 The all-party negotiations began in June. But as the IRA had not declared a ceasefire, the 
SF delegation was refused entry. The procedure and agenda of negotiations were agreed by 
October, four months after the start (Mitchell 1999, 85). But no further progress could be made as 
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the British general election in May 2007 approached; many delegates to the negotiations were 
candidates at the election. 
6.6. Finalising the Negotiations Framework 
The British general election brought the Labour party to power and Tony Blair became the Prime 
Minister. The Blair government had a huge majority at Westminster, particularly compared to the 
outgoing Major government which often had majority problems limiting its flexibility in Northern 
Ireland affairs. The Blair government was keen on getting Sinn Féin’s entry into the negotiations.259 
However, this needed to be done without upsetting, or at least not losing, the unionists, especially 
given that the Labour party was widely regarded as less committed to the union of Northern 
Ireland with Great Britain. The Blair plan was twofold: only two weeks after he became Prime 
Minister, Blair gave a pro-Union speech in Northern Ireland in May, while a move towards 
inclusion of the SF into negotiations was also afoot behind the scenes.260 After some contacts with 
the SF representatives and the government officials, it emerged that an IRA ceasefire could be 
achieved if the SF leadership were convinced that they would be quickly allowed to enter into all-
party negotiations and a deadline for the conclusion of talks were set (Powell 2008, 13-14). 
Consequently, Blair called on the SF to bring about a ceasefire in order to enter the process and 
announced a deadline for the talks. In his speech to the Commons declaring this policy, Blair 
noted: “The settlement train is leaving, with or without Sinn Fein. If it wants to join it is absolutely 
clear what it has to do. … I can announce for the first time a clear timetable. The substantive talks 
should start in early September at the latest. In my view, they should conclude by next May at the 
latest, when the legislative basis for the talks expires. That is an ambitious target, but I have no 
doubt that it is achievable if all concerned put their minds to it.”261 
The Blair plan worked and the IRA renewed its ceasefire in July, which paved the way for 
the SF’s inclusion into the process when the negotiations were due to restart in September. As the 
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SF entered the process, the DUP and the UKUP quit the process protesting that. The DUP and the 
UKUP would never return to the negotiations. But there was still a majority of the unionists 
participating in the negotiations. And, although the DUP was the second largest party of the 
unionist community, its leader Reverend Ian Paisley was a well-known hardliner with an 
inflammatory rhetoric, who often proved to be an adept obstructionist in any negotiations with 
the nationalist community. Mitchell (1999, 110) would claim that the two parties withdrawal was 
rather a positive development, as it freed the relatively moderate UUP delegation from daily 
attacks coming from the two parties and provided the UUP with more flexibility.262 
The substantive negotiations began in October, but the progress was very limited by the 
end of the year (Mitchell 1999, 126). And during the Christmas break the tensions between parties 
grew as Billy Wright (a well-known loyalist) was killed in the prison by the INLA, a republican 
group.263 Another republican group, the Continuity IRA, was behind a bombing in September, in 
other words, violence was on the rise and the negotiations were stalled. The British and Irish 
governments, however, were determined not to let the peace process collapse and negotiated a 
common document entitled “Propositions on Heads of Agreement” and issued it on 12 January 
1998. The document outlined the main features of an agreement and declared that there would 
be balanced changes in the Irish constitution and the British constitutional legislation to 
accommodate an agreement; Northern Ireland would have an assembly elected by proportional 
representation; and a North-South ministerial council and a British-Irish intergovernmental council 
(replacing the Anglo-Irish Council founded by the AIA) would also be established.264 In short, the 
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British and Irish governments once again underlined the parameters of a possible settlement and 
provided an impetus for the negotiations.265 
6.7. Reaching an Agreement under Anglo-Irish Quasi-Mediation 
During February and March 1998, some progress achieved at the negotiations despite some 
setbacks in the process.266 But the parties were still far away from reaching a deal and there were 
substantial differences over most of the key issues, the powers of the Northern Irish Assembly; the 
North-South bodies (how they would be created and what powers they would have); 
decommissioning; and prisoner releases (Mitchell 1999, 145). On 25 March the independent 
chairmen of the negotiations (i.e. the official mediators) issued a statement setting 9 April as the 
deadline for the conclusion of negotiations.267 The plan was that the parties would meet 
continuously from 30 March to 9 March and be given a first draft of the comprehensive agreement 
a week before the final deadline, and after two days of consultations with the parties a second 
draft would be given the parties for final negotiations that would culminate in an agreement by 
midnight on 9 April (Mitchell 1999, 145). However, the Irish and British governments could not 
agree on the strand two (i.e. north-south bodies) and this caused a delay in the production of the 
first draft. The most interesting aspect of this delay was that it made clear who the actual 
peacemakers were, as Mitchell (1999, 153) stated: “The parties were negotiating at Stormont. The 
prime ministers were negotiating in London, but they were in contact with some of the parties at 
Stormont: the British with the UUP, the Irish with the SDLP and Sinn Fein. For a few days, the other 
parties –and the independent chairmen- were not directly in the London loop.” Mitchell further 
confirms this Anglo-Irish dynamic of the negotiations when he explains how he and his fellow 
chairmen submitted to the two prime ministers demand to give the Northern Irish parties, as part 
of their first comprehensive draft, the strand two Anglo-Irish agreed text without any changes as if 
it was written by the official mediators.268  
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sustained by the governments, who were working hard to achieve agreement under extremely difficult, 
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The first draft envisaged that North-South bodies would be independent of the Northern 
Irish Assembly with executive powers, as demanded by the republicans. But this was totally 
unacceptable for the unionists and loyalists. The UUP and DUP immediately raised grave concerns 
and demanded renegotiation of the strand two text. Alarmed by the prospect of the negotiations 
falling apart, Blair went to Belfast and began holding talks with the unionists.269 Blair would stay 
with the parties from April 7 to April 10, in the building negotiations were taking place, and hold 
constant bilateral and multilateral meetings with the parties, particularly the UUP, SDLP, the SF 
and the Irish delegations.270 And his Irish counterpart was also present and involved during the 
same duration, the only exception was the time he briefly left the negotiations to attend his 
mother’s funeral in Dublin. A continuous pressure on the parties to settle out their differences was 
provided with the prime ministers’ efforts, which could be regarded as kin-state(s) led quasi-
mediation.271 The negotiations thus went beyond the 9 April deadline and a set of changes on the 
strand two text would be agreed in the early hours of the 10 April. The changes included a 
decrease in the number of North-South bodies and their potential list of competencies and linked 
these bodies existence to the operation of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Meanwhile, a deal on 
the strand one (i.e. the arrangements within Northern Ireland) was relatively quickly negotiated 
and agreed between the UUP and the SDLP delegations.272 The first draft of the independent 
chairmen included a set of options for the stand one. The unionists were in favour of a committee 
system rather than a ministerial executive council and the SDLP was arguing for a power-sharing 
executive with ministerial portfolios. In the end, the UUP delegation conceded most of the 
nationalist demands and a power-sharing executive, whose members would be chosen from a 
Northern Ireland Assembly on basis of proportionality, was agreed. As the UUP delegation was 
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165 
 
pressing hard for changes in the strand two issues, Powell (2008, 95) reports that the unionists 
were told by Blair that in return for renegotiation of the strand two text they would need to move 
on other matters, especially the strand one issues concerning the power-sharing executive.273 The 
SF leader Adams (2003, 346) also argues that Prime Minister Blair put pressure on the unionists to 
settle their disagreements with the SDLP over power-sharing within Northern Ireland so that he 
could push for renegotiation of the strand two with the Irish. However, the UUP leader David 
Trimble has not noted any such pressure in his account of these negotiations, instead Trimble 
(2007, 10) argued that there were already convergences between the parties on the strand one 
issues and he thought that, “… the unionist electorate would be more concerned about the 
constitutional and cross border issues, and would be more ready to compromise on power 
sharing.” Meanwhile, the strand three (i.e. the all relationships between the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland) track of the negotiations, which took place between the two governments, 
produced an agreement to establish a British-Irish Council (BIC) that would replace the AIA 
institutions. The BIC was set to cover all of the relationships between the two islands and 
therefore was more acceptable to the unionists. Also, there were agreements on the other mains 
issues as well, including the content and wording of the amendments to the Irish and the British 
constitutional legislations and affirmation of the consent principle for any change in the status of 
Northern Ireland in the future. 
After all these historically thorny issues seemed settled, two other issues emerged as the 
sticking points. These were the issues of early prisoner releases and establishment of a clear 
linkage between decommissioning and holding office in the power-sharing executive. The SF 
delegation was pressing hard for prisoner’s releases within a year and, to some extent, succeeded 
in the early hours of 10 April.274 In later hours of the morning of 10 April, the final draft was 
handed to the parties by the Mitchell team. When the parties went through the text during the 
next few hours, it emerged that all parties participating at the talks, except the UUP, were ready to 
accept the final draft. The UUP, on the other hand, decided to push for one final change and asked 
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Blair to make paramilitary decommissioning a precondition, for those related to the paramilitaries, 
for holding office in the Northern Ireland Executive. The UUP delegation succeeded in getting a 
unilateral compromise from Blair in the form of a letter in which the prime minister promised 
changes for preventing such persons from holding office in case the provisions in the Agreement 
failed to stop such persons holding office (Mitchell 1999, 179-180; Trimble 2007, 12-14). Upon 
receiving this assurance, the UUP decided to accept the agreement and Mitchell convened the last 
session of the plenary to ask parties whether they were accepting the Agreement. In this last 
plenary session all but the SF, which said it had to consult its party conference, agreed to the 
Agreement, and the SF leader Adams also spoke of the agreement positively (Mitchell 1999, 181).  
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was largely the culmination of the cooperation of the 
British and Irish governments over the years. The agreement’s main features (notably, the consent 
principle and the power-sharing between the communities) had long been promoted by the two 
governments, even to the extent that the two governments, beginning with the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, moved on to share power over the Northern Ireland affairs, despite one of the two 
communities’ vehement opposition. The intergovernmental cooperation, provided by the AIA, 
over the Northern Irish affairs was considered positively by the nationalists, which regarded the 
AIA as an acknowledgement on part of the British state that the Irish republic had a legitimate role 
to play in Northern Ireland and a step towards that would force the unionists to agree a power-
sharing deal with them. The SDLP, the main nationalist party, was long championing power-
sharing between the communities and the policy of seeking Irish unification only through political 
means, the SDLP thus needed to move least, compared to the other parties participating in the 
negotiations, from its historical positions, and the GFA was largely a pleasing outcome for them. 
Meanwhile, the republican movement, since the late 1980s, was gradually coming to terms with 
the fact that that the Irish unification would not come about through its military campaign. The 
British military’s success in containing the IRA violence was critical to Sinn Féin/IRA’s policy 
change, as this enabled an intra-republican discussion that paved the way for the ceasefires and 
recognition among the republican leadership that political struggle was the only viable option. 
When they joined the negotiations the republican leadership was also aware of the fact that, given 
the framework provided by the governments and the other parties’ positions, the Irish unification 
was not a possible outcome of the on-going negotiations process either. Prime gains from the GFA 
for the republicans were that the Agreement included strong and clear assurances that the British 
would agree to remain neutral if a majority one day decide in favour of the Irish unification and 
the republican movement would have the opportunity to grow further. The SF was long associated 
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with the IRA violence and criminality, which limited the party’s prospects for further growth, and 
was now provided with an opportunity to turn into a respectable and mainstream political 
player.275 On top of these benefits, though the republicans were not to explicitly admit this, they 
were getting the chance to participate in administration of Northern Ireland, and hence exercise 
power (a treasured goal for any political movement). 
The negotiations process and the compromises needed to reach a deal were much harder 
for the UUP leadership. Ever since the introduction of the direct rule, the unionists were mostly 
engaged in protest politics in one or another form, and the community’s politics were essentially 
fractured. There were those, such as Mr Paisley and his party, who were deeply committed in 
bringing down any process that may lead to an outcome they would not like, and there were 
some, especially at the UUP leadership, who were getting increasingly cognisant of the fact that, 
without a settlement and establishment of a Northern Ireland administration in which unionists 
would participate in, the unionist politics were set to lose more ground in the future, especially 
given the declining interest in politics among Protestant communities and the increasing number 
of young Protestants leaving Northern Ireland.276  Therefore, the UUP leadership had to shift their 
original political positions considerably, first they agreed to continue negotiations when the SF 
joined the process, then they agreed to most of the SDLP demands on power-sharing and finally 
they accepted a deal in the absence of a clear commitment for decommissioning from the 
republicans. As pointed above, their acceptance of the power-sharing deal came about since they 
wanted to weaken the North-South bodies envisaged in the first Mitchell draft, which they 
achieved in the end. This quid pro quo would not have been, most probably, achieved if Prime 
Minister Blair were not to put this as a condition to the UUP leadership for a renegotiation of the 
North-South bodies. In other words, some of the most crucial steps taken by the UUP delegation 
which ultimately enabled reaching a deal were thanks to quasi-mediation of the British 
government, which this time, unlike Sunningdale, with cooperation of the Irish government, tried 
to strike a balance between the unionist and nationalist concerns. 
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6.8. The Good Friday Agreement: Power-sharing with Anglo-Irish 
Dimension 
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was comprised of a set of documents which sought to address 
the main concerns of the all parties to the conflict.277 The GFA contained the proposed changes to 
the British and Irish constitutional legislations, detailed agreements on establishment and 
workings of power-sharing institutions, which would regulate and manage the conflict between 
the unionist and nationalist communities of Northern Ireland, and detailed provisions for 
establishment of the bodies of cooperation between Northern Ireland and the south Ireland and 
between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. Also, the GFA included general provisions for 
establishment of some mechanisms, as well as time frames in some cases, for the resolution of 
remaining issues. Those remaining issues notably included the issue of decommissioning (which 
the Agreement provided a two-year timeframe), establishment of an independent commission on 
policing reform, review of criminal justice system, strengthening of human rights law and equal 
opportunity provisions in Northern Ireland, and a commitment by the two governments to release 
the paramilitary prisoners within two years. On the constitutional matters, the Agreement 
provided for a set of balanced constitutional changes, through which Ireland would amend its 
constitution’s Article 2 and the Article 3 in a way that they would no longer implicate any 
territorial claim to Northern Ireland, and Britain, in return, would repeal the Northern Ireland Act 
of 1920. All the participants also agreed to respect the self-determination right of the people of 
the island of Ireland to bring about a united Ireland, provided that this would be exercised “on the 
basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South.”278  In short, the consent 
principle was at last agreed by all. 
The remaining main aspects of the Agreement were sectioned into three strands. The 
strand one section was providing for establishment of a 108-member Assembly, whose members 
would be elected by proportional representation using the STV (Single Transferable Vote) from the 
existing Westminster constituencies. At the Assembly, all key decisions would be taken by: “i) 
either parallel consent (i.e. a majority of those members present and voting , including majority  of 
the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; or a weighed majority (60%)  
members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist 
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designations present and voting.”279 The Northern Ireland Executive (i.e. cabinet) would be elected 
from the members of the Assembly and there would be ten ministers. The ministers were to be 
chosen by the d’Hondt electoral system, so the ministers would be allocated to parties on the 
basis of their electoral strengths. All members of the Assembly would individually designate their 
identity as nationalist, unionist, or other, as this would be needed for operationalization of the 
cross community consent principle in making of key decisions. And if a minimum 30 out of 108 of 
the Assembly members petitioned, any matter could be denoted as a key decision, while the 
selection of First and Deputy First Ministers (who would chair the Executive) and the chair of the 
Assembly were explicitly marked as key decisions in the Agreement.280 The above described 
executive and the legislative branches of the Northern Ireland’s political system can be regarded 
as fully in agreement with the grand coalition and mutual veto principles of consociational power-
sharing. The other two principles of consociational power-sharing, proportionality and segmental 
autonomy, were also largely reflected in the agreement. Proportionality was embedded in the STV 
electoral system and the method employed for allocation of the executive portfolios. There was 
no proportionality measures envisioned in the GFA for public sector employment or fund 
allocations but these matters were already mostly resolved under the British direct rule through a 
set of legal reforms. Segmental autonomy was largely provided through the already existent local 
government structure, again a result of the reforms implemented under the British direct rule. 
Although these local administrations could be under one of the two community’s rule, where one 
had a clear majority, there were measures to protect the rights and participation of members the 
other minority community. The GFA also included extensive provisions for protection of each 
member of the Northern Irish community in their participation in the political process.281 
A major part of the Agreement was the strand two section, which set out the details for 
the North-South Ministerial Council. This section begins with noting that the bodies would be 
established under the legislation to be introduced in the Irish and British parliaments under a new 
British-Irish Agreement, this was a significant gain for the nationalist who did not want to have 
such bodies’ establishment linked to any legislation to be introduced at the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. However, the unionist concern that such bodies would operate independently while the 
Assembly may remain blocked was addressed as well. The Article 13 of the Strand Two section 
specifies that North-South bodies and the Northern Assembly are mutually interdependent, and 
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hence one cannot function without the other. The list of areas for possible cooperation was 
reduced, compared to the first Mitchell draft, and no all-Ireland parliamentary body was envisaged 
as it was done at Sunningdale. It can be argued that the strand two institutions were carefully 
balanced in order to satisfy both sides’ main concerns. 
Finally, the strand three section of the Agreement envisaged a new British-Irish Council 
(BIC) that would be established under a new British-Irish Agreement. The strand three also 
stipulated the terms of a new British-Irish intergovernmental conference which would replace the 
Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference, which were 
established under the Anglo Irish Agreement 1985. The BIC would have representatives from the 
British and Irish governments as well as representatives of the devolved institutions in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. It would operate on consensual 
basis and seek cooperation on matters of mutual interest under the competence of the concerned 
administrations.282 As such the North-South bodies would be paralleled by a council that would 
include representatives from all the administrations on the British Isles. These measures were 
particularly designed to convince the unionists that North-South bodies were not a total 
abnormality and there would be similar institutions at the level of Anglo-Irish relations as well as in 
the totality relationships between all the peoples of the British Isles. Given that there were similar 
structures at the EU level as well, it was assumed that the unionist opposition to the North-South 
bodies could be softened this way. 
In sum, the GFA provided a set of power-sharing institutions for the Northern Irish parties 
as well as mechanisms for cooperation between the north and south of Ireland and between the 
devolved governments of United Kingdom and Ireland. The political system envisaged at the GFA 
largely followed the consociational power-sharing model. Its main divergences from the 
consociational model were the STV, which is in part an integrative electoral system, and the lack of 
segmental autonomy, which was largely compensated through the measures at the local 
government level. 
6.9. Implementing the GFA: Peace at Last? 
Full implementation of the GFA proved challenging, instability in Northern Ireland’s politics was 
the rule rather than exception until 2010. The main sticking points were decommissioning and 
police reforms. As the Northern Irish parties continued to clash over these matters, the British 
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government suspended the devolved government of Northern Ireland. There were four 
suspensions in total; first one was introduced in February 2000 and last one, which lasted almost 
five years, in October 2002. 
In the post-GFA era the DUP and Sinn Féin have become the largest unionist and 
nationalist parties, respectively, in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The DUP refused to share 
power with Sinn Féin citing the latter’s lack of support to the newly established Northern Ireland 
Police Service. But the British and Irish governments continued to cooperate and lead talks with 
Northern Ireland’s political parties in order to deal with the impasse. In October 2006, Blair and his 
Irish counterpart Ahern issued a roadmap for dealing with the deadlock. Accordingly, the all-party 
negotiations, with participation of the governments, held between November 2006 and March 
2007 and resulted in the St. Andrews Agreement. The DUP agreed to share power with the SF, and 
the SF agreed to support the police service and join the policing board. There were some minor 
amendments to the operation of the power-sharing institutions and some further provisions on 
human rights as well.283 The St. Andrews Agreement also noted that the devolution of criminal 
justice and policing was expected to be completed by May 2008, pending an agreement between 
the Northern Irish parties. In May 2007, Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions were 
restored, but between 2008 and 2010 the DUP and Sinn Féin continued to disagree over the issue 
of transferring policing and justice powers from London to Belfast (Dixon and O’Kane 2011, 94-
108). The DUP and Sinn Féin reached an agreement in February 2010, and police and justice 
powers were devolved to Belfast in April 2010.284 The two parties are currently leading a stable 
power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland, which, some have argued, is “… so stable as to verge 
on the boring.”285 
The recent stability of the Northern Irish politics can be evidenced by the fact that the 
number of the incidents of inter-communal violence and the conflict related death toll have been 
at their historic lows in the recent years.286 Although there are still occasional incidents of inter-
communal violence in the streets of Northern Ireland, it can be argued that Northern Ireland has 
made substantial progress towards a peaceful coexistence of the two communities. On the other 
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hand, the broader question of whether Northern Ireland’s is becoming a more integrated society 
remains (Nagle and Clancy 2010; Mitchell 2011). Northern Irish communities still tend to live 
separately and the demand for ethnically mix schooling is low.287 Moreover, the ethnic parties 
continue to maintain their grip on political power. In short, the GFA has been successful in bringing 
about a power-sharing regime but whether that regime could succeed in healing the deep 
communal divide is yet uncertain. 
6.10. Conclusion 
The GFA was not necessarily the outcome of the all-party negotiations process. As noted above, 
the agreement remained elusive even into the last week of the negotiations. But with the quasi-
mediation efforts of the two prime ministers the parties were pushed to entering into intensive 
negotiations over the core issues. The culmination of momentum meant the UUP delegation, as 
representative of the larger community, could no longer delay their decision to accept sharing 
power with the nationalists along with establishment of some North-South bodies for cross border 
cooperation. It can be argued that the UUP delegation could have said “No”, but the 
consequences of a “No” were obvious to them. These were further isolation of the unionist 
community (both at the UK and international level) and possibility of further Anglo-Irish 
institutions imposed on them, and no government which they could join in as the main partner. 
Meanwhile, the nationalists and the republicans were well aware of the fact that Irish unity was 
not a possible outcome of the negotiations and the consent principle was already an established 
principle, which was vigorously emphasised by both governments in the all preceding framework 
documents.  So, they too could have said “No”, but they knew well that the consent principle 
would not go away, neither there was even a slim chance for Irish unity by other means (i.e. 
violence, protest politics etc.), and they would also lose the opportunity to share power with the 
unionists almost on equal terms. In short, the incentives were firmly built in the process and the 
consequences of wrecking the process were abundantly clear to the participants. 
It can be argued that the Anglo-Irish cooperation was the main dynamic of the peace 
process. But there were also two very crucial developments that contributed to the successful 
culmination of the GFA negotiations process: politicisation of the IRA through Sinn Féin and an 
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increasing recognition among the unionist elites, especially within the UUP leadership, that power-
sharing with the nationalist community was the only feasible solution. But it should be underlined 
that these two developments only came about since the two governments’ quasi-mediation 
efforts along with their earlier coercive policies (such as the imposition of the AIA) impacted the 
parties’ views regarding a possible solution to the conflict. The Northern Irish experience may not 
be wholly instructive for many other cases because Northern Ireland is not an independent 
country and its political elites are amenable to particular third party pressures. However, there are 
some inferences to be drawn from Northern Ireland with respect to peacemaking for power-
sharing in deeply divided societies. As noted above, there was an independent trio officially 
mediating the all-party talks, but their role was often secondary to the two governments. The 
British and Irish governments may not be considered engaged in mediation from a strict point of 
view (as both are also parties to the conflict), but the way the two often acted could be regarded 
as kin-state(s) led quasi-mediation. And the centrality of Anglo-Irish cooperation to the successful 
culmination of the GFA process shows that kin-state(s) led quasi-mediation can be very effective. 
More inferences will be offered as this case study’s findings are combined and compared with the 
others in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Peacemaking for Power-sharing: The Role of Kin-states 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter will draw theoretical conclusions on the basis of the findings of the three case studies 
with regard to peacemaking for power-sharing in deeply divided societies. In the first half of this 
chapter I will combine and analyse the findings of the case studies at five levels: the local actors 
level; the local actors-third party peacemaker level; the local actors-kin-state(s) level; the third 
party peacemaker–kin-state(s) level; and the kin-states level. This analytical approach provides a 
framework for identifying the main conditions necessary for a power-sharing settlement as well as 
the roles which could be played by third party peacemakers and kin-states in bringing about such 
settlement. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Lijphart’s original conceptualisation of power-sharing is based on 
the Western European cases and his analysis is elaborate in its description of the institutions of 
power-sharing employed in those cases.  Although negotiations at the level of segmental elites are 
often mentioned as lying at the heart of building power-sharing institutions by Lijphart, the 
negotiations' process and its dynamics are not discussed in his studies. With respect to negotiating 
power-sharing, Tsebelis’ (1990) study is the only theoretical analysis of the negotiation process. 
Tsebelis (1990) points out that in the context of the development of Belgian power-sharing 
institutions two nested political games could be identified: one inter-elite game and one with the 
elites and their respective segments of the society. According to Tsebelis, these two games are 
interrelated and the electorate exercises some form of control over its elite and limits the inter-
elite negotiation space. Tsebelis, however, does not look at how the making of power-sharing 
could be modelled in a context where there are third party mediators and kin-states involved in 
the process. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the local actors-third party peacemaker level interaction 
has been extensively discussed in the peacemaking literature, while the local actors-kin-state(s), 
the third party peacemaker-kin-state(s) and the kin-states levels have remained largely 
understudied. By drawing on Tsebelis’ nested games approach, I will seek to address this gap in 
the literature with an illustration of how negotiating power-sharing could be modelled in the cases 
of third party mediator and kin-state involvement in the latter part of this chapter. 
The analysis in this chapter will often assume that the local constituents’ involvement in 
the negotiation process is only through their political leaderships and intergroup cooperation is 
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minimal. The findings of the case studies broadly underpin this assumption, however, each ethnic 
group’s engagement with negotiation process is not alike and there is some variation across the 
cases. Most notably, the Turkish Cypriot public seems to have sought direct involvement in the 
process, and, as a result, replaced their leadership (though not completely) and did contribute 
towards some progress in the negotiation process. In terms of intergroup relationships, only in the 
Northern Irish case there was some form of inter-communal political cooperation, particularly 
through some non-ethnic political parties (such as the Alliance and the Northern Ireland Women’s 
Coalition); but the influence of such political actors remained very limited and the dominance of 
ethnic parties in the Northern Irish politics remained unshaken throughout the period studied. 
This does not mean that the local constituents, civil society or non-sectarian political parties had 
no influence in the processes studied, but the point here is that the interaction between ethno-
political leaderships was the level at which the power-sharing settlements were negotiated. 
Moreover, the inter-elite bargaining was often done with almost no immediate input from other 
political actors and wider public because the negotiations were held privately and only the results 
were made public. This is a particularly interesting aspect of negotiating power-sharing in deeply 
divided societies for the reason that such secretive methodology is very reminiscent of 
international negotiation, whereas in democratic societies with no deep divisions crafting 
domestic political institutions is usually done in public, either through a parliamentary process, or 
under extraordinary circumstances (such as a constitutional overhaul) by a constitutional assembly 
with some input from wider public. 
As noted above, I will combine and analyse the findings of my case studies, through the 
use of a five-level analytical framework. Since all the five levels are often ridden with some form of 
conflict, I will call them “levels of contestation”. A simple illustration of the five levels of 
contestation, in which each pair of arrows indicates one level of contestation, can be seen below. 
Broadly speaking, there needs to be some form of cooperation at each level for successful 
culmination of negotiations for power-sharing.  Although the local actors level could easily be 
assumed as the most significant level of contestation, the other levels are also crucial and their 
degrees of significance will vary depending on the context of the conflict. In fact, the local actors–
kin-state(s) level was often the most important level of contestation in determining the outcomes 
of the negotiation processes studied. 
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Figure 1 – Levels of Contestation for Power-sharing 
 
7.2. Level One – Contestation for Power-sharing at the Local Actors Level: 
Conditions for Transforming Inter-Elite Rivalry into Cooperation 
The local actors level is the heart of the conflict since it is the level where the disputants are 
deeply embedded in waging the conflict. Therefore, it is the level at which power-sharing should 
be agreed and where certain conditions should exist in order to make a power-sharing settlement 
possible. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are a number of conditions identified as conducive for 
power-sharing, which have generated a fierce debate in the literature (See Section 2.5.10.). Most 
of those favourable conditions were not present in the Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases, and in 
Bosnia six out of the eleven conditions were present (See the table below). However, it is also 
arguable that the full blown civil war in Bosnia was largely offsetting the positive value of some of 
the existent favourable conditions there. For instance, although there was the tradition of elite 
accommodation in Bosnia during most of the multinational Yugoslav federation’s existence, this 
tradition was substantially undermined during the Bosnian war as the multi-ethnic Yugoslav elite 
of Bosnia became bitterly divided along ethnic lines. Likewise, the socioeconomic conditions in 
Bosnia were almost totally distorted during the war for all the three ethnic groups. In other words, 
most of the favourable conditions were not present in the three deeply divided societies studied, 
mostly because of the very recent memories of civil war or inter-communal political violence in 
the past. There were only two favourable conditions which existed across all the three cases; 
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those were small population size and small number of segments, both semi-permanent conditions 
determined by the structure of the conflict. 
 
 Favourable Conditions for Power-sharing
288
 Cyprus Bosnia N. Ireland 
1 
Geographical concentration of segments or federalism    
2 
No majority  segment plus segments of equal size (i.e. balance of power)    
3 External Threats (as a unifying factor)    
4 Small Population Size    
5 Overarching Loyalties    
6 Small number of segments    
7 Tradition of Elite Accommodation    
8 Socioeconomic equality    
9 
The inexistence of a solid majority that prefers majority rule to consociationalism    
10 
Intra-group political stability
289
    
11 
The Existence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate    
Table 2 – Favourable Conditions for Power-sharing in Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland 
However, through a comparative analysis of the Cypriot, Bosnian, and Northern Irish 
cases, I suggest that there are three conditions essential for power-sharing in deeply divided 
societies which should exist at the level of local contestation. First, there should be intra-group 
political stability in each ethnic group; particularly, the ethnic political elite should be rather 
consistent with regard to its position on power-sharing with the other ethnic group/s.  In each of 
the three cases studied at least one of the communities seems to be lacking internal political 
stability at earlier stages of the process and a settlement did become possible only after a 
relatively cohesive political leadership emerged. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots went 
                                                          
288
 The first nine conditions are drawn from Lijphart (1996); for a detailed discussion on them, see Section 
2.5.  The ones written in italics are those which are identified as most essential ones. 
289
 Intra-group political stability is deemed non-existent where at least one of the groups is ridden with 
political instability. 
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through a rebalancing act and a pro-settlement coalition (though still somewhat restrained by its 
minor pro-status-quo partner) emerged and positively contributed to the negotiation process; the 
Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, replaced their pro-settlement leader with a hardliner who refused to 
enter into substantive negotiations. In the case of Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslim leadership was 
mostly stable, but the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaderships were usually fraught with internal 
divisions, and only their respective kin-state’s forceful interferences in the politics of these two 
communities brought about the relative stability which made the Dayton settlement possible. The 
Northern Irish process was essentially different, because all the main political factions were 
participants in the formal negotiation process; however, in fact, the UUP, the SDLP and Sinn Féin 
were the key players, and the Catholic community’s internal political instability due to the 
nationalist-republican rivalry was a severe obstacle until the SDLP and Sinn Féin managed to forge 
some form of political alliance in the early 1990s, which happened largely thanks to the Irish and 
British intergovernmental cooperation over the conflict’s management. As internal political 
stability provides a communal group’s leadership with more flexibility regarding its negotiation 
positions, it should be regarded as a necessary condition for achieving a power-sharing settlement. 
This internal cohesion, however, cannot be maintained throughout negotiations, even at the very 
least common denominator basis (for instance, the second largest Unionist party UDP left the 
Northern Irish process protesting Sinn Féin’s entry into the all-party negotiations); but if there is 
still a substantial political majority backing the process within the community (as was the case in 
Northern Ireland), the process could still move on and succeed. 
The second essential condition for power-sharing settlement is the existence of a power 
balance or a tendency towards parity between rival ethnic communities. As discussed in Chapter 
2, a balance of power is pointed out by Lijphart as a favourable condition. I will argue that a 
tendency towards parity between the communities should also be seen as a favourable condition. 
The Northern Irish case is a particularly relevant example on this point. As the Northern Irish 
nationalist community’s political, economic conditions and even demographic status relatively 
improved over the years, the unionist community did become gradually more conciliatory towards 
them. The political and economic conditions for the nationalist community mainly improved due 
to the British intervention (particularly under the direct rule);  at the same time the unionist 
community’s political dominance was eradicated, again as the direct rule replaced the unionist 
dominated government of Northern Ireland. In the Bosnian case, on the other hand, there was 
essentially a balance of power between the groups. Although the Bosnian Muslims were the 
largest group (though not a majority), the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats had the backing of 
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their respective kin-states. The case of Cyprus, however, is a prime example of power imbalances, 
which are obviously likely to hinder a power-sharing settlement. The Turkish Cypriots were 
demographically a minority with around 18-20 % of the population, while the Greek Cypriots were 
a much larger group with around almost 80% of the population. The Greek Cypriots were also the 
more prosperous of the two and had the sole internationally recognised government on the island 
since 1963. The only substantial factor favouring the Turkish Cypriots in this quite imbalanced 
conflict was the support they were getting from their kin state Turkey, which is a powerful regional 
actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the tendency towards power parity seems to have 
substantially improved the chances for power-sharing in Northern Ireland, whereas in Cyprus the 
power imbalance appears to have worked against a power-sharing settlement. 
The third essential condition for power-sharing is the existence of a mutually hurting 
stalemate (MHS). As discussed in Chapter 3, Zartman (2001) argues that the timing of peace 
initiatives is crucial and an MHS constitutes a ripe moment for third party intervention. The case 
studies indicate that an MHS is also essential for power-sharing settlements. In the cases of Bosnia 
and Northern Ireland, a mutually hurting stalemate was largely in place as the substantial 
negotiations begun, but in Cyprus, though the stalemate was in place for decades, it does not 
seem to be operating as a mutually hurting one. By 1995 all the groups in Bosnia were weary of 
the war and the conditions on the battlefield could be described as a stalemate. In Northern 
Ireland, the stalemate had been long in the making, and by the mid-1990s it was firmly in place: 
the unionist community was weary of the conflict and its political leadership was also concerned 
as the Anglo-Irish initiatives were bypassing and denying them any meaningful exercise of political 
power at the local level. Again, the Cyprus conflict appears different in this respect as well. For the 
Turkish Cypriots, it can be argued that their long running political isolation and its accompanying 
economic difficulties meant that they were regarding the stalemate as hurting them. But for the 
Greek Cypriots this was hardly the case, although many Greek Cypriots, alike their Turkish Cypriot 
compatriots, were suffering from the fact that a substantial amount of their private properties 
were now inaccessible as they ended up in the wrong side of the de facto divide; this was probably 
their only major concern resulting from the stalemate and this concern’s effect was also 
diminishing as there has been almost three decades past since the de facto partition. Moreover, 
with the impending EU membership, the Greek Cypriots were anticipating that the stalemate 
would be improving in their favour. In short, the Cypriot stalemate was not mutually hurting, or at 
least it was not perceived as such by the Greek Cypriots. 
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It should be underlined that these three conditions as well as the small population size and 
small number of segments do not necessarily lead to a power-sharing settlement. Instead, I would 
argue that the existence of these conditions is very likely to improve the chances of such 
settlement, and that third party interveners and other international actors should take into 
account the status quo regarding these favourable conditions in order to structure their 
interventions in a way which does not, in the least, harm the chances of power-sharing settlement. 
Although most of these conditions are inherently embedded in the local context, some could be 
improved through third party and/or kin-state intervention, as I will seek to point out below. 
7.3. Level Two - Contestation for Power-sharing at the Local Actors- Third 
Party Peacemaker Level: Power mediation for Power-sharing? 
The second level of contestation is the local actors-third party peacemaker level, where a third 
party mediator seeks to mediate a power-sharing settlement between the local groups. At this 
level, promotion of power-sharing by third peacemakers is likely to run into conflict with the local 
parties who would prefer a majoritarian system or other political goals over power-sharing such as 
secession or annexation by another country. The peacemaker, thus, may end up in a contestation 
for power-sharing with one or more of the disputants and is likely seek to ally itself with one party 
in order pressure the other one. In such contexts the peacemaker would need to manipulate the 
disputants and the mediation context if the mediation process is to succeed. As the parties tend to 
have other issues at stake, such as territory and security, the mediator could formulate and 
propose different sets of possible compromises (i.e. settlement proposals), thus providing a basis 
for negotiation. However, if mediated negotiations on such proposals also seem to be failing, the 
mediator could try to exert its influence on the parties by either simply threatening to end the 
process and/or through other pressuring tactics. For instance, a common combination of such 
strategies is declaring a deadline for ending the mediation and indicating what consequences a 
collapse of the process would entail for the parties, which could include public naming and 
blaming, and imposition of some diplomatic or economic sanctions. In other words, a mediator in 
power-sharing negotiations is usually not an intermediary which simply conveys one party’s 
message to the other side (which could be described as facilitator), but it is often a formulator-
manipulator. The overall negotiation framework can be described as a three way interaction 
having the mediator at its core: one interaction between each disputant and the mediator in 
addition to the disputant-disputant interaction. The bilateral negotiation processes between the 
mediator and each disputant may then even supersede the local-local interaction and become the 
main level of power-sharing negotiation, particularly where the local-local level is ridden with 
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political violence and mutual distrust, which often causes the disputants direct interactions to 
become quarrelsome and unproductive. 
The Bosnian case exemplifies how power-sharing negotiation in the context of a deeply 
divided society may turn into parallel negotiation processes between the individual disputants and 
the mediator. When it became clear that collective mediation was unlikely to succeed as the war 
continued, the US took over the mediation and negotiated separately with the main power-
brokers in the region, even by-passing some of the primary disputants. In the case of Cyprus, the 
mediation was undertaken by the UN, which had very limited manipulative capacity, and the 
mediation process was largely maintained because continuation of the process was necessitated 
by certain wider developments of strategic importance. For most of the period studied, the 
Cypriot leaders usually met face-to-face under UN mediation but, in terms of the actual dynamics 
of the wider process, this was a smokescreen as both sides were more involved in maintenance of 
their relationships with certain other actors. This was simply due to the fact that the Cypriots saw 
the UN led negotiation as a sub-game of their respective wider political games. The wider games 
were the EU integration processes of Cyprus and Turkey: while the Turkish Cypriots, initially, 
continued to participate in the UN mediated process because of Turkey’s pressure, the Greek 
Cypriots were engaged in the process in order to advance their EU accession and also to maintain 
their international status. In other words, what brought the Cypriots to the table was not a 
genuine interest in negotiated settlement but their wider strategic calculations. The Cypriot case 
thus largely confirms the argument in the peacemaking literature (which was discussed in Chapter 
3) that what brings the disputants to the table is consequential for the result of a peacemaking 
process. The Northern Irish process was totally different in this respect because it was mostly 
mediated at Anglo-Irish level. Although a third party mediation team lately joined the process, it 
only assumed a facilitative role in the substantive negotiations, which included chairing the all-
party negotiations even-handedly and presenting the Anglo-Irish prepared papers as its own in 
order to provide more legitimacy to such documents for public opinion purposes. I will discuss the 
kin-states’ involvement in the Northern Irish case in the next section, which is on the local actors–
kin-state(s) level. However, as for third party mediator in a context where there is strong kin-state 
involvement, a sustained cooperation between those kin-states and the mediator (as it was the 
case in Northern Ireland) could contribute to the process as the latter may add some form of 
international legitimacy to the process. 
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Although collective mediation is often deemed incoherent and ineffective, as the Bosnian 
case particularly illustrates, it remains a fact of contemporary diplomacy. This is dictated by the 
wider context: the conflicts that are known by their intractability are hardly ever likely to attract 
state actors or other varieties of influential mediators unless there are issues at stake that are 
concerning such actors. For these reasons, a plausible alternative to collective mediation, which 
could largely rectify its weaknesses, is a more focused collective mediation, one composed of 
actors who share similar perspectives on the conflict situation at hand. The case of Cyprus 
underscores that the UN’s mediation is also suffering from problems similar to that of collective 
mediation. The UN’s mediation, after all, is a particular form of collective mediation as it rests on 
the organisation’s universal character. The UN’s problems in mediation mostly stem from its 
intergovernmental nature which provides only limited independent capacity and resources. But 
where there is a strong and uniform international consensus backing its mediation, the UN could 
play an effective role in negotiating power-sharing. The successful US mediation in Bosnia 
empirically supports my proposition in Chapter 3 that power mediation appears as a more apt 
style in mediation of power-sharing settlements. However, power mediation cannot be a 
sustainable and fruitful mode of intervention in the post-settlement phase. Power mediation is 
effective in bringing about agreements, but for the stability of the settlement in the longer term 
the relationship between the disputants need to become more cooperative and this cooperation 
cannot be achieved by power mediation. First of all, no power mediator would be willing to take 
up such role persistently and, more crucially, power mediation is not an effective strategy in the 
longer term as it tends to create severe legitimacy and ownership problems for the local political 
system. Therefore, a facilitative mediator who seeks to improve the relationship between the 
disputants should take over in the post-settlement phase. In sum, depending on the stage of the 
peacemaking intervention, each style of mediation can play a significant role in resolution of the 
conflict. 
7.4. Level Three - Contestation for Power-sharing at the Local Actors-Kin-
state(s) Level: The Role of Kin-states in Peacemaking 
The two levels discussed above can be observed in any peacemaking intervention, but the local 
actors – kin-state(s) level is unique to certain conflicts where there is kin-state involvement. At this 
level, where the local actors and kin-state(s) interact, their interaction may become a contestation 
for power-sharing. In other words, kin-state involvement in deeply divided societies can either 
help or impede bringing about a power-sharing settlement at the local actors’ level. Kin states can 
assume a set of roles in peacemaking interventions for power-sharing, which I conceptualise as 
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promoter; quasi-mediator; power-broker; and enforcer. These roles are conceptually distinct roles 
but they are often combined by kin-states in their engagement with local actors. 
In the Cypriot case, for the period studied, Turkey could be identified as an active kin-
state. Although Greece is also a kin-state, which historically played very substantial roles in the 
development of the conflict, its role during the 1999-2004 was mostly limited with promoting its 
kin community’s interests, particularly within the EU. Kin-state engagement in ethnic conflicts 
often involves provision of some resources to their kin community, often in the 
internationalisation of the conflict.290 In the three case studied in this thesis, however, the kin-
states’ involvement appears to have been much deeper and broader than usual. Turkey’s, Federal 
Yugoslavia’s and Croatia’s kin-state roles were very intrusive, as indicated by their substantial 
political and military involvements. This was mainly due to the fact that they were the sole 
international backers of their respective kin communities. Britain’s involvement in Northern 
Ireland has been intrusive as well, but this was also because Britain was a “reluctant” sovereign in 
Northern Ireland as well as a kin-state to the unionist community (See Section 6.1.). As pointed out 
in Chapter 4, the Turkish involvement in the peacemaking process was not motivated by a genuine 
interest in settlement of the Cyprus conflict but rather by the EU integration process of Turkey. 
Therefore, with respect to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Turkish government often acted like 
a power-broker who sought to deliver its part of an international bargain which it struck with 
other international actors. In short, Turkey’s involvement was more concerned with its own 
broader interests than particular power-sharing arrangements negotiated. The Turkish–Turkish 
Cypriot contestation was a dynamic process during which the Turkish government initially tried to 
become a quasi-mediator as it sought to convince Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to alter his 
negotiation stance and policy. But when that failed, Prime Minister Erdogan stepped up the 
pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leader and sought to become a power-broker by allying itself with 
the Turkish Cypriot opposition. Likewise, Milosevic’s early engagement with the Bosnian Serb 
leadership could be described as quasi-mediation. However, the intransigence of the Bosnian 
Serbs and the increasing international pressure on Yugoslavia would subsequently turn Milosevic 
into an enforcer, particularly helped by the fact that the new American mediator sought to solely 
engage with Milosevic at the expense of the Bosnian Serbs. A similar pattern could be traced in the 
case of Croatia and the Bosnian Croats. 
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 This point is drawn from the discussion on kin-states in Section 3.4. 
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On the basis of my assessments of the kin-states’ roles in the cases studied, I suggest a 
typology of kin-state roles in peacemaking. The roles are discussed in the table below in ascending 
order of importance, from milder to more intrusive degrees of involvement, along with some 
examples and assessments. A promoter291 kin-state is the most common form of kin-state 
involvement; it basically involves backing of kin community by kin-state at international level. As 
argued in Chapter 3, kin-states are well-placed to become quasi-mediators, and the cases studies 
have confirmed this proposition. A quasi-mediator292 kin-state is one which engages closely with a 
kin community’s leadership and uses its influence towards a settlement. Power-broker293 kin-
states and enforcer294 kin-states, however, are much more intrusive actors in the affairs of their 
kin. The main distinction between a power-broker kin-state and the enforcer one is that while the 
former dominates the relationship, the latter simply replaces the local leadership and enforces its 
own will. Milosevic and Tudjman played purely enforcement roles at the Dayton negotiations: they 
both negotiated on behalf of their respective kin communities and enforced their kin 
communities’ consent to the settlement. On the other hand, in the Northern Irish process the 
British and Irish governments, as the kin-states of the two local communities, worked together 
over the years to produce a set of documents which underpinned the all-party talks that 
culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. Both could thus be regarded initially as power-brokers, 
particularly during the negotiations of Sunningdale in 1973 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, 
but both later, especially with the start of the all-party talks, sought to become quasi-mediators. 
Across all the three cases, the kin-states’ roles in the early stages of the conflicts was promotion as 
they tended to support their ethnic kin’s unilateral goals. But as the kin-states’ policies shifted to 
support power-sharing (with the sole of exception of Greece), the kin-state-local actors level 
became more contentious. The contestation at the local actors–kin-state(s) level is usually 
stabilised by kin-state’s assertion of its dominance over its kin as the local actors are inherently the 
much weaker side (due to their size or reliance on their kin-state for support). But local actors 
could also exercise certain leverages against their kin-state’s leadership; for instance, they can 
seek to form public opinion in the kin-state if they have wider support for their cause. A relevant 
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 The term “promoter” is used to underscore the supportive aspect of kin-states’ role. 
292
 For a definition of quasi-mediation, see Section 3.4. 
293
 The term power-broker is often used in electoral studies in reference to actors who can influence people 
to vote for a particular candidate in exchange of political or financial favours (See, for example, Caro 2004). 
Here, I adapt the term to emphasise kin-states’ capacity in acting as influential actors in determining the 
policy of their kin community. 
294
 There is no specific pattern in the use of the term “enforcer” in political science. My use of the term is in 
order to underline that kin-states may become enforcers of a certain policy over their kin community either 
because of their wider international interests, engagements or obligations. 
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example is the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash’s failed attempts at forming a public opinion in 
Turkey against the Annan Plan (See Section 4.6.). As for the post-settlement phase, the Northern 
Ireland case shows that the contestation at the local actors-kin-state(s) level could turn into a 
cooperative relationship over the years, particularly as the peace process progresses. 
As noted in Table 3 below, the kin-state’s role could lead to certain complications for 
implementation and institutionalisation of a power-sharing settlement. Where the kin-state 
assumes an enforcer role, in the local kin community’s view the settlement is very likely to be 
regarded as an imposition. Although local actors’ and third party peacemaker’s individual goals 
could be rather easily identified, a kin-state’s strategy in a given conflict is usually harder to 
determine. For local actors, there are usually a small set of political goals amongst which they 
would seek to attain one, depending on the political context; these are a power-sharing deal, a 
majoritarian rule, establishing dominance over the other group and secession. On the other hand, 
a third party peacemaker is usually inclined to seek a power-sharing deal in a deeply divided a 
society. Meanwhile, a kin-state has a much larger set of policy options, including non-interference, 
annexation, supporting establishment of a power-sharing regime or majoritarian democracy, 
favouring and supporting one group’s dominance over the other(s). The kin-state’s policy is, 
therefore, usually the most dynamic component of a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing; 
and it is often determined on the basis of the developments regarding the kin-state’s wider 
international interests. In the case of Yugoslavia the international sanctions imposed on the 
country seems to have played a crucial role in determining the eventual policy shift of Milosevic, 
while in the cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland the kin-states’ wider interests (the EU 
integration process of Turkey and the strengthening of Anglo-Irish relations) were the major 
factors. 
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Type of Kin-
state’s 
Involvement  
Its Context Characteristics of the 
interaction 
Assessments Cases 
Promoter Most kin-state 
involvement would 
fall into this category. 
It does not require 
very close ties or 
direct engagement in 
the conflict. 
It involves promotion of 
kin community’s 
interests. Kin-state uses 
its international network 
and resources to help its 
kin at international level. 
It is largely a supportive 
role. It usually takes the 
form of financial and 
logistical support, 
especially in 
internationalisation of the 
conflict. 
Greece in the 
Cyprus conflict in 
the 1950s and also 
later at the EU level. 
Ireland in the 
Northern Ireland 
conflict in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Quasi-
mediator 
Kin-states would 
employ their close 
ties with their kin to 
improve the chances 
of a mediation 
process, particularly 
where there are 
issues at stake 
harming their wider 
interests. 
It is similar to a 
mediator’s role; it seeks 
to bridge the gap 
between its kin and other 
disputant(s), e.g. 
formulation of some 
proposals. Its role is not 
perceived impartial; 
however, this may bring 
certain advantages in 
terms of engaging with 
some local actors. 
As it is a relatively less 
intrusive mode of 
engagement, it does not 
create severe dependency 
or legitimacy issues 
regarding the emerging 
settlement.  
Britain and Ireland 
in the Northern Irish 
all-party talks 
(1996- 1998). 
Turkey in the 
Cyprus conflict 
(1999-2002). 
Federal Yugoslavia 
during the Vance 
Owen Plan 
negotiations (1993). 
Power-
broker 
Its context is limited 
with certain conflicts 
where kin-state 
involvement in the 
conflict is very 
substantial. Also, 
there are certain ties 
and engagements 
which make kin 
community 
dependent upon kin-
state. 
As power-brokers, kin-
states are the dominant 
party in the relationship. 
Their actions are often 
unilateral; however, 
there is some negotiation 
with the local actors over 
kin-state’s actions 
regarding the conflict 
and its settlement. 
It is an intrusive form of 
kin-state intervention. It 
tends to create post-
settlement issues, 
regarding the ownership 
and legitimacy of the 
power-sharing settlement. 
Britain during the 
1973 Sunningdale 
conference. Britain 
in the 1985 Anglo-
Irish Agreement. 
Greece and Turkey 
in the 1958-1960 
Cyprus 
negotiations. 
Turkey during the 
Annan Plan 
negotiations (2003-
2004). 
Enforcer It is only the case in 
certain conflicts in 
which the kin 
community is totally 
dependent on the 
kin-state; for 
example, in war 
settings where kin 
community wages a 
war with the kin-
state’s support. 
The interaction often 
turns into contestation, 
mainly because kin 
community leadership 
resists becoming a mere 
extension of the kin-state 
policy. However, given 
the imbalances in the 
relationship, this often 
becomes inevitable. 
It is a very intrusive form 
of kin-state involvement. It 
is contribution to 
settlement process is 
essentially very 
problematic, as it almost 
totally lacks any political 
input from the local 
actors. 
Federal Yugoslavia 
and Croatia in the 
Bosnian conflict 
(1994-1995). 
Table 3 – Typology of Kin-state Involvement in Peacemaking 
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7.5. Level Four - Contestation for Power-sharing at the Third Party 
Peacemaker–Kin-state(s) Level: Hybridity in Peacemaking? 
The fourth level of contestation for power-sharing, which is again only pertinent to cases where 
there is kin-state involvement, is between third party peacemaker and kin-state(s). When there 
are kin-states involved in a conflict, it is usually the case that their engagement with a third party 
peacemaker will constitute another level of contestation. Third party peacemaker-kin-state(s) 
interaction could take a form of contestation, as kin-states’ policies tend to vary and often clash 
with third party peacemaker’s efforts. This is particularly the case when kin states are strongly 
backing their kin during at early stages of conflict. Given that most kin-states are powerful regional 
actors, political leverage or other diplomatic tools available to a third party peacemaker for 
influencing a kin-state’s policy are often considerably limited. But such influence over a kin-state 
for changing its policy can be exerted by linking the kin-state’s wider interest to the developments 
in the conflict. That was done in the case of Bosnia through international sanctions, which made 
the rump Yugoslavia’s wider interests contingent on the resolution of the conflict, while in the 
case of Cyprus the UN sought to exploit an already existent link between Turkey’s EU accession 
and settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Without some form of cooperation with kin-states, power-
sharing settlements are not likely to be successfully mediated by a third party peacemaker, 
because kin-states are often main international backers of local disputants, which provide them 
with resources and means to sustain their conflicts. In short, any third party peacemaker needs to 
engage with kin-states in order to acquire or sustain their cooperation for a power-sharing 
settlement. 
Cooperative relationships were eventually developed between most kin-states and third 
party peacemakers in the cases studied. The kin-states and the third party peacemaker 
cooperated particularly well in Northern Ireland, mainly because the third party peacemaker’s 
entry into the process and its specific role was agreed as such by the kin-states; hence there was 
no room for contestation between the two and the mediator. The third party peacemakers sought 
to form cooperative relationships with the kin-states in Bosnia and Cyprus by breaking the kin-
group-kin-state alliances. In the Bosnian case, the use of military force by NATO and the imposition 
of economic sanctions broke apart the alliance between the Bosnian Serb leadership and 
Milosevic, underlining that a kin-group-kin-state alliance would not be likely to endure a forceful 
third party intervention. And in the case of Cyprus, the incentivising power of the liberal peace (in 
the form of EU integration) led the new Turkish government to shift its support to the Turkish 
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Cypriot opposition, and also helped the UN Secretary-General to form a cooperative relationship 
with the Turkish government for resuming the stalled mediation process. 
The cooperative relationships forged between the kin-states and the third party 
peacemakers in Bosnia and Cyprus are consequential for theoretical discussions on hybridity in 
peacemaking. As noted in Chapter 3, Mac Ginty (2008) claims that local peacemaking traditions 
and mechanisms are often superseded by the dominant Western approaches in the liberal peace 
interventions. However, as I pointed out in the same chapter, kin-states may assume a hybrid role 
in the context of liberal peace interventions, which could lead to hybridisation of the liberal peace 
blueprints. Third party peacemaking with kin-state involvement can thus be regarded as a hybrid 
form of international peacemaking, as it expands the usual disputants-mediator triangular 
framework. Although kin-states were often indirect parties to the conflicts studied, their direct 
participation (particularly at final phases of the process) and active involvement seem to have 
been part of the collective strategy of the third party peacemakers and the kin-states. In the case 
of Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslavia, the American peacemaking team was even complicit in the kin-
state’s take-over of the kin community’s decision-making, while in the case of Cyprus both Greece 
and Turkey were full-fledged participants in the endgame negotiations mediated by the UN. In the 
Northern Ireland case, particularly when the Good Friday negotiations were deadlocked, it was the 
direct participation of the British and Irish prime ministers which provided the impetus for 
progress. In other words, as a result of the peacemaker and kin-state(s) cooperation, the kin-states 
were critical players in the endgames. The third party peacemaker–kin-state(s)’ level cooperation 
is a hybrid modus operandi in international peacemaking which combines third party mediation 
with kin-state(s)–local actors level intermediary mediation. However, in terms of hybridisation of 
the liberal peace blueprints with kin-state involvement, the case studies indicate that there was no 
consideration of non-Western political frameworks which could possibly better meet local needs. 
7.6. Level Five – Contestation for Power-Sharing at the Kin-states Level: 
Regional Conflict or Cooperation? 
For this level to exist there should be at least two kin-states involved in the conflict. Kin-states 
involved in the same conflict are likely to be sharing borders with each other and have bilateral 
disputes other than the one between their kin communities. It is also often the case that 
resolution of bilateral disputes between kin-states becomes closely intertwined with the local 
conflict. In the case of Bosnia, bilateral disputes between Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia were 
closely related with the Bosnian process; it was on the agenda of the Dayton conference to settle 
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other kin-states level issues, particularly the situation of the Croatian Serbs. The case of Northern 
Ireland was particularly striking in terms of what kin-states level cooperation could achieve: the 
Irish and British states increasingly cooperated over the years and eventually succeeded in 
establishing a framework for the Good Friday settlement. In the case of Cyprus, however, there 
was almost no cooperation between Greece and Turkey in order to settle the Cyprus conflict, and 
also there were many Greek-Turkish bilateral long running disputes. In other words, the 
contestation at the kin-states level was mostly intact in Cyprus for the period studied, while in the 
other two cases the contestations were already turning into cooperative relationships at varying 
degrees. 
As long as there is an intense regional level contestation between kin-states, it is unlikely 
that there would be a power-sharing settlement at their kin-groups level. The contestation 
between kin-states for power-sharing is mostly shaped by kin-states’ relationship with their 
respective kin as well as external and internal dynamics influencing a particular kin-state’s 
policymaking. Kin-states who are related to a dominant majority are not likely to be in favour of 
power-sharing at the kin-groups level, and kin states who are related to minorities are often 
inclined towards power-sharing. However, if kin-states value their relationship with each other 
more than their relationships with their respective kin communities, or where there are severe 
threats to their national interests due to the running conflict, they are likely to support a third 
party peacemaker’s mediation for a power-sharing settlement. The British and Irish states 
increasingly engaged with each other over Northern Ireland, particularly after both joining the EU, 
and they also sought to improve their bilateral ties despite the conflict. The violent disintegration 
of Yugoslavia led to an intricate set of antagonistic relationships among the kin-states and local 
groups in Bosnia. However, when the leaderships of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia substantially 
changed their policies, mostly thanks to international pressure and sanctions, some form of kin-
states level cooperation between them emerged, especially during the Dayton negotiations. In the 
case of Cyprus, a kin-states level cooperation between Greece and Turkey did not come about 
mainly due to two reasons: the existence of many other on-going disputes between the two 
countries and Greece’s preference for low level of engagement in its kin community’s affairs.295 
Whether kin-states could recognise the potential of their regional cooperation is a significant issue 
here. A third party peacemaker therefore should aim to help kin-states improve their ties and 
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historical reasons. As noted in Chapter 4, the Greek backed coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974 triggered the 
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involvement in the conflict with promotion of its kin’s interests at international level. 
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move towards a cooperative relationship. In brief, the contestation at kin-states level needs to 
evolve towards a cooperative relationship for a power-sharing settlement. 
7.7. Post-settlement Intervention: Power-sharing under Hybrid 
Sovereignty 
This section aims to combine the assessments of the case studies regarding the power-sharing 
institutions envisaged and their implementation. The case studies have showed that the 
settlements followed the consociational approach to power-sharing. The choice of consociational 
political frameworks over other alternatives, such as the integrative approach, in the three cases 
provides empirical support for my concluding proposition in Chapter 2. That is to say, in deeply 
divided societies consociational power-sharing would be the only mutually acceptable political 
settlement in the short term. The three settlements also seem to have common institutional 
characteristics with respect to third party intervention. 
One institutional commonality shared across the three cases is that third party 
intervention mechanisms were embedded in their proposed power-sharing systems. In Bosnia the 
institutional means for international intervention were particularly expansive, ranging from the 
influence of international judges at the Bosnian Constitutional Court to the Office of High 
Representative, which had coercive political powers. Continuation of the British and Irish 
governments’ cooperation over Northern Ireland was institutionalised at two levels: the British-
Irish Council and the North-South Council. Moreover, the two governments continued to closely 
engage with the Northern Irish elites, especially during the negotiations of the St Andrews 
Agreement in 2006, as implementation of the power-sharing settlement ran into problems. In the 
case of Cyprus, the settlement provided for continuation of the guarantor statuses for Greece, 
Turkey and the UK, and there would be international judges holding the balance at the proposed 
Supreme Court. There was, however, no permanent or temporary international body envisaged 
for bringing together the kin-states and the local actors. Likewise, in Bosnia the kin-states’ 
engagement and cooperation were not sought for post-Dayton process; although there were 
extensive roles provided for other international actors. Bodies similar to the British-Irish 
institutions for Northern Ireland would not be totally applicable to Bosnia and Cyprus, since the 
two are independent countries. But given that the kin-states’ involvement in the negotiations 
were no less significant in Cyprus and Bosnia than was in Northern Ireland, establishment of some 
transnational bodies for the kin-states and the local actors’ cooperation and engagement could be 
a conducive factor for successful implementation of the settlements. 
191 
 
The specific roles envisaged for third parties in the power-sharing systems discussed also 
raise some conceptual issues. As noted in Chapter 2, the consociationalist and centripetalist 
(integrative) power-sharing theorists have long conceptualised power-sharing as a national or sub-
national level endogenous political framework, while the complex power-sharing school have 
taken into account international involvement in design and implementation of power-sharing 
settlements and also highlighted consociational-integrative mix design of power-sharing systems 
in some cases. The three power-sharing settlements examined in this thesis could be best assessed 
through a consociational power-sharing lens in terms of their internal institutional design as they 
envisaged strictly ethnic and deeply entrenched mechanisms of power-sharing.296 However, the 
existence of widespread third party involvement in the making and implementation of power-
sharing in Bosnia and Northern Ireland also confirms the complex power-sharing approach’s 
emphasis on the role of international actors. Moreover, the third party intervention mechanisms 
embedded within the settlements, as well as the post-settlement roles played by some 
international actors in Bosnia and by the kin-states in Northern Ireland, suggest that power-
sharing in these deeply divided societies relies on the continuing mediation and interference of 
the kin-states or other third party actors. Therefore, a more apt conceptual definition is needed to 
emphasise this significant external component of the power-sharing in these two cases. As the 
international actors and the kin-states involved in these cases engage in negotiations with the 
locals over the implementation of power-sharing, especially when there is a deadlock between the 
locals. This negotiation between the locals and third parties often results in hybrid outcomes as 
both sides cannot impose their own will and need to comprise. The interaction thus indicates that 
there is a form of “hybrid sovereignty” in Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The term “hybrid 
sovereignty” is borrowed from Bacik (2008). According to Bacik, “hybrid sovereignty” denotes the 
existence of traditional patterns and forms of authority within the formal modern statehood in the 
context of the Arab Middle East. My use of the term, however, is to emphasise that there is a 
local-international (or local-kin-state) hybrid form of modern nation-state sovereignty in existence 
in Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The term “hybrid sovereignty” can be related to the term “shared 
sovereignty”, which is outlined by Krasner (2004); however, Krasner’s argument rests on the 
assumption that sovereignty could be shared and this process could be regulated, whereas, in fact, 
the status quo, at least in Bosnia, is that sovereignty is not shared but often negotiated over, on an 
ad hoc basis, resulting in its hybridisation. 
                                                          
296
 This observation is based on the case study discussions on the settlements. 
192 
 
 Although power-sharing under hybrid sovereignty seem to have made some progress 
towards institutionalisation of peace in Bosnia and Northern Ireland, it remains to be seen 
whether such arrangements are conducive for sustenance of power-sharing in the longer term. 
Even under international intervention in the form of hybrid sovereignty, consociational power-
sharing institutions could often become deadlocked because the divisions continue to run deep, or 
since local actors may not compromise when they are safe in the knowledge that third parties 
would prevent a total collapse. Therefore, third parties should seek to minimise their involvement 
and should not dictate but urge local actors to replace consociational power-sharing institutions 
with integrative ones. A gradual shift appears to have begun in Bosnia, where some substantial 
changes were incorporated into the consociational system over the years and the original strictly 
ethnic identity based power-sharing became somewhat integrative. The Annan Plan for Cyprus 
was rejected, so it is not possible to assess whether similar developments could have happened in 
Cyprus. In Northern Ireland, though, the relatively integrative consociational system has been 
relatively stable in the recent years. 
7.8. A Nested Games Approach to Negotiating Power-sharing: Between 
Deadlock and the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
In this section a game theoretical account of power-sharing negotiations under kin-state and third 
party peacemaker involvement in a deeply divided society is proposed. As this game theoretical 
analysis will be based on Tsebelis’ (1990) nested game approach, a discussion of Tsebelis’ analysis 
is essential. Arguing that an actor’s choices may appear suboptimal to an observer not because the 
actor is irrational but since the observer’s perspective is incomplete, Tsebelis (1990) has suggested 
a nested game approach to explain apparently suboptimal actions of political actors. According to 
Tsebelis, while the observer focuses on only one game, the actor is, in fact, involved in a network 
of games, which he calls nested games. In other words, what seem suboptimal from the 
perspective of one game is actually optimal if the whole network of games is studied (Tsebelis 
1990, 5-11). One of Tsebelis’ applications of the nested games approach is on constitutional 
bargaining among segmental elites in a consociational democracy.297 Tsebelis (1990, 164-172) 
posits that segmental elites and their respective constituents in a consociational democracy would 
somewhat differ in terms of the ordering of their preferences regarding constitutional bargaining. 
And if the elites are wholly faithful to their constituents’ preferences expressed at the electoral 
arena, inter-segmental interaction would be shaped in accordance with the electorate’s view. In 
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that case, Tsebelis claims that there would be either a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a Deadlock game. 
Whereas if the elites’ own preference sets were to prevail, the situation would be a game of 
Chicken (Ibid, 164): 
For elites, as for the followers, the most preferred outcome is to be intransigent when the 
opponent compromises. The second best outcome is mutual compromise. Finally, yielding 
to an intransigent opponent and avoiding conflict is preferred over mutual intransigence. 
This fear of mutual intransigence is what distinguishes elite preference orderings from 
those of the masses. So for the elites the game is chicken. 
The game’s type matters because different types of games have different outcomes in 
game theoretical terms: there is one dominant strategy with a unique Nash Equilibrium in a typical 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or a Deadlock game, but in a game of Chicken there is more than one 
dominant strategy and three Nash equilibriums (two in pure strategy and one in mixed strategy 
cases).298 According to Tsebelis, where the constitutional bargaining is either a PD or Deadlock 
game, which are both faithful representations of the constituents’ preferences, politics would 
become more ideological and polarised because choices are clear and unconditional. Whereas in a 
game of Chicken there is no unique equilibrium, hence the parties would make their choice 
contingent upon the opponent’s strategy and politics is likely to become more pragmatic. In other 
words, in the game of Chicken the chances of striking a constitutional bargain would be higher as 
the actors would have more flexibility. But since the elites are often likely to take into account 
both the parliamentary and the electoral arenas, the actual game is very much likely to be a 
composite game with a payoff structure of its own. Tsebelis suggests that the degree of influence 
constituents have on their elites would determine how the payoffs of the games at the 
parliamentary and the electoral arenas are combined and converted into payoffs in the actual 
game, and that the degree of constituents’ influence would largely be determined by two factors: 
information and monopoly of representation. Briefly stated, where the public could closely follow 
the elite discussions, the elites are to have less flexibility in negotiations; and monopoly of 
representation is essential because if there is intra-segmental opposition, the segmental elites are 
to have less flexibility than otherwise they would. 
However, Tsebelis’ application of nested games approach to constitutional bargaining in a 
consociational democracy is not sufficient in analysing power-sharing negotiations in a deeply 
divided society. As elites in a deeply divided society often do not prefer yielding to an intransigent 
opponent in order to avert conflict, the elites and their followers are very likely to share the same 
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ordering of preferences. In other words, the elites in a deeply divided society often do not prefer 
yielding to an intransigent opponent in order to avert conflict, which was particularly evident 
across the three cases studied in this thesis. The communal elites in all the three cases were often 
not afraid of initiating or sustaining conflict, mostly due to the fact that yielding to an opponent in 
those three deeply divided societies had more severe consequences (such as secession or 
majoritarian rule) than what issues at stake in a relatively united and established consociational 
democracy such as Belgium would have. A nested games approach to negotiating power-sharing in 
a deeply divided society should also take into account actors other than local elites involved in the 
process. As noted above, there are usually two external actors involved in negotiating power-
sharing settlements: third-party peacemakers and kin-states. Below, I first discuss how a nested 
games approach can be employed in analysing kin-state involvement in negotiations for power-
sharing settlements. Subsequently, I will seek to specify in game theoretical terms how third party 
peacemakers’ could increase the chances of settlement. 
A game of negotiating power-sharing can be formulated as a basic two by two game of 
local elites, in which there are two strategies available to both sides. The same two strategies are 
also indirectly available to kin-state actors; they can support either one or the other of two 
strategies. Both local elites prefer to be hard-line when the other side accommodates. I call its 
payoff D (for dominance), as the party who does take a hard-line stance would be dominating over 
the other side. The exactly the opposite situation (accommodating while the other side is taking 
hard-line stance) is the worst outcome for both sides, and I call its payoff R (for repression). The 
other available outcomes are mutual accommodation and mutual hard-line stance. The local elites 
and their constituents would prefer mutual hard-line stance over mutual accommodation. I call 
the payoffs for mutual accommodation S (for power-sharing settlement), and the payoffs for 
mutual hard-line policy can be called C (for continuing the conflict). So both sides’ preference 
ordering is D>C>S>R and this preference ordering corresponds to the Deadlock game, where the 
strategy which is mutually most beneficial is also dominant. As pointed out above, Tsebelis argues 
that the constituents could prefer mutual accommodation over mutual hard-line stance as well, 
and therefore the game could be either Deadlock or Prisoners’ Dilemma. However, in the cases 
studied it can be argued that the parties’ seems to have mostly preferred hard-line stance over 
accommodation. In the cases of Bosnia and Northern Ireland, in the initial phases of the conflicts 
hard-line stances were preferred over accommodation, although relatively less hard-line stances 
were taken in the latter stages. On the other hand, in the case of Cyprus an empirical analysis by 
Lumsden (1973) found that the Cyprus conflict in the early 1970s was a PD game, but more 
195 
 
recently Yesilada and Sozen (2002) have empirically showed that it is a Deadlock game and both 
sides seem to prefer continuing the conflict over mutual accommodation. In short, it could be 
argued that conflicts in deeply divided societies are often Deadlock games rather than PDs. This 
strategic interaction can be shown in a game matrix as follows: 
Table 4 - Payoff Matrix for Deadlock Game of Power-sharing Negotiations 
 Accommodate Hard-line 
Accommodate S1, S2 R1, D2 
Hard-line D1,R2 C1,C2 
Note: The subscripts 1 and 2 are to identify payoffs for each individual player. Both players have the same preference ordering: 
D>C>S>R  
For kin-states, the most favoured outcome is that their kin community taking hard-line 
stance while the other group is accommodating. The second best outcome for them is mutual 
accommodation, because on contrary to local actors and their constituents kin-states would not 
be totally enmeshed in the conflict and, particularly after an initial escalation of the conflict, are 
very likely to seek an accommodation in order to prevent the conflict threatening their wider 
interests. However, they would prefer continuing the conflict rather than seeing their kin 
dominated by a hard-line opponent, since a domination of their kin by a hard-line opponent is, 
after all, not an acceptable outcome especially for their domestic public opinion. As such, from kin-
state’s perspective, the negotiating local elites’ preference ordering should be: D>S>C>R. 
Therefore, the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
The significance of kin-state’s preference ordering is that the local elites are often very 
likely to pay attention to the concerns of their kin-state’s leadership as they seek their help in 
waging the conflict. For that reason, the actual payoffs would be determined by a combination of 
the payoffs held by the local and kin-state actors. In simple terms, if the local actors have no 
dependency relationship with their kin-state, or if there is no kin-state involved, the payoffs would 
totally reflect the local perception of the game. However, if there is kin-state involvement, the 
degree of such involvement will weigh in the calculations of local elites and be reflected in their 
perception of the game. If we assume that x is the variable which captures the level of kin-state 
involvement and it varies from 0 to 1, while x increases the local elite’s perception of the game 
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would become more reflective of the kin-state’s perception. In simple algebraic terms, an 
equation299 can be written to calculate the actual payoffs of the local elites: 
P= xPK+(1-x)PL 
In this equation P stands for the actual payoffs of the local elite in the composite game, 
while PK is for the payoff at the kin-state level and PL is for the payoff at the local level. If both kin-
states are enforcer type, it could be assumed that the x is 1 and the game would become a PD 
game. However, as the individual relationship between each group and their kin-state would likely 
to be different, the equation is likely to generate different payoffs for each group and lead to 
various possible games. If it turns out to be a PD game, the power-sharing settlement is a Pareto 
superior outcome to the dominant strategy (hard-line stance), and when the game is iterated, 
there is an increasing likelihood that they will reach a mutual accommodation (i.e. power-
sharing).300 Whereas if it is a Deadlock game (as a result of the preference set held by the local 
actors and their constituents), the strategy that is mutually most beneficial is taking hard-line 
stance, which is also a unique Nash Equilibrium, and thus there is no incentive for the parties to 
agree on a power-sharing settlement. 
As for third-party peacemaker’s involvement in the game discussed above, third-party 
peacemaker could use the influence of kin-states over their local kin groups in order to bring about 
a settlement. In terms of the nested game formulated above, this would mean that third party 
peacemaker will aim to bring about the kin-state’s influence by reinforcing the kin-state’s 
involvement in the peacemaking process. However, only a third party peacemaker who could 
manipulate the negotiation context would play a significant role in incentivising the kin-state to 
exercise its influence over its kin community. In other words, where there is a manipulative third 
party peacemaker the variable x, which measures kin-state’s involvement, is likely to have a higher 
value as third-party peacemaker will seek to help maximise kin-state’s involvement in order to 
bring about a settlement. As discussed earlier in this chapter, third party peacemakers often seek 
to involve kin-states in a peacemaking process to have access to their leverage over their kin 
community; this is particularly the case when kin-states are brought into the negotiations by third 
party. The game tree figure below is for illustrating the game for one of the local elites who have a 
kin-state involved in the process. 
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the future”, which suggests that, even if the participants are unaware of it, the fact that the agents will 
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Figure 2 - Game Tree for Peacemaking Intervention with Kin-state Involvement  
       
This game tree is for showing the main dynamics of the process, so there are no payoffs 
posited for the actors. In this one-shot game, which is also under perfect information condition, 
the local elite have the final say over the outcome of the third party intervention. The local elite 
would have its domestic considerations, but there are two major external factors as well: the third 
party intervener’s and their kin-state’s strategies. The game begins when the third party 
intervener choose between a manipulative and a non-manipulative strategy; in other words, 
between power mediation and facilitative mediation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, a non-
manipulative strategy in the context of a deeply divided society is unlikely to have much influence 
over the local elites, while a manipulative strategy could incentivise both local actors and kin-
states to work towards a settlement. In the next stage of the game the kin-state can support the 
third party intervener and thus improve the intervention’s chances of success, or it can undermine 
the effort and make it less likely to succeed. And in the final stage of the game, the local elite can 
either cooperate with or resist to the third party intervention. All other things being equal, the 
game indicates that the local elite would be more likely to cooperate towards a settlement when 
the intervener is manipulative and supported by the kin-state. 
198 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
This chapter first combined the findings of the case studies and developed them into theoretical 
conclusions through a five-level framework. Its discussion particularly underlined kin-states’ role in 
peacemaking for power-sharing. A typology of kin-state involvement, which is the first of its kind 
in conceptualising kin-states’ role in peacemaking interventions, has been suggested. Third party 
peacemaker’s role in peacemaking for power-sharing was also extensively analysed, and their 
cooperative engagement with kin-states was pointed out as one of the most crucial components 
of a successful peacemaking intervention. The latter part of this chapter sought to offer a game 
theoretical analysis of negotiating power-sharing in deeply divided societies. The nested games 
approach adopted helped illustrate specific consequences of the interaction between kin-states 
and their kin communities for negotiating power-sharing. Finally, a model game showing how third 
party peacemaker, kin-states and local actors would interact within the context of peacemaking 
intervention for power-sharing was proposed. The theoretical conclusions drawn and models 
suggested in this chapter are broadly applicable for analysis of peacemaking in conflicts with kin-
state involvement. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
 
According to BBC editor John Simpson, “In 1972, it would have seemed like the most absurd 
fantasy that the Queen would ever shake hands with a leading figure from the Provisional IRA.” 
But it did happen on 27 June 2012: the Queen and Martin McGuinness, a former IRA commander 
and the Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, shook hands in a carefully choreographed 
charity event in Belfast.301 If anything, the event was a symbolic turning point in the history of the 
Troubles. The Northern Ireland conflict is not resolved; however, immense progress has been 
made since the GFA in 1998. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, there seems to be a relative stability and 
peace, compared to the horrors of the Bosnian war, though the country’s future looks shaky as its 
society and politics remain deeply divided. In Cyprus, there is no direct violence, and no peace or 
justice either. The future of the island currently looks divided, and its people mostly seem content 
with frozen conflict and (il)liberal peace on the island.302 
Although their future directions might appear rather different, these three deeply divided 
societies, in the recent past, have been recipients of similar peacemaking interventions for power-
sharing settlements involving both third party peacemakers and kin-states. The present thesis has 
analysed this understudied form of third party intervention with kin-state involvement by drawing 
on the cases of Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The findings and conclusions of the study are 
manifold; covering both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. The case study of 
Cyprus demonstrates the role of the Turkish government in moving the peacemaking process 
forward, an aspect of the peacemaking intervention underemphasised in the literature. It also 
illustrates the negligence of the two kin-states as there was no cooperation between them 
towards a successful culmination of the UN peacemaking intervention. The fact that both Cypriot 
communities were, for the most part, not genuinely interested in a settlement indicates that 
peacemaking interventions with limited and inconsistent kin-state involvement are susceptible to 
the manipulation of the local actors. The case study also confirms the argument in the mediation 
literature that what brings parties to the negotiations table matters. And if local parties are not 
genuinely after a settlement, like in Cyprus, peace will remain elusive regardless of the extensive 
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efforts of third party peacemaker. The case of Bosnia shows how the form of kin-state 
involvement could substantially change and even take the form of a take-over of local leadership 
with implicit support of third party peacemaker. The deep involvement of the kin-states in their 
kin communities’ politics in Bosnia has been noted in the literature before, but has not been 
analysed in terms of its implications for the third party peacemaking theory. My analysis of Bosnia 
points out that the form of engagement and the nature of relationships between kin communities 
and their kin-states could change depending on the policies of the international community. The 
section on Northern Ireland particularly underscores the effectiveness of kin-state(s) led 
peacemaking and how it could be even further strengthened through the involvement of third 
mediators. The role of Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation in management of the conflict 
has been widely noted, however, the mediation role of the two governments and their 
relationship with the official mediators has not been analysed. The case study of Northern Ireland 
suggests that the British and Irish governments were engaged in quasi-mediation with the local 
parties during the negotiations leading to the GFA in 1998, and the official mediators’ role was 
secondary, rather than primary, in the mediation of the all-party negotiations. 
Chapter 7 brings together the findings of the three case studies through a five-level 
analytical framework, which encapsulates all the levels of interactions in a peacemaking 
intervention for power-sharing with kin-state involvement: the local actors level; the local actors-
third party peacemaker level; the local actors-kin-state(s) level; the third party peacemaker-kin-
state(s) level; and the kin-states level. The framework is broadly applicable to the analysis of 
similar peacemaking interventions for power-sharing. At the local actors level, the thesis argues 
that three conditions are essential for power-sharing. These are intra-group political stability in 
each ethnic group; the existence of a power balance or a tendency towards parity between the 
groups; and the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate. At the local actors-third party 
peacemaker level, the discussion concludes that power mediation is likely to be the most effective 
form of intervention. Assessments of the local-actors-kin-state(s) level culminate in the suggestion 
of a typology of kin-state involvement in peacemaking. This typology which classifies kin-state 
involvement into four roles as promoter, quasi-mediator, power-broker and enforcer is an original 
contribution to the field. As noted in Chapter 7, these roles can be mixed in practice; but they are 
still useful in identifying the potential effect of kin-state involvement in certain stages of a 
peacemaking intervention. For example, in cases where kin-states appear as power-brokers or 
enforcers the third party peacemaker cannot succeed in their intervention unless they take into 
account this factor. Moreover, third parties can seek to manipulate the local-actor-kin-state 
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relationship by providing incentives or disincentives for kin-states to use their involvement for the 
benefit of the peacemaking intervention. Kin-state mediation may appear conceptually 
problematic owing to the fact that kin-states can also be direct or indirect parties to the conflicts 
concerning their kin. However, the findings of the case studies have strongly indicated that kin-
states can provide a form of mediation, which I refer to as quasi-mediation. Kin-states as quasi-
mediators can assume some mediation roles (e.g. formulation of specific proposals) similar to a 
third party peacemaker and utilise their close relationship with their kin in such efforts. Quasi-
mediation is one of the roles which can be assumed by kin-states, and it has been part of early kin-
state interventions across all the cases. Its use by kin-states is likely to be a widespread 
occurrence, which can be investigated by looking at more cases. Promotion is another role likely to 
be widely assumed by kin-states in their involvement in peacemaking. Kin groups often ask for 
support of their kin-states, and the least a kin-state can do is promoting its kin’s interests at an 
international level. The specifics of these promotion activities have been outside the remit of this 
thesis as it is a wider phenomenon whose context extends beyond peacemaking. However, the 
concept needs be further investigated in order to better understand the kin-state-kin-community 
relationships in general. The analysis at the third party peacemaker-kin-state(s) level points to a 
hybrid form of peacemaking which combines third party mediation with kin-state involvement. 
The hybridity of peacemaking as such could lead to the hybridisation of the liberal peace 
blueprints as well, but that has not been identified in the processes studied, most probably due to 
the excessive forcefulness of the third party interveners, which seems to have minimised kin-
states’ potential for the hybridisation of the liberal peace. This does not necessarily entail that 
such hybridisation cannot happen in other contexts. Finally, the kin-states level is highlighted for 
its potential for contributing to a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing. At this level, the 
main finding is that kin-states level cooperation can be a core dynamic of peacemaking, as it was 
the case in Northern Ireland, and where it does not exist, third party mediators should work 
towards the creation of a kin-states level cooperation. 
The findings of the research project also indicate that power-sharing settlements in deeply 
divided societies are mostly consociational. This was a rather expected outcome, given the depth 
of the social divisions in the societies under scrutiny. As for post-settlement intervention, the 
thesis proposes that the continuation of third party interventions during the implementation 
stages in Bosnia and Northern Ireland raises conceptual issues regarding the nature of sovereignty 
in these societies. The power-sharing regimes in these two contexts then could be seen as 
operating under hybrid sovereignty, which is shaped through an interaction between local and 
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external actors. The findings of the thesis regarding kin-state involvement are ultimately 
formulated in game theoretical terms to illustrate how the local-actors-kin-state(s) interaction 
could be broadly modelled within the context of peacemaking for power-sharing. In Chapter 7, I 
have argued that the perception of the game will vary between kin groups and their kin states. In 
deeply divided societies kin groups would have preferences that correspond to a Deadlock game, 
whereas their kin-states tend to see a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. The two games have different 
possible outcomes and the latter is more prone to a negotiated settlement such as power-sharing. 
A nested games approach has been applied to analyse how these two perceptions of games will 
play out in the context of a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing. An algebraic equation is 
suggested to combine the payoffs of the games so that a composite game can be devised. The 
typology of kin-state involvement could be used to determine how the payoffs will turn out for the 
composite game. For instance, if the kin-state is an enforcer type, the game will become a PD 
game, and if it is a promoter kin-state, the game is more likely to resemble a deadlock. The nested 
games’ analysis is illustrative and its applications to the cases have not been provided. Also, a 
model game is outlined for illustrating the kin-group-kin-state-third-party-peacemaker interaction. 
The model game captures the main dynamics of such interaction, but it ought to be further 
elaborated. A further development of the model should include all the actors, including both of 
the local disputants, kin-state(s) and third party peacemakers. This could be further supported 
with an empirical investigation establishing individual preference sets of all these actors. The 
actors’ precise preference orderings need to be known and this could either be achieved through 
interviews with the actors or through a systematic analysis of the parties’ views and actions in the 
process studied. Once the preference sets are compiled, these can be translated into numerical 
values and the game could be analysed to see whether it yields any specific implications. 
However, game theoretical analysis is not the only possible avenue for further research, 
and it is not likely to be conducive to further elaboration of the five-level framework and its 
conclusions. Therefore, field research, in particular interviews with local, kin-state and other third 
party actors, can be undertaken to further develop and confirm the robustness of the framework 
and its conclusions. Particularly the typology of kin-state involvement in peacemaking can be 
improved and further substantiated with fieldwork. The empirical basis of this research can be 
broadened with the inclusion of more case study analyses. Some prominent candidates for such 
further research are Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, which all have kin-state 
relationships with Russia. Although these are not entirely ethnic based relationships, they seem to 
constitute some form of local-group-kin-state relationship. The case of Nagorno Karabakh and its 
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kin-state Armenia is another one which could be studied in terms of third party peacemaking with 
kin-state involvement. These cases, however, are considerably different than the ones studied in 
this thesis as they involve only one kin-state and they are secessionist entities rather than deeply 
divided societies. On the other hand, the fact that the three of them are all related to the same 
kin-state, Russia, could help explain variation in the policy of the kin-state across different cases.  
The breadth and the complexities of interactions between local actors and kin-states are 
vast. But this interaction has been often assumed to be linear or uniform. It is not uncommon 
practice in the news media, for instance, to argue or assume that the Cyprus conflict essentially 
consists of two opposing parties: the Turkish side, incorporating both the Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey, and the Greek side, which includes both the Greek Cypriots and Greece. And it is not rare 
in the academic literature to look at the Cyprus conflict as a dispute between the island’s two 
native communities. In fact, interactions between local groups and their kin-states often tend to 
be very complex and they are certainly not one-dimensional. This thesis has inquired into a small 
segment of such interaction, in the context of peacemaking processes in Cyprus, Bosnia and 
Northern Ireland. Therefore, it should be stated that the complex and fluid set of interactions 
between local actors and kin-states need to be further studied. Some questions for further 
research can be formulated as: 
 How do the interaction of local actors and kin-states impact upon the post-settlement 
phase?  
 Is this interaction legitimate in the eyes of local public? How do kin-states justify their 
actions to their own and kin community’s public? 
 Does the interaction’s nature change over time? Could kin-states and kin communities 
distance themselves from each other in the longer term? 
A few preliminary assessments in relation to the first question are provided in this thesis, 
while the latter two have not been addressed at all. The thesis, overall, has been an exercise in 
theory building to analyse how local groups, their kin-states and third party peacemakers interact 
within the context of a peacemaking intervention for power-sharing. It concludes that kin-state 
involvement in peacemaking for power-sharing is a complex, fluid and context-dependent process. 
This complexity and variation, however, can be better understood through the proposed five-level 
theoretical framework, and the role of kin-states in peacemaking can be illuminated by the use of 
the typology outlined in this thesis.  
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APPENDIX A - The Lists of Favourable Conditions for 
Consociational Democracy in Arend Lijphart’s Work303 
Lijphart 1968 (6) Lijphart 1969 (8) Lijphart 1977 (9) Lijphart 1985 (8) Lijphart 1996 (9) 
1 Distinct lines of 
cleavages between 
subcultures. 
IBID Segmental isolation 
and federalism 
Geographical 
concentration of 
segments 
Geographical concentration of 
segments and federalism 
2 A multiple balance 
of power among the 
subcultures 
IBID IBID No majority segment 
plus segments of 
equal size 
No majority  segment plus 
segments of equal size 
3 External threats IBID Small country size External threats External Threats 
4 A relatively low load 
on the system 
IBID Small country size Small population size Small population size 
5 Moderate 
nationalism 
-- Overarching loyalties IBID Overarching loyalties 
6 Popular attitudes 
favourable to 
government by grand 
coalition 
Widespread approval of 
the principle of 
government by elite 
cartel 
-- -- - 
7 -- The length of time a 
consociational 
democracy has been in 
operation 
-- -- - 
8 -- Internal political 
cohesion   of the 
subcultures 
-- -- - 
9 -- Adequate articulation of 
the subcultural interests 
-- -- - 
10 -- -- Moderate Multiparty 
system 
Small number of 
segments 
IBID 
11 -- -- Representative party 
system 
--  
12 -- -- Crosscutting 
cleavages (in some 
instances) 
--  
13 -- -- Tradition of elite 
accommodation 
IBID IBID 
14 -- -- -- Socioeconomic 
equality 
IBID 
15-    The inexistence of a solid 
majority that prefers majority 
rule to consociationalism 
  
                                                          
303
 This table is an updated version of Bogaards’ (1998, 478) compilation of the lists of favourable conditions 
in Lijphart’s work with the addition of Lijphart (1996). 
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